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ABSTRACT 
 
Prior to Indian independence, the Indian National Congress made savvy use of the United 
Nations as a global stage upon which to establish a sense of inevitability around postcolonial 
Congress leadership despite the uncertainty of post-independence power sharing in New Delhi. 
The aspirational postcolonial state staked its claim to moral leadership through anticolonial 
propaganda, the prominent UN delegate Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit’s self-representation of modern 
Indian womanhood, and highly gendered emotional discourses over the issue of racial 
oppression. Once faced with the realpolitik of a fragmented and bloody independence, however, 
nationalist idealism had to be balanced against the pragmatics of state building. The Indian state, 
focused on the consolidation of power at home and maintaining legitimacy in the international 
arena, at times placed domestic concerns above the ideals of the United Nations, becoming 
complicit in the reinforcement of the nation-state system. The extent of the postcolonial state’s 
affiliation with inherited imperialist aggression was minimized through evasive diplomatic 
maneuvers and the suppression of information. And as Cold War ideologies clashed at the UN 
after the Korean War broke out, Pandit and India became caught up in the masculine competition 
between nation-states. This evolving relationship between the postcolonial Indian state and the 
emergent United Nations produced the foundations of UN postcolonialism – a gendered cultural 
construct that emerged in the early years of the UN through both the emotional high of the 
postcolonial moment and the contradictions of decolonization at the start of the Cold War. This 
cultural approach argues for a shift away from the more mechanistic organizational histories of 
the United Nations that fail to consider fully how and where power is produced.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Indian Congress nationalism and postcolonial internationalism have cast a long shadow 
over scholarship on India at the birth of the United Nations. The historiography that accounts for 
them has produced a narrative of Indian exceptionalism that emerges from the ethically elevated 
path of the Gandhian independence movement and arrives, apparently fully formed, at the UN. 
The timeline for this story typically begins with Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit fighting for an end to 
colonialism and racial oppression from the periphery of the UN Charter conference in 1945, and 
moves in linear fashion toward the Nehruvian foreign policy objectives that allowed India to 
exercise moral leadership on the global stage via the UN. This project argues that such a neat arc 
and the cogent and palatable story of India’s historical relationship with the United Nations it 
tells is not the whole story. It virtually ignores the reality of decolonization, minimizing India’s 
self-interest and military power as well as other fractious geopolitical issues that interrupt the 
clean lines of India’s transition from a colonial possession to an aspiring postcolonial world 
power. What’s more, the central role of gender and emotion in the production of the postcolonial 
nation-state through the UN is invisible in this dominant account.  
As my research shows, prior to independence, the Indian National Congress made savvy 
use of the United Nations as a global stage upon which to establish a sense of inevitability 
around postcolonial Congress leadership despite the uncertainty of post-independence power 
sharing in New Delhi. The aspirational postcolonial state staked its claim to moral leadership 
through anticolonial propaganda, Pandit’s self-representation of elite, modern Indian 
womanhood, and highly gendered emotional discourses over the issue of racial oppression. Once 
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faced with the realpolitik of a fragmented and bloody independence, however, nationalist 
idealism had to be balanced against the pragmatics of state building. The Indian state, focused on 
the consolidation of power at home and maintaining legitimacy in the international arena, at 
times placed domestic concerns above the ideals of the United Nations, becoming complicit in 
the reinforcement of the nation-state system. The extent of the postcolonial state’s affiliation 
with inherited imperialist aggression was minimized through evasive diplomatic maneuvers and 
the suppression of information. And as Cold War ideologies clashed at the UN after the Korean 
War broke out, Pandit and India became caught up in the masculine competition between nation-
states. This evolving relationship between the postcolonial Indian state and the emergent United 
Nations produced the foundations of what I call UN postcolonialism – a gendered cultural 
construct that turns on both the emotional high of the postcolonial moment and the contradictions 
of decolonization at the start of the Cold War.  
The United Nations Charter, signed at the UN Conference on International Organization 
in 1945, was an optimistic and future-oriented document. The Preamble was particularly 
idealistic, committing the new organization to work to preserve international peace and affirming 
the dignity of all through a commitment to human rights and the promotion of social and 
economic progress. Born out of the hope for postwar peace as envisioned by geopolitically 
dominant states, the ideals contained in the Charter nevertheless formed a space through which 
the millions of colonized and oppressed around the world could place their hopes for relief from 
imperial power and racial subjugation in the postwar world. Anticolonial and antiracist 
organizations had grown in number and power throughout the interwar period and many asked 
for seats at the table at the UNCIO to work to bridge the gap between word and deed and perhaps 
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reconcile some startling contradictions: What did a commitment to human rights in the Preamble 
mean when Jan Christiaan Smuts, Prime Minister of a state dependent upon the brutal logic of 
white supremacy, wrote it? Did the two references to self-determination in the Charter mean that 
the four original member states that were dependencies – Belarus, Ukraine, the Philippines, and 
India – could legally proclaim their independence?  
The United States responded to requests for participation by granting organizations such 
as the NAACP access to the meeting halls to “advise” on issues of racial equality, but as private 
citizens these representatives had no real power in the negotiations.1 The British, on the other 
hand, refused to allow representatives of the anticolonial All-India National Congress through 
the door. Indian representatives hand-picked by the British were already participating at the 
conference, and the British worked hard to minimize official dialogue about India’s fate. 
Operating on the sidelines of the “global media frenzy”2 surrounding the San Francisco 
conference, Pandit, who had only recently been released from her last prison stay for her 
commitment to the Quit India Movement, used her exclusion from the official meeting rooms to 
turn the spotlight onto her protests demanding an end to colonial rule. Reporters “sent out story 
after story about the small, beautiful Indian woman who was defying the British Empire, 
championing the cause of the oppressed, and calling upon the nations to begin at once to live up 
                                                
1 See Chapter 1: “Beyond Civil Rights: The NAACP, the United Nations, and Redefining the Struggle for Black 
Equality,” in Carol Anderson, Eyes Off the Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human 
Rights, 1944-1955 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 8-57. 
2 Roger Normand and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the United Nations: The Political History of Universal Justice 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 123. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
4 
to the noble phrases that were being written into the Charter.”3 Pandit’s was just one voice 
among many calling for the UN to implement real change in the postwar world. 
Just over a year later Pandit headed the reconstituted Indian delegation to the first UN 
General Assembly in 1946 where she successfully spearheaded passage of a resolution 
condemning South Africa for racist policies against South Asians there. Sympathetic observers 
interpreted an independent postcolonial state demonstrating moral leadership at the birth of the 
UN as proof of the possibilities for the postwar world community to finally address issues of 
racism, imperialism, and other inequities.4 By the time Pandit was elected to preside over the 
General Assembly in 1953, India had also become a leader of the nonaligned movement both 
inside the UN through the increasingly effective Afro-Asian bloc and from New Delhi where 
India sought to mediate Cold War conflicts from an idealistic (yet pragmatic) middle ground.5 
Throughout this period and into the 1950s – India’s so-called “golden age” of diplomacy – when 
India’s UN delegations were fairly effective in promoting India’s interests at the UN through 
both official “parliamentary” and unofficial “corridor” diplomacy despite limited initial 
experience – they continued to appeal to a position of moral authority.6 
The first two chapters of this project focus on the Charter conference and the first 
General Assembly when the Indian National Congress via Pandit embraced the United Nations 
                                                
3 Anne Guthrie, Madame Ambassador: The Life of Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 
Inc., 1962), 125. 
4 Penny M. Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1997), 3-4. 
5 Though he did not initially use the term “non-alignment,” Nehru first made public his commitment “to keep away 
from the power politics of groups” in what is considered his first foreign policy speech delivered immediately after 
he became the head of the interim government in September 1946 (“Future Taking Shape,” Broadcast from New 
Delhi, September 7, 1946, in Nehru, India’s Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches, September 1946—April 1961 
[Delhi: Government of India, 1961], 2). 
6 C. S. R. Murthy, India’s Diplomacy in the United Nations: Problems and Perspectives (New Delhi: Landers 
Books, 1993) 3, 29.  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
5 
as a space through which to build an aspirational postcolonial nationalism. My work takes 
seriously Cynthia Enloe’s insistence on making visible women in international politics. As long 
as scholars ignore women, she argues, we fail to recognize the many forms of power at work, 
even in arenas traditionally deemed far removed from women’s spheres—such as the military.7 
Though celebrated in her time, for decades Pandit was marginalized in the historiography. The 
long-prevailing attitude by (mostly male) academics was revealed in private correspondence with 
a prominent India/UN scholar who informed me that research on Pandit would likely find she did 
not “do” much during her tenure at the United Nations. E.S. Reddy, perhaps the most prolific 
documentarian of Indian foreign policy in the Nehru era, describes the controversial long-time 
UN delegate Krishna Menon, as “the Indian National Congress’ window to the outside world” 
throughout this period.8 Rena Fonseca, in a 1994 article, identified V.K. Krishna Menon as 
India’s head of delegation at the time of decolonization with Pandit arriving as a “new 
representative” in 1952 when in fact the opposite is true: Krishna Menon did not become a UN 
delegate until after 1950.9 More recently Manu Bhagavan has granted Pandit a central role in this 
history as “the most powerful advocate” of a vision laid out of Nehru and Gandhi to “forge a 
common destiny for all human kind” through the international organization.10 While Pandit’s 
inclusion in the historiography is warranted, Bhagavan’s work exemplifies the exceptionalist 
                                                
7 Cynthia Enloe, Making Feminist Sense of International Politics: Bananas, Beaches and Bases (Pandora, 1989), 
197. 
8 E.S. Reddy and A.K. Damodaran, eds., Krishna Menon at the United Nations: India and the World (New Delhi: 
Krishna Menon National Memorial Committee, 1990), viii.  
9 Rena Fonseca, “Nehru and the Diplomacy of Nonalignment,” in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim, 
eds., The Diplomats: 1939-1979 (Princeton University Press, 1994), 385.  
10 Bhagavan, India and the Quest for One World: The Peacemakers (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 2, 1. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
6 
narrative and Pandit’s successes are used to highlight the superior ideals forwarded by Gandhi 
and Nehru without regarding to questions of gender or power.  
Chapter One, “Rehearsal of UN Postcolonialism: Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit at the UN 
Conference on International Organization (UNCIO),” demonstrates the ways in which Pandit’s 
gendered performance on the periphery of the meetings in San Francisco established her 
diplomatic celebrity and lay the foundations of India’s aspirations for postwar global moral 
leadership. My research shows that Pandit did not arrive fully formed at San Francisco, but was 
complicit in the creation of her own persona quite apart from her male mentors in India. 
Politically experienced within a national context but a novice on the international stage, Pandit 
took advantage of the opportunities presented to her to gain increased media attention for her 
cause. Her calls to end colonial rule and discrimination were not new additions to the discourse 
of international diplomacy, but her self-conscious performance of a modern, ideal Indian 
womanhood with intimate ties to both her brother and Gandhi was new, and it captured the 
imagination of contemporary observers near and far. Letters from Nehru to Pandit support the 
argument that her personal growth and political sagacity in this context were not prefigured. 
British imperial discourse had singled out the low status of Indian women as a critical reason for 
continued colonial rule. Pandit’s elite, cultured, and charismatic self-representation provided the 
perfect future tense for the almost-postcolonial India. Her physical presence and embodied 
difference attracted an orientalist gaze directed toward her by western observers fascinated with 
this “diminutive, silvery-haired woman,” dressed always in a sari, who could speak with such 
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force as she “Twist[ed] the Tail of the British Lion.”11 Preoccupation with her exoticism and her 
ability to present the Indian case through a persona that was read by contemporary observers as 
more British subject than Indian colonial combined to produce an especially effective avatar for 
the Congress nationalist cause. 
Pandit’s ability to garner support from both well-heeled America supporters and the India 
lobby in the U.S. meant she was well positioned to represent the Indian cause at the UNCIO that 
spring. This chapter shows how Pandit’s propaganda in San Francisco bolstered the notion that 
Congress was the only legitimate inheritor of the postcolonial Indian state. Pandit claimed the 
Congress represented all of India and presented herself as that organization’s chosen 
representative. Her main backers in the United States and at San Francisco were Congress 
supporters. Elite Americans such as Pearl S. Buck who helped Pandit at the start of her U.S. tour 
had long been supporters of Gandhi and Nehru, and the most powerful India lobbying 
organizations in the United States were also affiliated with Congress nationalism. Despite some 
challenges to this predominant position, the voices of other Indian nationalist interests were 
effectively drowned out: figuratively by the overwhelming press coverage of Pandit that 
reiterated her legitimacy, and literally when, for example, a heckler at a press conference (an 
Indian Muslim attached to the official UNCIO delegation) was forced out of the room by other 
attendees. In these ways, Pandit’s iteration of Indian aspirational postcoloniality abroad pushed 
aside the very real contests for power at home and reinforced the legitimacy of the Gandhi-Nehru 
dyad prominently on the global stage.  
                                                
11 William Moore, “Indian Woman Twists the Tail of British Lion,” April 27, 1945, Chicago Daily Tribune, 6. 
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The second chapter, “Race, Gender, and Emotion at the Birth of the United Nations 
General Assembly,” follows Pandit from the periphery in San Francisco into the 1946 Assembly 
where she led India’s official UN delegation. The only female head of delegation in New York 
that fall, Pandit was directed by the newly formed interim government (headed by Nehru) to 
press for the passage of a resolution condemning South Africa for the so-called “Ghetto Law” 
that discriminated against South Asians in that country. Debate over the issue revolved around an 
inherent contradiction in the UN system: the Charter called for the protection of equality and 
human rights but also stated that nothing in the Charter should undermine member states’ 
domestic jurisdiction.12 Opponents of the resolution sought to maintain the debate within legal 
parameters and to protect the legal integrity of the sovereign nation-state from political 
intervention, but India’s allies refused to accept such a dispassionate categorization. The result 
was a General Assembly that grasped the power of the majority – against the wishes of some of 
the creators of the organization – to address human rights issues as political and ethical questions 
without reference to the International Court of Justice.  
My evidence shows that the fight to pass India’s resolution against South Africa took 
place through competing and highly gendered emotional discourses that both shaped the contest 
for power and helped alter the political outcome at the birth of the General Assembly. The UN 
was a space created largely by white, western male diplomats and their mimics who valued logic 
and control as evidence of mature, masculine, civilized behavior. This emotional community was 
                                                
12 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 3-4. 
Chapter I, Article 2(7) of the UN Charter reads: “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.” The potential problems that would arise 
from this contradiction were identified immediately by legal scholars, see Hans Kelsen, “Limitations on the 
Functions of the United Nations,” The Yale Law Journal 55:5 (1946): 997-1015.  
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disrupted when a competing mode of diplomatic representation emerged over debates on racial 
oppression and colonialism.13 At the center of this drama was Pandit, who was accused of 
bringing manipulative feminine emotion to bear on what should have been a strictly legal 
discussion, particularly once she shed tears during her speech before the final vote. My evidence 
demonstrates the depth of emotion expressed on all sides of this debate, building throughout the 
session as the various actors adjusted their “emotional displays” in reaction to the changing 
emotional environment.14 Pandit’s male opponents expressed intense anger, frustration, and 
indignation, and resorted to personal insult on more than one occasion. These confrontations 
unfolded in smoky, packed meeting rooms and in front of the eyes of the world as the debates 
circulated through heavy press coverage in South Africa, South Asia, and the United States. The 
1946 Assembly already was imbued with heightened emotion as member states and the world at 
large looked to the UN to heal postwar wounds and prevent future conflict. The colonized and 
oppressed in particular invested hope that this test case would help ensure ideals of the Charter 
would be used bring an end to imperial rule and white racial domination. Pandit’s fight against 
racism in South Africa became a proxy through which communities invested in the ideals of the 
UN framed their own struggles.  
The drama playing out on the global stage between the old imperial guard (embodied 
expertly by Smuts) and the postcolonial aspirant appealed to observers in the contemporary 
moment for important political reasons. The transnational implications of India’s challenge to the 
UN Charter and the win over South Africa assured a central role for these moments in a variety 
                                                
13 Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Review Essay: Worrying About Emotions in History,” American Historical Review 
107:3 (2002): 827. 
14 Ibid., 842. 
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of histories.15 As the first “win” against South Africa in the decades long international fight 
against apartheid, the 1946 General Assembly remains significant because it “charted the course 
of future relations between South Africa and the rest of the world.”16 Though the UN did not 
have the power of enforcement at that time, the condemnation nevertheless indicates that South 
African racial law was on the international radar even before the official implementation of 
apartheid.17 This story figures also within U.S. civil rights histories because of its import to the 
movement and its leaders in the ongoing fight for racial equality. Observers in the Black press in 
the United States focused on the confrontations between Pandit and South Africa’s Smuts as 
symbolic of the struggle for power between the pre-war imperialist worldview and the 
possibilities for postwar change. Carol Anderson, Penny Von Eschen, and others have revealed 
how racial ideologies underpinned the creation of the United Nations and India’s role in 
challenging that foundation. And the success of the Indian resolution has been identified as a key 
moment in a postwar “politics in the making” when India and anticolonial allies gathered enough 
votes to override the intentions of the UN’s framers, establishing the General Assembly as a 
location where democratic principles could be wielded by smaller and less powerful states and 
altered the terms of the postwar world order.18   
                                                
15 See for example, Steven D. Gish, Alfred B. Xuma: African, American, South African (New York: New York 
University Press, 2000), 143-150; Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White 
Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 343-346; and Nico Slate, Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States 
and India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 180-182. 
16 Thomas Borstlemann, Apartheid’s Reluctant Uncle: The United States and Southern Africa in the Early Cold War 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 77. 
17 Peter Henshaw, “South African Territorial Expansion and the International Reaction to South African Racial 
Policies, 1939-1948,” South African Historical Journal 50 (2004): 70-73. 
18 Carol Anderson, “International Conscience, the Cold War, and Apartheid,” 307-308. See also Von Eschen, Race 
Against Empire, and Brenda Gayle Plummer, ed., Window on Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 
1945-1988 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). 
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The evolving UN postcolonial culture at the General Assembly celebrated India’s 
independent stance against racism within a British Commonwealth nation without real concern 
for power struggles occurring at home. But at that point in the timeline of independence, the 
structure of post-independence governance was far from settled. Congress was maneuvering to 
push the Muslim League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah out of the center, and political partition was 
by no means inevitable.19 The choices to send Pandit and to bring the Ghetto Law as the Indian 
delegation’s primary cause were not simply a “brilliant” win for the Nehruvian and Gandhian 
vision for a postwar world based on human rights.20 Gandhi was reported to have personally 
asked Pandit to take on the issue in his name. And in Nehru’s first radio broadcast to the nation 
after the formation of the interim government, the South Africa issue was presented as one of the 
ways in which the aspirational postcolonial nation would reach out to the world.21 These were 
also strategic maneuvers that drew on Pandit’s unplanned success in 1945 and were designed to 
bolster the prestige of a Congress-led postcolonial state. The attention garnered by Pandit’s 
performances on the global stage muted the reality of increasing violence throughout the 
subcontinent and minimized the contests for power in New Delhi. Smuts’s efforts to label India 
as hypocritical for speaking on behalf of citizens of another country when India had its own 
religious and ethnic problems gained no traction in the face of overwhelming support for the 
moral argument in the culture of an evolving UN postcolonialism.  
                                                
19 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 279-280. 
20 See Manu Bhagavan, India and the Quest for One World, chapter 4: The New Hope, xx-65, and 1. 
21 S. Gopal and Uma Iyengar, eds., The Essential Writings of Jawaharlal Nehru, Volume I (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 323-324. 
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 Considering the heightened emotion connected to the UN’s formation, it is not surprising 
that Pandit’s performances at the United Nations in 1945 and 1946 on behalf of the aspirational 
postcolonial nation mark the typical beginning of an exceptionalist narrative. In addition to 
providing the fertile ground upon which interracial solidarities could be build in and around the 
UN, my work shows that Pandit’s diplomatic celebrity helped the Indian National Congress gain 
a footing in the international arena prior to independence. The “India” that was at the center of 
these emotional debates was presented as cohesive, self-confident, and future-oriented. The 
predominant scholarship on Indian foreign policy in this period echoes the Indian nationalist 
discourse based on moralistic claims and the position of nonalignment that was produced 
through Pandit, Nehru, and other diplomatic representatives at the UN. Some scholars are 
positively reverential in their analyses of Nehruvian foreign policy, at times explicitly conflating 
Gandhian pacifism and Congress nationalism with UN involvement. Usha Sud argues that 
India’s view on global issues were deemed “extremely crucial” by other states because of 
Gandhi’s ability to achieve “independence without bloodshed” and Nehru’s commitment to non-
alignment, both of which, according to Sud, originated in ancient Buddhist and Hindu 
philosophies that have always preached pacificism and believed “the world is one family.”22 
Others adhere to what Srinath Raghavan describes as the “ingenious idealism” explanation.23 
Manu Bhagavan, for example, contends that India worked to “reconfigure the global order 
through the UN” based on “the Nehruvian faith in ‘world organization’ to bring about peace and 
                                                
22 Usha Sud, United Nations and India: Saga of Cooperation (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1996), 
72, ix, 38. 
23 Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 1. 
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justice.”24 This interpretation remains powerful because these highly emotional historical 
moments continue to serve contemporary Indian nationalist ideologies that seek to protect the 
foundations of the postcolonial Indian nation from criticism. 
The second half of this research project considers India at the United Nations after 
independence when the idealism of postcolonial imaginings collided with the reality of 
decolonization and the challenges of international diplomacy within emerging Cold War politics. 
The relatively short period of time covered by this research merits close examination because it 
marks the boiling point between the end of World War II and the beginning of broader 
decolonization when the postcolonial Indian state was a potent symbol for the possible outcomes 
in a reconfigured postwar order. After 1947, independent India was no longer a hypothetical: 
nationalist and internationalist ideals had to be balanced with the pragmatic needs of a 
functioning state that faced overwhelming issues including famine, poverty, and widespread 
violence. Indian representatives to the UN could no longer function purely within ideological 
terms. Postcolonial rule brought with it the challenges that many sovereign nations faced in this 
period: questions of border control, military defense, health care and protection for refugees, 
economic development, and so forth. At home, the new state took “over a governmental 
machine…[that] mirrored that of their imperial precursor,” but it also inherited the internal 
problems that had been faced by the British. And a sense of insecurity pervaded the region due to 
the fragmented nature of independence.25 Lines drawn on a map by departing colonial 
bureaucrats resulted in migration, bloodshed, and terror on a massive scale. Abroad, 
                                                
24 Manu Bhagavan, “A New Hope: India, the United Nations and the Making of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights,” Modern Asian Studies 44:2 (2010): 322.  
25 S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State: Power, Politics, and Internal War in South Asia (New Jersey: Zed Books, 
1993), 2, 5-6. 
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nonalignment was central to India’s foreign policy, a position Nehru hoped would “both enhance 
India’s prestige and…protect the country from having to commit its strained resources in binding 
commitments to either bloc.”26 The UN remained the primary location through which India 
enacted its foreign policy, but with state-building as essential as nation-building after 
independence, India’s relationship with the UN was less sanguine. 
Chapter three, “Resisting the Global Stage: Postcolonial Nation-Building, the Invasion of 
Hyderabad, and the UN Security Council, 1948,” is concerned with a moment when the Indian 
government explicitly resisted international scrutiny and became complicit in the production and 
maintenance of the nation-state system. In the case of South Africa, India’s UN delegates drew 
on a position of moral authority to justify international condemnation on behalf of human rights. 
But in the case of Hyderabad, domestic concerns outweighed the moral imperatives of the 
international organization leading India to actively limit the issue’s exposure on the global stage 
to protect the state’s self-interest. The Indian leadership had learned from the experience of 
taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council. Nehru had believed that the UN 
would agree with India’s position and work to resolve the crisis without further loss of territory 
from an already “moth-eaten” state. But international peacekeeping efforts and extensive 
negotiations failed to solve the conflict and India was left with no choice but to continue to 
accept at least some UN intervention.27 My evidence shows how handling the Hyderabad threat 
differently at home and at the UN allowed the Indian state to avoid additional international 
                                                
26 Fonseca, 378. 
27 Nehru’s decision to go the UN continues to be identified as one of his biggest foreign policy mistakes by even his 
staunchest defenders. See, for example, the essays by Jagmohan, Inder Malhotra, and M.V. Kamath in the volume 
Witness to History: Transition and Transformation of India, 1947-1964 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 
2011), which was produced through the Nehru Centre. 
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involvement on the subcontinent at the time and gain control of the historical narrative for 
decades to come. 
This chapter argues that the long suppressed story of Hyderabad at the UN must be 
recovered in order to more fully understand both the complex nature of UN postcolonialism and 
the long shadow cast by Partition on the subcontinent. My research demonstrates the various 
strategies the Indian government and delegates at the Security Council utilized to delegitimize 
Hyderabad’s position and gain control of the historical narrative. At home, the stakes were very 
high for the fledging Indian state, which had already been fragmented by the partition of British 
India. Of greatest concern were Kashmir in the North West and the large southern state of 
Hyderabad, which its Muslim ruler, the Nizam, had declared independent. Congress leaders such 
as Vallabhbhai Patel, an aggressive advocate for the accession of all princely states, pushed for 
decisive military action against Hyderabad to create a cohesive state with defendable borders and 
reduce the threat from Pakistan after the Kashmir region became embroiled in war. Nehru 
supported greater caution, but his approach did not override an increasingly tense standoff 
subsumed into the fear – both in the subcontinent and abroad – that the dispute would lead to 
widespread violence on the scale of Partition. Adding to the emotional weight of the conflict, 
Hyderabad was characterized by India’s leaders as the discursive “heart” of India, without which 
the new state would fall apart. The Muslim minority that dominated the state was depicted as 
deranged and dangerous. After a year of high-level negotiations between Delhi and the Nizam, 
and the escalation of border clashes throughout the region accompanied by increasingly freighted 
discourse in the press and by governmental leaders, the Indian military invaded and occupied 
Hyderabad in September 1948. Representatives of Hyderabad attempted to be heard by the 
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Security Council, but India refused to cooperate, presenting the international community with a 
fait accompli.   
 My research highlights the ways in which India avoided Security Council intervention by 
denying Hyderabad’s legitimacy as a sovereign state and declaring the issue protected by 
domestic jurisdiction – a postcolonial invocation of an argument previously utilized to defend 
South Africa’s racist laws and Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia. Critics at the UN and in the press 
in Pakistan, the United States, and the United Kingdom questioned India’s justification for the 
invasion, accusing India of hypocrisy for using superior military power to force a smaller state to 
accede. But with the direct support of British Commonwealth nations, which did not want India’s 
power further eroded, opposition at the UN failed. Meetings were delayed, information was 
withheld, and India’s reputation was protected. With a virtual press blackout inside Hyderabad, 
the Indian nationalist version of the story was widely accepted within months. As other scholars 
have shown, the Indian government actively suppressed evidence of widespread violence in 
Hyderabad.28 These maneuvers effectively silenced India’s internal imperial aggression in the 
historiography. In seven monographs on India at the United Nations published between 1957 and 
2013, only two make a passing reference to Hyderabad, the others do not mention it, even in 
discussions on the closely related Kashmir case or the broader question of the “pacific settlement 
of disputes.”29 
                                                
28 See Omar Khalidi, ed, Hyderabad: After the Fall (Wichita, KS: Hyderabad Historical Society, 1988), and most 
recently A.G. Noorani, The Destruction of Hyderabad (London: Hurst & Company, 2014). 
29 See India and the United Nations, Report of a Study Group set up by The Indian Council of World Affairs (New 
York: Manhattan Publishing Company, 1957) [none]; Ross N. Berkes and Mohinder S. Bedi, The Diplomacy of 
India: Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958) [none]; T. 
Ramakrishna Reddy, India’s Policy in the United Nations (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, Inc., 1968) 
[none]; Dhiraj R. Chamling, India and the United Nations (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1978) 
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Chapter four, “The Gendered Embodiment of Nonalignment: Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit and 
Indian Peacekeeping” looks at two simultaneous performances of India’s postcolonial national 
character through Pandit at the UN General Assembly and Indian soldiers in the Korean 
demilitarized zone in the fall of 1953. Since her debut on the global stage in 1945 and her win 
over South Africa in 1946, Pandit remained a well-known diplomatic figure. She continued to 
represent the India at the UN and served as ambassador to the Soviet Union and then the United 
States and Mexico. However, Nehru and male diplomats such the controversial V.K. Krishna 
Menon had emerged as the most prominent diplomatic representatives of India’s nonaligned 
foreign policy, an increasingly significant position since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. 
Pandit’s election as the first female President of the General Assembly has been depicted in 
typical nationalist narratives as the culmination of what she started on behalf of the aspirational 
postcolonial Indian nation in 1945 – once relegated to the periphery, India had finally reached 
the center via Pandit. Certainly Pandit’s achievements deserve to be recognized. She was one of 
the foremost female diplomats of her generation, serving as one of a tiny minority of female 
representatives in a still male-dominated environment. But my research shows that at the 
moment of Pandit’s arrival at the center her power remained constricted by continued 
preoccupation with her as a cultural object. Within the complex Cold War gender politics of 
competitive masculine nation-states where Indian nonalignment was often figured as passive and 
feminine, Pandit remained confined by her feminine representation of Indian diplomacy.  
                                                
[passing reference on 2 pages]; C. S. R. Murthy, India’s Diplomacy in the United Nations: Problems and 
Perspectives (New Delhi: Landers Books, 1993) [none]; Usha Sud, United Nations and India: Saga of Cooperation 
(New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House Pvt Ltd, 1996) [none]; and Manu Bhagavan, India and the Quest for One 
World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013) [discussed on two pages under the heading “Darkness before the 
dawn,” but without reference to the Security Council discussions]. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
18 
Pivoting away from the UN, I analyze one way in which the Indian state worked to 
project a more masculine diplomatic agenda on the global stage through the Custodian Force 
(India) (CFI), which oversaw the repatriation of prisoners of war in Korea simultaneous to 
Pandit’s tenure as General Assembly President. Beginning with the invasion of South Korea by 
the North Korean military in June 1950, India had worked at the UN and through traditional 
diplomatic channels to help negotiate an end to the conflict. As the first proxy war between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, the Korean conflict was a test of Nehru’s nonaligned foreign 
policy in international relations and of the UN’s ability to maintain peace. Nonalignment allowed 
the Indian state to forge a pragmatic middle ground between the two great powers, while also 
maintaining idealistic ties linking the postcolonial Indian nation to Gandhian non-violence. At 
the UN, this position provided an attractive alternative to India and other less powerful states that 
were caught in the Cold War power struggle. Almost immediately after North Korean invaded 
South Korea, the binary of Cold War politics virtually shut down the Security Council; previous 
Council functions were shifted to the General Assembly, where the United States and its allies 
hoped to control the agenda while avoiding the Soviet veto. However, democratic voting at the 
Assembly had already proven a powerful tool for smaller and less powerful UN member states. 
From this reconfiguration of UN decision-making emerged the nonaligned Afro-Asian bloc, of 
which India was an acknowledged leader.30  
 After three years of war, conflict over tens of thousands of unrepatriated prisoners of war 
remained the only roadblock to an armistice in Korea. India, led by Krishna Menon’s leadership 
                                                
30 See Andrew J. Rotter, “Gender Relations, Foreign Relations: The United States and South Asia, 1947-1964,” The 
Journal of American History 81:2 (1994): 518-542. 
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at the UN, helped find a diplomatic solution to the impasse. India chaired the Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission (NNRC) and staffed the CFI to oversee the prisoners between 
September 1953 and January 1954. This chapter argues that the deployment of peacekeeping 
troops provide the Indian state with an opportunity to enact Nehruvian nonalignment through the 
bodies of male soldiers for both an international and a domestic audience. This operation marked 
India’s status as a fully-fledged state with sophisticated military capabilities and at the same time 
tied Indian soldiers’ actions to Gandhian non-violence. In the historiography of Indian 
peacekeeping, the CFI is considered the origin of the postcolonial state’s commitment to 
peacekeeping missions as an extension of India’s “ancient” history of non-violence. My research 
shows that the Indian state and its representatives attempted to find a balance between the 
militarized character of a prison system and upholding the ideal of peacekeeping. On the one 
hand, New Delhi selected India’s most highly decorated British-trained generals to chair the 
NNRC and lead the CFI, Lieutenant General K.S. Thimayya and Major General S.P.P. Thorat. 
Both men had prominent positions during Partition and the first Indo-Pakistani war in 1947. On 
the other hand, the Indian state and major Indian newspapers helped figure the young male 
soldiers of the CFI as symbols of the Gandhian ideal. The birth of Indian peacekeeping in Korea 
in 1953 also has been aligned with Gandhian ideology in the small number of scholarly works on 
the CFI – most of which have been published through the Indian government.  
 My research brings critical cultural analysis to what is considered an originary moment of 
the Indian state’s commitment to UN peacekeeping operations in Indian historiography. Sandra 
Whitworth writes about the contradictions of modern peacekeeping and the role it plays in 
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legitimizing a nation’s military and, through affiliation, the nation itself.31 In her analysis of 
gender and modern UN peacekeeping, she argues that in national discourse these missions 
idealize soldiers as “benign and altruistic” while downplaying any information that contradicts 
that image. In this respect, the mission becomes more about the creation of national myths than 
about the mission itself. I situate the historical and contemporary discourse about the CFI and 
NNRC within this literature. The success or failure of the neutral position in Korea was a test of 
the UN model of mediation in response to a Cold War crisis. The custodians’ mission was less 
about the prisoners as individuals than it was about the resolution of a conflict that could provoke 
expanded war. For the Indian nation, the meaning held added import. The use of the military 
outside national borders was a marker of India’s arrival as a fully-fledged state. And yet, the 
dominant discourse seeks to downplay the actual militarization of “peacekeeping” by minimizing 
violence during the mission and claiming that the soldiers’ uniforms could be transformed into 
symbols of peace.32 
 When Pandit was elected to preside over the 1953 General Assembly, Lebanon’s Charles 
Habib Malik, who had represented his country at every General Assembly since 1945, 
remembered having to take a back entrance to hear her speak when she was shut out of the 
UNCIO meetings. He marveled at how far she had come from those days: “You were at San 
Francisco, but you were outside; you were at the periphery of things,” he said. “Today, however, 
                                                
31 Sandra Whitworth, Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 2004), 35. 
32 See for example, Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar, For the Honour of India: A History of Indian Peacekeeping 
(New Delhi: Centre for Armed Forces Historical Research/Army HQ, 2009). 
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you are at the centre.”33 Malik’s story represents an aspect of UN postcolonialism that that 
remains central to the “golden age” narrative, namely, that India’s presence at the center equated 
to a successful exertion of moral leadership on the global stage. With Pandit’s election it might 
have seemed that India had finally achieved insider status, but Cold War politics assured the 
major powers at the Security Council remained the only real insiders. Nevertheless Pandit’s 
presence and the influence of the nonaligned Afro-Asian bloc did alter the politics and culture of 
the UN. Centering Pandit in this story reveals the extent to which the aspirational postcolonial 
nation was constructed on the global stage through a woman who became a powerful symbol of 
India’s future potential. Admiring contemporaries remarked that Pandit combined the best of the 
East and the West, an observation that indicates her success at embodying a cosmopolitan 
sophistication that appealed to an international audience without undermining the ideal of Indian 
nationalist womanhood.34 It also demonstrates that the struggle for power over questions of 
imperialism and racism were made more potent when a colonized woman led the challenge in 
the arena of international diplomacy. Pandit’s tears fell precisely into the contested space 
between the great powers and their challengers; heightening the emotional weigh of already high 
stakes debates. But the trajectory of Pandit’s career at the UN points as well to the limitations of 
nation-building within the gendered politics of anticolonial nationalism and postwar nation-state 
politics. Postcolonial India’s foreign policy did not always run parallel to the purposes of the UN 
as made clear by the military deployment against Hyderabad. And the feminized characterization 
                                                
33 Charles Malik (Lebanon), Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Plenary Meetings, Verbatim 
Records of Meetings, 15 September—9 December 1953 (New York) [hereafter General Assembly, Eighth Session], 
180. 
34 Suresht R. Bald, “The Politics of Gandhi’s ‘Feminism’: Constructing ‘Sitas’ for Swaraj,” in Women, States, and 
Nationalism: At Home in the Nation?, Sita Ranchod-Nilsson and Mary Ann Tétreault, eds. (New York: Routledge, 
2000), 84-85. 
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of India’s nonaligned policy required more masculine embodiments of the state at the UN and in 
Korea. The following chapters critically evaluate this narrative arc “from the periphery to the 
centre” and reveal a more complex UN postcolonial culture that is neither straightforward nor so 
triumphant.  
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 1 
REHEARSAL OF UN POSTCOLONIALISM:  
VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT AT THE UN CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION, 1945 
 
 
The skilful timing and unremitting energy of Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pandit 
and her supporters in the United States have ensured a floodlight of 
publicity for India’s claims at a time when the peoples of the world are 
looking anxiously to the conference for formulation of principles and 
policies which are intended to shape their destinies.  
Times of India, 7 May 1945 
With such puppets representing India at San Francisco people were 
naturally disappointed and did not expect much from the Conference, so 
far as India’s interest was concerned. The only ray of hope was the 
presence of Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit in America. 
 
R. L. Khipple, The Woman Who Swayed America, 194535 
 
The most important thing to emerge out of the 1945 UN Conference on International 
Organization (UNCIO) for the Indian nationalist cause was the geo-political and international 
diplomatic experience gained by Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit. As a founding member of the United 
Nations, India had an official delegation at the conference, but the three knighted Indian men 
selected by the British to represent the colony were considered “stooges” by the large number of 
anticolonial and antiracist individuals and organizations gathered in San Francisco. The irony of 
a dependent state joining an organization ostensibly made up of sovereign nations only helped 
boost attention for Pandit’s anti-imperial public speech. Pandit was no novice to politics. As the 
eldest daughter in India’s most famous Indian National Congress family, she had been steeped in 
the language and action of nationalist politics since childhood. But her debut on the international 
stage in 1945 provided her with a formative education in diplomacy on a larger scale and 
                                                
35 R. L. Khipple, The Woman Who Swayed America: Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit (Lahore: Lion Press, 1946), 79. 
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foreshadowed the contradictory nature of UN postcolonialism, which would develop in the 
coming years. In the making of international diplomatic celebrity, her performance on behalf of 
Indian independence and anticolonialism writ large in the months surrounding the conference 
was at the time and continues to be considered “a star-making turn.”36 She was a highly effective 
and affective avatar for the Indian nationalist cause and she would use the lessons learned in San 
Francisco to great success when she returned as India’s official head of delegation to the UN in 
1946 and beyond. The combination of anticipation surrounding the forming of the UN in San 
Francisco, a savvy political propaganda machine supported by the India lobby in the United 
States, and characteristics specific to Pandit as an individual, helped launch a political and 
cultural force.  
Pandit’s presence in the United States in the spring of 1945 was both personal and 
political. The majority of the Congress leadership remained imprisoned for their participation in 
the 1942 Quit India Movement, but Pandit had been released due to health concerns in early 
1944 shortly before her husband succumbed to illness worsened by his own imprisonment. 
Because Indian law prohibited women from inheritance, Pandit was left without significant 
income. She worked for some months organizing famine relief in Bengal, but was personally 
adrift and in need of financial stability. When lawyer and politician Tej Bahadru Sapru, with the 
support of Gandhi, invited her to join the Indian delegation to the Pacific Relations Conference 
to be held in Virginia, USA in February 1945, she combined this opportunity with visits to see 
her two eldest daughters who were attending Wellesley College in Massachusetts.  
When she arrived in New York City in December 1944, Pandit was the first prominent 
Indian National Congress figure to visit the United States since the start of the war. In response 
                                                
36 Manu Bhagavan, India and the Quest for One World: The Peacemakers (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 
31. 
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to her arrival, individuals and organizations sympathetic to the Indian cause welcomed her with 
open arms. Pearl S. Buck offered her practical help finding accommodation and clothing 
appropriate to the New York winter. The Chinese Consul General held a reception in her honor 
where she met the British author W. Somerset Maugham among others. Power couple Henry and 
Clare Luce Booth gave a dinner-reception at the Waldorf-Astoria that drew “the elite of New 
York.”37 Eleanor Roosevelt hosted a luncheon in Pandit’s honor. New York’s Mayor Fiorello H. 
LaGuardia received her at City Hall. And over 1000 people reportedly heard her speak publicly 
for the first time at the Indian Independence Day celebration on January 26, an event hosted by 
the India League of America.38 It became apparent quickly that Pandit was naturally adept at 
representing the Indian cause in gatherings both large and small.  
The social and political culture that undergirded postcolonial Indian politics at the United 
Nations in 1945 was a “glittering” world made up of international and internationally-minded 
elite diplomats, activists, and artists. While Pandit’s political and familial lineage gave her entrée 
to this elite setting, her intelligence and personal charisma assured her staying power. To 
observers, Pandit moved through this milieu effortlessly, but throughout her first stay in the 
United States, Pandit was learning how to utilize her political history and distinctive personal 
characteristics to move her agenda forward. Over these months, Pandit self-consciously created a 
self-representation that would allow her the most access to and success on the international stage. 
Her savvy complicity in the appropriation of herself as a symbol helped produce an especially 
effective diplomatic celebrity.  
                                                
37 Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, The Scope of Happiness: A Personal Memoir (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1979), 
190-191; “Mrs. Pandit,” India Today 5:11 (February 1945): 3. 
38 “Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit,” India Today 5:10 (January 1945): 4; “Events Today,” New York Times, 26 January 
1945, 19; “India is Visualized Seizing Independence,” New York Times, 27 January 1945, 4; “Display Ad 4 – No 
Title,” Washington Post, 29 January 1945, 5. 
  26 
  
Since childhood Pandit and her sister, Krishna Hutheesing, were groomed to become 
exemplary models of the “educated, ‘modern,’ new woman” early twentieth-century Indian 
nationalism desired.39 For Pandit, her Anglophile education and elite upbringing (made visible 
and audible through her comportment and speech), mixed with the bravery, strength, and 
domesticated femininity required of the ideal Gandhian satyagrahi was eminently 
transportable/translatable into the elite social and political culture she encountered in the United 
States. She occupied a liminal space, a gendered persona at once Eastern and Western that 
appealed to her influential supporters as well as a broader audience. As an Indian admirer wrote 
after the 1945 lecture tour:   
Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, in her self, combines all that is best in the two ways of life—the 
Eastern and the Western…Her exterior beams with the manners and etiquette of…her 
European governess—but her heart throbs with the Kashmiri Brahmin blood of her 
ancestor[s].40 
 
Perceived more as an approachable “British subject” than the less comprehensible category of 
“Indian,” her performance could be consumed comfortably by American audiences. Through her 
embrace of this self-representation, Pandit gave India its toehold into UN culture even before 
Indian independence was achieved. And her political legitimacy as the primary spokesperson for 
Indian interests was greatly enhanced due to her close association with her brother, Jawharlal 
Nehru, and her family’s decades long relationship with Gandhi. But when one U.S. newspaper 
declared her the “First Lady of India,”41 it signaled the arrival of much more than a familial 
                                                
39 See Partha Chatterjee, “The Nationalist Resolution of the Women’s Question,” in Recasting Women: Essays in 
Colonial History, Kumkum Sangari and Sudesh Vaid, eds., 233-253 (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1989). For more 
on women and gender in the Gandhian movement, see Suresht R. Bald, “The Politics of Gandhi’s ‘Feminism’: 
Constructing ‘Sitas’ for Swaraj,” in Women, States, and Nationalism: At Home in the Nation? Sita Ranchod-Nilsson 
and Mary Ann Tétreault, eds., 81-97 (New York: Routledge, 2000); and Ketu H. Katrak, “Indian Nationalism, 
Gandhian ‘Satyagraha,’ and Representations of Female Sexuality,” in Nationalisms & Sexualities, Andrew Parker, 
Mary Russo, Doris Sommer, and Patricia Yaeger, eds., 395-406 (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
40 Khipple, 149. 
41 S.A. Haynes, “India Stands For Equality, Leader Tells Baltimoreans,” Afro-American, 7 April 1945, 1. 
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representative; it telegraphed the arrival on the world stage of an Indian woman who was to lay 
the very foundations of India’s ambitions for global moral leadership in the post-war geopolitical 
order. 
 
Setting the Stage 
Pandit arrived in the United States in late 1944 via a circuitous route. With the end of the 
war approaching, the Indian National Congress leadership felt it was time to send a spokesperson 
to the United States to garner public support on behalf of their cause. Widowed since January 
1944, Pandit found herself alone and without financial support for the first time in her life. Left 
with no sons and no will guaranteeing her a portion of her husband’s inheritance, according to 
Indian communal law their money and property reverted to her husband’s family. Pandit was 
initially offered only the minimum Rs. 150 widow maintenance and Rs. 50 for her daughters 
until they married.42 Nehru offered what support he could from his prison cell at Ahmadnagar 
Fort: Rs. 2000 and his encouragement to keep working, try not to worry, and to remember that he 
considered her and their younger sister, Krishna, “joint-owners” of the family estate.43 Pandit 
could have pursued a legal case against her in-laws, but Gandhi, an important father figure since 
her father Motilal’s death in 1931, urged her to let the conflict with her in-laws go as “we had 
more important things to do.”44 Against her lawyer’s advice but with the intent of ending the 
painful episode, Pandit agreed to accept a small settlement from her brother-in-law. She “signed 
a document giving up [her] personal claims and that of any unborn grandsons [she] might have, 
                                                
42 Ibid., 179-180. 
43 Jawahar to Nan, 13 March 1944, in Nayantara Sahgal, ed. Before Freedom: Nehru’s Letters to His Sister (New 
Delhi: HarperCollins Publishers India, 2000), 391 and 395. Letters in the volume date from 1909-1947, with just 
one letter from 1956. 
44 Pandit, 181. 
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and the chapter was brought to a close.”45 The question of on-going financial resources remained 
pressing, and a lecture tour in the United States held the potential for addressing that problem. 
In spite of its financial constraints, Pandit’s status as a widow did open up new 
possibilities for her activism and allowed her increased mobility. In a conversation with Eleanor 
Roosevelt for McCall’s magazine during Pandit’s tenure as Indian Ambassador to the United 
States in 1950, the two women mused about the particular pressures placed on female diplomats. 
Responsibilities were two-fold for a woman who was expected to play the roles of both 
Ambassador and Ambassador’s wife, demands that Pandit said caused physical and emotional 
strain. She acknowledged that despite its added pressures, widowhood had made her 
international diplomacy possible. While Minister of Health (the first Indian woman to hold such 
a position), Pandit traveled to see her husband every weekend, even when they worked in 
different cities. “But supposing my husband had been alive today?” she asked, “I would never 
have accepted this position. It would have been putting him into a terrifically awkward 
situation.”46 The timing of her husband’s death contributed to the serendipitous timing of her 
emergence at the United Nations the following year. Married, she would have been less inclined 
to perform a role that required independent travel abroad; widowed, she was able to become one 
of the very few women active at the highest levels of international diplomacy in the 1940s and 
1950s.  
Given these circumstances, when Gandhi, out of prison since June 1944, and Sapru, 
President of the Indian Council for World Affairs, approached Pandit to speak on behalf of India 
in the United States, she was free to go. The only hurdle remaining was governmental permission 
to travel. The British had confiscated her passport and seemed unlikely to reissue it in the 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
 
  29 
  
foreseeable future.47 Ultimately, she found a way around British restrictions on her mobility and 
entered the United States without a passport. In her memoirs Pandit describes Edith Pao, the 
American wife of the Chinese Consul General in Calcutta, inviting her to attend a consulate 
dinner for the American Air Force. There, Pandit was introduced to the chief of the Allied Air 
Command in the Eastern region. With approval from U.S. Undersecretary of State Sumner 
Welles, she boarded a U.S. army plane in December 1944, U.S. visa in hand. The British, 
concerned about the impact of Indian propagandists in America, nevertheless were unable to 
prevent Pandit’s entry into the United States. If the American government gave her access, the 
best the British could do was track her movements and send their own counter-propagandists to 
lessen her impact.48 
After Christmas holidays spent with her daughters, Pandit left for the Pacific Relations 
Conference (PCR) in Virginia, one of five Indian delegates attending as non-voting observers. 
She attended lectures and meetings and had the opportunity to mingle with other delegates from 
all over the world. Throughout her travels, Pandit wrote to her brother about her experiences. In 
February, Nehru responded to her letter about the conference and shared his insights about these 
types of international meetings. Pandit having apparently expressed frustration with the lack of 
definitive action at the conference, he conceded, “You are perfectly right in saying that these 
conferences do not decide anything important or solve any of the world’s problems.”49 Yet the 
conference was by no means a waste of Pandit’s energies. It was during the PCR that she began 
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to attract the media attention that would become ubiquitous in the coming months and years. 
According to one biographer, her few opportunities to talk in Virginia gained “favorable news 
releases, which created interest in the woman from India.”50 And a Washington Post columnist 
predicted that the “brilliant, colorful Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit” was certain to be 
“spotlighted.”51 Even before the main event started in San Francisco, she had begun to make an 
impression on observers, one that would propel her into international diplomatic celebrity in 
service to the Indian nationalist cause. 
Word of Pandit’s successes reached Nehru in prison half a world away via news reports, 
friends’ updates, and much-delayed letters she wrote to him throughout her journeys. The letters 
Nehru wrote to her in this period provide a glimpse into how he viewed her experiences as a 
training ground for future endeavors. Writing from Ahmadnagar Fort (Maharashtra) and later 
Bareilly Jail (Uttar Pradesh), government censors constrained his ability to be explicit about 
political issues. International mail delivery was also highly unpredictable; letters often were 
months in transit. As a result, Pandit would not have received her brother’s letters in time to act 
immediately on his advice. Nevertheless, the letters demonstrate Nehru’s recognition of his 
sister’s growing effectiveness on the global stage. In a late January 1945 letter, he wrote he had 
been following her travels in press accounts and had “no doubt” she would improve the “minds 
and outlooks” of the American people on the Indian issue. On a more personal note, he also 
hoped the experience would help Pandit grow in confidence and develop new “ideas and energy” 
for the work ahead.52 In a letter from February, he mentioned that cables containing brief extracts 
of her statements had “rather upset the composure of people in New Delhi and Whitehall,” a 
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testament to the wide circulation of her anticolonial critiques.53 An early April letter conveyed 
Nehru’s pleasure at that Pandit was “making good and impressing people” and that she seemed 
to be “finding” herself: 
You are growing in mind, in outlook, in self-assurance, and in a friendly and favourable 
atmosphere your capacities are developing. One must of course have ability and capacity 
but almost equally important is the chance and opportunity to develop them…What 
delights me is that you are taking full advantage of this and thus making yourself fitter for 
the vast amount of work that lies before us. Keep growing and learning, flexible in mind 
and body, and yet always with that hard steel-like something which tempers us and keeps 
us straight and anchored, and gives us a sense of real values.54 
 
Even before Pandit made her most lasting impression at the UNCIO in San Francisco, her talent 
at speaking effectively on behalf of the Indian cause to audiences outside the subcontinent had 
become apparent. 
 
Global 1945 
 Physically distant yet inextricably linked to the bloody battlefields of the Second World 
War, San Francisco became an unlikely location of diplomatic import when delegates from fifty 
countries met to debate the structure of the proposed United Nations in late April 1945. 
Newspapers in the previous months had been filled with momentous stories drawing readers’ 
attention to happenings in locations across the globe embroiled in the war. The Allies had won 
the Battle of the Bulge, firebombed Dresden and Tokyo, and freed Manila from Japanese 
occupation. Franklin Delano Roosevelt died just weeks after being sworn in for an 
unprecedented third term, leaving the untested Harry S. Truman to lead the emerging 
superpower. As battles continued on numerous fronts in Asia, Europe, and the Pacific that 
spring, concentration camps including Buchenwald, Bergen-Belsen, and Flossenbürg were 
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liberated, revealing the horror of genocide perpetrated by Germany. The war had been long and 
grueling, and it had effected a large portion of the world’s population.  
At the same time, governments and leaders were developing a vision for the postwar 
world. In February the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain walked away from the 
Yalta Conference with a signed agreement on the reorganization of postwar Europe. The Arab 
League formed in Cairo in March, creating an important regional political power. Now, San 
Francisco had been selected as the location for the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization and invitations were sent to founding member states to convene at the end of 
April.55 With the reality of gruesome warfare and massive civilian casualties in the sixth year of 
this global war as its backdrop, diplomats converged on the City by the Bay. A second world war 
in a generation was ending and an international organization was being built, in the words of 
President Truman at the opening session, to “provide the machinery which will make future 
peace not only possible but certain.”56  
At the center of power in San Francisco were those delegations representing the Big Four 
– China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States – with the reality of a bipolar 
power struggle emerging between the latter two increasingly obvious. The document presented 
to member states for their consideration had been hashed out amongst these powers during the 
Dumbarton Oaks talks (August 21-October 7, 1944).57 Invited delegations from the other 
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founding nations were allowed to put forward, debate, and vote on amendments to the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Unsurprisingly, the draft Charter reflected the contradictions of an 
organization guided by powerful governments seeking to protect their own sovereignty while 
simultaneously extending new powers to an international organization. A prime example of this 
tension was the belief expressed by many smaller member states that the power of the veto at the 
Security Council was a “defect” written into the draft Charter.58 With deference to the greater 
responsibility for the war and the enormous power held by the Big Four, the other member states 
nonetheless resented the veto and hoped for a larger, more inclusive Security Council with 
regional representation.59 Time would prove their fears well-founded: the insistence on the part 
of the Big Four (plus France) to maintain the veto in the Charter contributed directly to frequent 
deadlock at the Council throughout the Cold War years.60 
Though the fight over the veto was among the most heated of the conference, the 
delegates faced many more disputes over the organization of the UN Charter. The smaller 
countries submitted thousands of revisions to the Dumbarton Oaks proposal, and the Big Four 
put forward more than 20 joint amendments of their own. In order to address these questions, the 
conference was divided into four major commissions each with several sub-commissions tasked 
to discuss sections of the draft plan and any relevant amendments. The commissions met for six 
weeks, working longer and longer hours as the end of the conference neared. The official Indian 
delegation submitted no substantive amendments, but it was honored with the selection of Sir 
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Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar (1887-1976), a lawyer and politician from southern India, to serve 
as the first chair of the Economic and Social Council committee. Debate over major issues was 
vigorous including over the status of regional organizations, the establishment of permanent 
members on the Security Council, and the scope of the Economic and Social Council. But the 
deck was stacked against smaller countries in more ways than one. First, the Big Four had veto 
power over any amendment. While they were willing to negotiate behind the scenes and make 
some compromises, they would not allow their power to be undermined considerably. Also, in 
Stephen C. Schlesinger’s assessment, most of the smaller nations were “resigned to whittling 
down the dominance of the big nations, but not driving them out of the organization.” A 
compromised system outweighed the possibility of no organization at all.61  
Inside the meeting halls at the UNCIO roamed many observers representing a wide 
variety of interest groups. Their hope: to impact decisions on specific issues. Individuals and 
organizations without official representation in the conference halls hoped to wield some 
influence on the direction of the postwar world order even in the face of great power dominance. 
British journalist Alistair Cooke noted the presence of these interest groups, which he described 
as “unpopular crusaders for small nations and lost causes, drilling away underneath the official 
whirl in the hope of deepening the foundations of the peace.” These included the Serbian 
Orthodox church in Yugoslavia, spokesmen for the Armenian question, the American League for 
a Free Palestine, and Friends of Republican Spain.62 Near the end of the conference the Christian 
Science Monitor noted that those such as the Venezuelans calling for the repudiation of Spain’s 
Franco, whether “Ill-timed or right-timed…have made it clear that multitudes are seeking a 
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peace based on moral considerations.”63 From within the political landscape of the United States, 
the NAACP also asked for a seat at the table during the San Francisco conference. The U.S. 
government granted access to the NAACP along with 41 other interest groups, inevitably 
diminishing the influence of any one organization when so many were allowed to attend. As 
private citizens these representatives could observe and lobby from inside the meeting halls, but 
they had no direct influence in negotiations.64 
These events in San Francisco echoed a similar phenomenon at the formation of the 
League of Nations in 1919 when activists from across the globe gathered in Paris to speak out 
against racial and colonial oppression and create a “new order” as the world emerged from the 
First World War.65 The question of racial equality became a highly contested issue as a result. 
Those “seeking to combat racial discrimination in the world needed a powerful and officially 
recognized voice at the peace conference itself,” and so they looked to the Japanese delegation.66 
These men had received instructions from the Japanese government to make clear that 
cooperation with the League would be predicated on the inclusion of a racial equality clause in 
the covenant.67 When the League of Nations Commission, designated to produce the League’s 
Covenant, sidestepped the first attempt to include such language, the issue went global, drawing 
emotional reactions from both inside and outside the meetings.68 Japan’s initially nationalist 
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proposal was transformed into a “universal crusade”69 as millions around the world hoped for 
change, including participants in the Pan-African Congress organized by W.E.B. Du Bois to run 
parallel to the Paris talks.70  
For defenders of white supremacy from North America and the white British settler 
colonies, even vague language on the subject of equality was cause for alarm in 1919. The 
Australian Prime Minister William Hughes put up the most vocal opposition to the Japanese 
proposal, allowing U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and South Africa’s Jan Christiaan Smuts to 
lay the blame for the language’s omission on Hughes’ shoulders.71 Despite intense rounds of 
diplomatic talks and an “eloquent and moving” final appeal by Japan’s Baron Makino, proposed 
language on racial equality was left out of the final Covenant.72 In the end, the dominance of 
white, western male diplomacy in Paris won when the limited structure of the new organization 
successfully excluded competing interests. The real decisions were not made at the more 
democratic plenary meetings but “by the leaders of the great powers, who met in an increasingly 
smaller group as the conference stretched on.”73 Small states could not override the intentions of 
the League’s framers, and in regards to racial equality the great power statesmen were unwilling 
“to recognize that this issue might be of intense concern to millions of people throughout the 
world.”74 Nevertheless, the debates did succeed in producing a “heightened emotional awareness 
of race” and questions of imperial power around the globe.75 
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While governments selected their delegations and gave permission to various groups to 
have insider access in San Francisco in 1945, and news outlets assigned reporters to cover the 
creation of the UN Charter, activists with a diverse array of political interests also mobilized on 
the fringes of this new conference. Among these many interest groups were the India League of 
America and the National Committee for India’s Freedom who were lobbying for Indian 
independence and together selected Pandit to represent their cause. The context for the 
discussion of race and empire was quite different at the end of the Second World War than it had 
been in 1919. These issues could not be shunted aside so easily by European leaders. Though in 
the words of Mark Mazower “the UN was designed by, and largely operative as an instrument of, 
great power politics,” the make-up of the new international organization and its rhetoric was 
nevertheless more inclusive than had been the League of Nations and its Covenant.76 The 
colonial nations had made many promises to their dependencies to gain their participation in the 
war effort; the Allies could not have triumphed without the financial support and enormous 
influx of soldiers from the colonized world. Furthermore, the principles that emerged from the 
Atlantic Charter, which formed the basis of the 1942 “Declaration of the United Nations” and 
then were carried over into the Preamble of the UN Charter, stated a commitment to a postwar 
world in which nation-states would work together effectively to not only avoid war but also to 
promote human rights and justice. 
The Preamble was particularly idealistic, committing the new organization to work to 
preserve international peace, and affirming the dignity of all through a commitment to human 
rights and the promotion of social and economic progress. Born out of the hope for postwar 
peace as envisioned by geopolitically dominant states, the ideals contained in the Charter also 
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formed a space through which millions of colonized and oppressed peoples around the world 
could place their hopes for a reconfiguration of power in the post war world. These millions 
sought relief from the imperial power and racial subjugation that the League of Nations had 
failed to end. The UN Charter gestured toward these goals, but its effectiveness remained 
untested. Questions of racial equality and imperial power were addressed differently in 1945 than 
they had been in 1919, though without satisfactory outcomes for those looking to the UN as an 
instigator of real change. The question of colonies and trusteeships was not on the agenda at all 
at Dumbarton Oaks, and as for human rights, the Big Four “concurred that the most innocuous 
place to insert language on the subject was in the section on the responsibilities of the Economic 
and Social Council. The Council would ‘promote respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms,’ but have no power to enforce them.”77 In San Francisco, Du Bois and the NAACP 
were successful in getting the United States to submit proposals on human rights and 
colonialism, but that delegation did little to get those proposals passed. A human rights 
commission was established, but was years away from effective intervention. As for the question 
of imperial power, though the rhetoric espoused the ideal of self-governance and equality of 
nations, the UN Charter in the end did not include language espousing the goal of independence 
for all. The new Trusteeship Council took over from the League’s mandate system as a 
supervisory system, leaving power once again in the hands of the imperial states. As Mazower 
points out, “European powers were reasserting their control over their colonial possessions in 
Southeast Asia even as the San Francisco conference met, and American anticolonial rhetoric 
dwindled as the war came to a close and the importance of good transatlantic relations with 
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major West European powers,” especially Great Britain and France, “became obvious in 
Washington.”78  
Anticolonial activists inside and outside the meeting halls were dissatisfied with the 
continued dominance of imperial powers, lending Pandit and the Indian question even broader 
interest and support. The stage at San Francisco could not have been better set for Pandit’s 
introduction to world diplomacy. April 1945 was a liminal moment in both world history and in 
the history of South Asia. Much remained unsettled on both fronts, and yet the basic outlines of 
the future were becoming increasingly clear: Germany’s defeat was imminent and important 
gains were being made on the Asian-Pacific front. In India, much of the Congress leadership 
remained imprisoned, but the devolution of imperial control was clearly on the horizon. Nehru 
was finally released from prison in June, and he immediately set about negotiating the terms of 
British withdrawal. The same combination of uncertainty and hope contained in Indian 
nationalist’s desires also infused the UN Charter conference. By making parallels between the 
UN’s goals and India’s desire for freedom, Pandit would draw on the emotional center of this 
threshold moment to gain support and attention from a wide array of observers. 
 
“Acid Test” of the UN Charter 
Underpinning Pandit’s message at San Francisco was the representation of India as “the 
pivot of the whole system of imperialism and colonialism.” How India’s fate was addressed at 
this moment, therefore, would be “an acid test” of the principles of the United Nations, “and the 
continued denial of India’s freedom by Britain [would be] a negation of those principles and of 
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the sacrifices that have been made” to win the war.79 Pandit’s words echoed a statement Gandhi 
made to the press in the days leading up to the conference: “The freedom of India will 
demonstrate to all the exploited races of the earth that their freedom is very near and that in no 
case will they henceforth be exploited.”80 This theme linking India’s freedom to the ideals of the 
United Nations would become a common one throughout Pandit’s tenure at the UN in the 
coming years. But in 1945, it clashed with the goals of the official Indian delegation, the 
members of which also hoped to gain Indian independence eventually, but were willing to 
cooperate in San Francisco on the creation of the Charter without reference to specific colonies 
at that time.  
Pandit’s highly visible presence outside the meeting halls of at the San Francisco 
conference disrupted the script envisioned by the British and the official Indian delegation. As 
had happened at the League of Nations, India’s official representatives to the UN Charter 
conference were not affiliated with either the All-Indian National Congress or the Muslim 
League, the two most prominent Indian nationalist organizations. The British instead had 
selected delegates who were sympathetic to continued colonial involvement in the subcontinent: 
three knighted Indian men with long histories of cooperation with the metropolitan and colonial 
governments. Sir V. T. Krishnamachari (1881-1964) was almost twenty years senior to Pandit. 
He had been the Diwan (finance minister) of the Indian princely state of Baroda throughout the 
inter-war period and had served as an Indian delegate to a number of bodies including the 
League of Nations and several Round Table Conferences. Sir Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar had 
been a prominent leader of the nationalist Justice Party (est. 1916), which had it roots in the 
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organized efforts to curtail the dominance of the Hindu Brahmin caste in social, religious, and 
political spheres beginning in the nineteenth century.81 Mudaliar had most recently served as one 
of two Indians appointed to Churchill’s War Cabinet and would go on to represent India at the 
UN after independence. Sir Malik Firoz Khan Noon (1893-1970), the youngest of the three 
representatives, was born in Lahore and educated at Oxford.82 Noon was the High Commissioner 
to the UK from 1936 to 1941, and then became first Indian to hold the defense portfolio on the 
Viceroy’s Council (1942-45).83 These three men, accomplished though they were, represented a 
stark contrast to Pandit’s youthful appearance and more radical speech. Had it been up to the 
British government, no Indian nationalists or Indian journalists would have been allowed to 
attend the Charter conference to challenge the official delegation.84 The British and Indian 
governments had collaborated to prevent opponents from reaching San Francisco, a policy that 
was only partially successful. Pandit was already in the United States when the conference was 
announced, of course, and she had already proven her effectiveness as a spokesperson for the 
Indian cause. As a result, the conflict between the official delegation and independence activists 
was not prevented, and news of the conference and Pandit’s performance did circulate to India.  
Congress connections in the United States made Pandit’s work more effective. With the 
support of the India League of America and the Committee for India’s Freedom, she was invited 
to help make the San Francisco conference “India conscious.”85 Due to the inability of other 
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Indian activists to leave the subcontinent and the two main Indian lobby groups’ political 
affiliation with the Gandhian tradition, the All-India National Congress version of Indian 
nationalism dominated in San Francisco. Pandit’s political speech and the printed propaganda 
released on her behalf claimed Congress was the only legitimate representation of the Indian 
peoples’ desires, and that Pandit herself was a recognized spokesperson for the party. This 
nationalist narrative denied the fact that the Congress faced stiff opposition at home from the 
Muslim League in areas with large Muslim populations and in ongoing negotiations with the 
British government. It also silenced the existence of other organized political organizations 
(more radical and more conservative) that did not support the Congress platform, including the 
right-wing Hindu Mahasabha and the Scheduled Castes Federation representing the Dalit 
community. The coherence of Indian Congress nationalist dominance projected through Pandit’s 
unofficial diplomacy at the San Francisco conference belied a much more tenuous reality on the 
ground in India.  
Three letters to the editor from the Times of India in May and June of 1945 outline some 
of the expressed frustration at the idea of Pandit’s representation of the Indian people as a whole 
given that she had not been elected by any Indian constituency. Ramprakash Roy pointed out that 
Pandit did not represent the diverse spectrum of political interests organized throughout India 
such as the Muslim League, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Radical Democratic Party, or the 
Scheduled Castes’ Federation.86 Other letter writers focused specifically on the Congress-League 
power struggle. Mahmud A. Wazifadar argued “that unless the major question of Congress-
League unity is solved once and for all India cannot be represented by any major party or 
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individual.”87 Another writer quoted “a distinguished Indian publicist” as saying, “If the world 
Press seeks truth and not mere sensation they will resist the propaganda wiles of this Indian 
‘nationalist’ siren and examine more closely the Muslim charge that the freedom for which the 
Indian Hindu Congress so loudly clamours is freedom to oppress.”88 This critique turned the 
American press’s fascination with Pandit as a womanly warrior on its head, depicting her instead 
as a femme fatale who was luring men to a dangerous conclusion with her beauty and charm. 
A heckler at Pandit’s biggest press conference at the end of April highlights Pandit’s 
inability to remain insulated from the realpolitik of competing Indian nationalisms. Just after she 
delivered a short statement to an estimated 200 journalists and prepared to answer their 
questions, “a persistent Muslim” began asking questions, insinuating that Congress had been 
responsible for “violence and sabotage” during the Quit India movement in 1942. Rather than 
address the accusation, Pandit asked if the questioner was a journalist. Admitting he was not, he 
was forced to leave the room.89 Speculation abounded about how he gained access to the press 
conference. Malik Firoz Khan Noon remembers in his autobiography that this press conference 
held very high stakes for the Muslim man who asked Pandit the “awkward question.” He was in 
fact a “brave stenographer” for the Indian delegation, and when “he walked out all cameras 
clicked. No one ever got such publicity as he did.” Noon claims that this man’s actions were so 
well-known and so widely criticized by the Congress Party that the stenographer could not find a 
job in government after independence and instead attempted to change his identity, opening a 
store in Connaught Place in Delhi. “When Partition came,” Noon writes, he became a victim of 
communal violence, and “was left for dead from sword wounds. He still carries the mark of a 
                                                
87 “Letter to the Editor 1—No Title,” Times of India, 22 May 1945, 4. 
88 J.D.J., “Freedom From Fear: To the Editor,” Times of India, 29 May 1945, 4. 
89 “British Policy in India; Mrs. V. Pandit’s Criticism,” Times of India, 28 April 1945, 9; William Moore, 
“Challenger: Indian Woman Twists the Tail of British Lion,” Chicago Tribune, 27 April 1945, 6. 
  44 
  
sword would on his face.”90 R. L. Khipple later wrote that the stenographer’s efforts 
“boomeranged, and Mrs. Pandit received much wider publicity than she would have otherwise 
received.”91 
Noon was the only of the three Indian representatives reported to directly address Pandit 
and others’ criticism of the delegation’s independence, though he chose to engage more directly 
with Gandhi’s leadership in India than with Pandit’s representation in San Francisco. When 
asked about her by reporters, Noon was dismissive, referring to her as a “charming lady” without 
any direct comment on her political positions.92 He later refused to comment on the memo she 
submitted to the UN steering committee saying “he did not want to criticise a lady.”93 In early 
May, at a press conference described “as one of the most animated at San Francisco,” Noon 
presented his views on Indian independence. The journalists present, a majority of whom seem to 
have been more sympathetic to the Congress position, challenged his statements, and it was 
reported that the event sometimes felt like “a political debate rather than a press conference.”94 
First, Noon accused Gandhi of being too influenced by “reactionary and orthodox Hindus,” who 
made him “bigoted and narrow-minded” with a political stance “half a century out of date.”95 
Noon blamed Gandhi for rejecting the Cripps proposal, undermining the Allied war effort, and 
inciting communal violence through the Quit India movement in 1942.96 He further suggested 
the elder statesman should step aside and allow Nehru to take control of the Congress since 
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Nehru was “’the one man in the Congress who is likely to have the breadth of vision to see the 
Moslem point of view and come to an understanding with the Moslems.’”97 When asked why 
Nehru was still in prison if his leadership would be so effective, Noon replied that Congress’s 
civil disobedience had been “’a misnomer for rebellion,’” and that he hoped “’sincerely’” Nehru 
would be released soon. “[T]he final question shot challengingly at Sir Firoz as the conference 
broke up was, ‘Is not the Government of India controlled by the British’? Reply (in an equally 
challenging tone): ‘That is absolutely wrong’.”98 
Noon’s comments circulated back to India and reportedly caused “great concern among 
Indian nationalist circles.”99 In answer to the press conference, Gandhi said he would fulfill 
Noon’s wish if the Congress prisoners were released.100 Further, he said there was no need for 
Nehru “to come to the front. He is in the front. The Government of India would not let him work 
as he would. He and I are friends. But we are no rivals. We are both servants of the people and 
the platform of service is as big as the world.’”101 One “former member of the Congress Working 
Committee said in an interview: ‘It is very amusing to see Sir Firoz Khan Noon deposing 
Mahatma Gandhi. The people’s leaders are not appointed by some high authority, as [he] has 
been appointed to represent India at San Francisco against the declared wishes of the 
country.’”102 Shortly after the San Francisco conference, Noon joined the Muslim League, and he 
became Jinnah’s special envoy after independence.103 He briefly served as Pakistan’s Prime 
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Minister from December 1957 to October 1958, before being ousted by the first declaration of 
martial law in Pakistan’s history.104 Though he gained some publicity, Noon was less visible than 
Pandit, who garnered much more positive coverage from the mainstream media in the United 
States and India, her Congress-inflected calls for independence overriding the statements of a 
vocal critic from outside the Congress’s circle of power. 
   
“The Woman Who Swayed America” 
From prison, Nehru tracked his sister’s actions through North American newspaper 
clippings as best he could. Simultaneously with U.S. audiences, Nehru was a consumer of what 
James W. Carey describes as an invented cultural form—American print culture—which 
conveys “dramatic action in which the reader joins a world of contending forces as an observer at 
a play.”105 Pandit’s savvy complicity in the appropriation of herself as a symbol combined with 
the gaze of American print culture to produce an especially effective diplomatic celebrity. Upon 
his release in June, he began forming an interim government, and he wrote to her a personal 
assessment of her successes: “You know that your work in the States has been very greatly 
appreciated here by all kinds of people. You have done a splendid job, as perhaps no one else 
could have done in the circumstances. The immediate consequences of what you have done may 
not be obvious but I am sure that the remoter consequences will be considerable.”106 He made a 
decidedly accurate prediction. Her success at drawing both elite supporters and large crowds to 
the Indian cause in the United States led Pandit herself, Nehru, and others to recognize the 
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potential of her effectiveness on the world stage. San Francisco served as a rehearsal for Pandit’s 
future diplomatic career, and she worked to negotiate a persona fit for the task at hand. 
One challenge Pandit faced was how to tread a course between representing the whole of 
India through her speech and highlighting her own position in Indian cultural and religious 
hierarchies. Nehru for one encouraged her to use Hindi when speaking to Indian audiences in the 
United States, presumably to signal a level of authenticity to the diasporic South Asian 
community there.107 One U.S. paper printed a picture of her in a moment of “Calm Before the 
Storm” before one press conference, an image that served to ground Pandit’s actions within a 
Hindu-inflected spirituality strongly identified with the political symbolism of the Congress. In 
the photo, Pandit and an unnamed man face one another across a narrow table. On the right side 
of the image, the “sister of India’s great nationalist leader” smiles serenely over clasped hands 
held close to her chin. With hands clasped at his chest, the man bows to Pandit from the left of 
the image, eyes cast down.108 He wears one of the most ubiquitous symbols of individual 
Congress affiliation: the Gandhi topi. This close-fitting cap made of white khadi (homespun 
cloth) and pointed in the front and back, first became popular during the Non-Cooperation 
movement as one aspect of what Lisa Trivedi calls Gandhi’s contribution to the “visual 
vocabulary of national community.”109 By 1945, the topi was “an established visual symbol of 
dissent” used widely by Indian nationalists.110 
Pandit also negotiated her physical representation of modern Indian womanhood (and 
thus the modern Indian nation). The relationship between her and her clothing offers one clear 
example of the co-production of a persona designed for public consumption. While arranging her 
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lecture tour with the New York-based Clark Getts Lecture Bureau, Mr. Getts wanted to discuss 
her attire since the “American public…would expect someone from India to look exotic and to 
wear bright clothes and fine jewels.”111 Though she refused to alter her rather subdued style, her 
usual selection of gray or pastel saris, her wedding ring, and a watch, were “exotic” enough in 
the U.S. context to merit significant press attention. Early in her lecture tour, Pandit articulated a 
level of frustration with the constant comments on her attire and its links to gender differences 
between the United States and India. Discussing the many women who hold high posts in India, 
she argued, “’They got the jobs…not because they were women but because they were better 
than the men.  And these…are not women whose clothes are described every time they enter the 
legislative assembly.’”112 By refusing to alter her simple style to please her lecture sponsor, 
Pandit established some distance between herself and the orientalist gaze. However, in a 1949 
interview Pandit was more reflexive about the sari as a cultural symbol. “Everybody admits that 
the sari is the most graceful dress for women… But I find that in traveling, climbing in and out 
of airplanes, the sari is a confounded nuisance, and I’d like to wear skirts or slacks. But society 
demands that I wear a sari.” The male reporter refused to allow her the last word on the issue.  
Despite her “silver hair” and nationalist politics, he assured his readers, the “attractive younger 
sister of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru” remained beautiful. “She looks as good in the sari as 
the sari looks on her.”113 American, Indian, or otherwise—it is apparent that the sari played an 
integral part in the performance of an acceptable Indian womanhood in all of these contexts. 
The more prominent Pandit became on the world stage, the more pronounced the 
attention to her attire, culminating in a virtual frenzy of descriptions during her early days at the 
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UN. William Moore’s coverage during the Charter conference was the first by a U.S. reporter to 
rely heavily on visual description to emphasize Pandit’s visceral impact on contemporary 
observers. His first article, combining political reporting with not so subtle sexually-charged 
language was headlined, “Indian Woman Twists the Tail of British Lion”: 
Folding her dazzling white robe [no buttons, no zippers] (sic) around some alluring 
curves, Mrs. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of India moved into Anthony Eden’s hotel today and 
began twisting the British lion’s tail…Thus was the Indian question which many say will 
be the test of the basic principles of international organization brought out into the open 
as the conference was beginning its work.114 
 
Another article by Moore two days later featured an interview with Pandit who warned that 
America should help India versus the British in order to avoid a war against imperialism.  
Invoking another prominent Eastern woman, Moore described his interviewee as: 
a diminutive, silvery haired woman who speaks with force that recalls the chill fury with 
which Madame Chiang Kai-shek once brought the American congress to tears, was 
wearing a sheer black robe, so folded that its silver edging fell about her wrists and 
spiraled downward.115 
 
For Moore, Pandit’s political message was inextricably linked with her appearance, made 
more exotic, and thus more intriguing, because of her “native” costume. Wrapped in yards of silk 
or cotton cloth, Pandit embodied a certain type of “Eastern” womanhood that made compelling 
“dramatic action” for consumers of her as news.116 The same would remain true throughout 
Pandit’s diplomatic career at the UN, with her sari and her gender dominating initial coverage of 
her election as President of the General Assembly in 1953. 
Pandit’s voice was as significant as her appearance in translating Indian womanhood to a 
Western audience. Nehru initially expressed some concern about her speaking voice. He 
wondered in one letter, “how does your accent, intonation etc go down there? You tell me that 
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your voice has been liked. That I can understand easily enough for you have a good speaking 
voice. But what of the special dislikes of Americans regarding the English way of speaking.”117 
Her speaking voice did merit attention, though not negatively. In one 1945 article she was 
described as having an “Oxonian accent,” insinuating a connection to the upper class education 
her father, her brother, and other nationalist leaders obtained in England though Pandit herself 
was not educated in England. A reporter at her first press conference as Ambassador to the 
United States in 1949 expressed surprise that Pandit “spoke flawless English…in a low, well-
modulated voice ‘without a trace of accent.’”118 Anyone familiar with Pandit’s personal history 
would have been wholly unsurprised by her command of English. She spoke “with the cultured 
English” the “wealthy, aristocratic Brahmin,” common to the Nehru family.119 Pandit became 
literate in English even before learning to read and write Hindi, and her father insisted his 
children speak with “a pure English accent.”120 One of the most successful Oxford-educated 
lawyers in India before converting to Gandhian nationalism after the First World War, the family 
patriarch “was of the view that unless we all turned ourselves into English people, there was no 
chance for us in the world.”121 During her childhood the entire family lived according to British 
standards Monday through Friday: they ate European food with utensils while sitting at a dining 
room table; dressed only in European clothing; and spoke English exclusively. Only on the 
weekend did the children experience the Kashmiri Brahmin food, language, and culture that their 
mother continued to maintain in a separate portion of the family estate.  
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In addition to establishing an effective persona for herself, Pandit also worked to cement 
her legitimacy as the main spokesman for Indian interests beyond her close association with 
Nehru and Gandhi. One paper even declared her the “First Lady of India,” as if Nehru were 
already Prime Minister.122 In San Francisco Pandit consistently claimed to speak on behalf of all 
of India, taking for granted that her political party already spoke as the representatives of the 
Indian people as a whole. In one statement she declared she was “chosen by her compatriots in 
[the United States] and Canada as the sole spokesman for their cause.” She also spoke, she said, 
for the Indian National Congress, “’which represents an overwhelming majority of all the 
peoples of India.’”123 As the most visible of those aligned against the official Indian delegation at 
San Francisco, she was described in the American press as a more legitimate spokesman for 
India than Krishnamachari, Mudaliar, and Noon. She contrasted her own status against that of 
the official Indian delegates who were not representative of Indian interests at all, but were 
simply nominated by the British. W.E.B. Du Bois agreed with this assessment of the three 
“Indian Stooges.” In an article in the Chicago Defender, Du Bois described himself and the 
NAACP’s Walter White running away from a photo-op with the official Indian delegates. Since 
they “in no way” represented the Indian people, Du Bois wrote, “[i]t would have been a calamity 
for us to be photographed with them.” Instead, the two activists lunched with Pandit, who he 
described as “a charming women in every way; physically beautiful, simple and cordial, [who] 
represents as few people could, nearly 400 million people, and represents them by right of their 
desire and her personality, and not by the will of Great Britain.”124 Walter White heaped on even 
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greater praise in his assessment of Pandit at the end of the San Francisco conference, an 
extraordinary passage worth quoting at length: 
Imagine, if you will, an exquisitely featured face of lovely reddish brown surmounted by 
a semi-circle of silver hair brushed backward and upward to that it looks like a halo when 
the sun shines through it. Imagine laughter as spontaneous and gay as that of a healthy 
child filled only with the joy of living and darkened by none of life’s heartaches and 
tragedies. Imagine beautifully kept hands which dart and flash with the color and skill of 
a bird in flight, lending just the need emphasis to words spoken with a throaty richness in 
flawless English. Imagine the transition with unbelievable speed from gayety to somber, 
moody fury against the suave exploiters of her people—a change of mood so startling 
that Helen Hayes, the great actress, was moved to describe its possessor as ‘a bright 
shining flame.’ 
 
The relationships Pandit forged with Black American leaders such as Du Bois and White in San 
Francisco because of her ability to present herself as the only legitimate representative of the 
Indian cause translated into powerful solidarities around questions of racial equality and 
anticolonialism when Pandit returned to the UN in 1946 as head of India’s delegation. 
 
The Future 
Pandit capitalized on her family history, natural charisma, and gripping oratory in order 
to present a compelling personification of modern India at the birth of the United Nations. To 
Western audiences this fair-skinned, sari-wearing Indian woman with perfectly coiffed hair, the 
sister of Jawaharlal Nehru, and a non-violent protestor who had been thrice imprisoned for civil 
disobedience embodied both the intriguing otherness of India and the possibility of India’s 
future. Her future press attaché once referred to “her mass appeal in the Western world” as a 
“phenomenon.”125 These observers, perhaps most familiar with Katherine Mayo’s negative 
depiction of Indian women in Mother India, were struck by the particular combination of 
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Pandit’s charismatic femininity and powerful political speech.126 For the Congress’s nationalist 
project she embodied the ideal “modern Indian womanhood, lovely, graceful, intelligent, poised 
and thoroughly feminine,” and thus reflected the position the Congress leaders believed 
postcolonial India deserved to assume in world politics.127 According to British diplomat Philip 
Noel-Baker, “if India could produce such women, India could herself most assuredly control her 
national affairs.”128 Pandit embodied this space in a moment in which the contingencies of 
history combined with the power of print culture allowed her to appropriate her own 
representation and project herself, and India, as legitimate actors on the world stage. The San 
Francisco conference was a major diplomatic event garnering attention from around the world. 
But it was the drama taking place outside the meeting halls via Pandit that predicted the nature of 
UN postcolonialism that would take root in 1946 through the Indian delegation’s fight against 
racism in South Africa. In other words, the Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit of 1945 was the perfect future 
tense for both the aspiring Indian postcolonial state and the ideals of the UN itself. 
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2 
RACE, GENDER, AND EMOTION AT THE BIRTH OF THE  
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1946 
 
 
 
The color and colonial issues hang like a spectre over the entire 
proceedings of the United Nations General Assembly. 
Chicago Defender, 2 November 1946 
 
 
Near the end of June 1946, UN Secretary General Trygve Lie received a petition signed 
by Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, head of India’s delegation to the first part of the first session of 
the UN in London in the winter of 1946.129 In the document, Mudaliar requested that the 
question of the treatment of Indians in South Africa be included on the General Assembly’s 
provisional agenda. The letter offered a brief history of Indian indentured laborers’ emigration to 
South Africa and argued that they had “progressively suffered discrimination and deprivation of 
elementary rights ever since 1885,” culminating with the passage of the Asiatic Land Tenure and 
Indian Representation Act on 2 June 1946.130 Referred to as the “Ghetto Act” by its opponents, 
the provisions of the new law severely limited South African Indians’ access to land ownership 
and occupancy. It also extended representational rights to Indians via “European” proxies. A 
growing South African Indian passive resistance movement had responded with mass meetings, 
marches, and the occupation of disputed land. The letter informed the Secretary General that 
because the Ghetto Act constituted a repudiation of past agreements, India had terminated trade 
with South Africa and recalled its High Commissioner in protest. The situation was “likely to 
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impair friendly relations between India and South Africa,” which, according to the UN Charter, 
allowed the Indian government to submit the question for consideration by the General 
Assembly.131 In response to India’s request, the treatment of Indians in South Africa appeared on 
the first General Assembly agenda. This agenda item came to be considered the “most hotly 
debated”132 issue at the UN that fall by contemporary observers, and according to scholars today 
it “change[d] the terms of the debate and international norms” at the birth of the Assembly.133 
For the newly formed interim Indian government, the South Africa case was a debut of 
India’s aspirational postcolonial leadership on the global stage. Lacking military and economic 
strength, and plagued by poverty, famine, and growing communal violence, India could 
nevertheless “exert moral leadership” in the world.134 No matter the outcome of the debates, 
simply having the issue heard at the UN would both boost confidence in the interim government 
at home and garner international support for Jawaharlal Nehru’s foreign policy vision that 
included antiracism, anticolonialism, and respect for human rights. As the newly appointed Vice 
President of the Indian interim government, Nehru made an important foreign policy speech in 
late September 1946, wherein he named the South African Indian resolution the most important 
for the Indian delegation at the upcoming UN General Assembly, calling it a “moral and human 
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issue” that could not be ignored.135 In addition, the South African Indian resolution related to 
other resolutions addressing human rights at the 1946 Assembly, in particular the condemnation 
of racial persecution and discrimination, and the affirmation of genocide as an international 
crime.136 The Indian delegation also led the fight that session against South Africa’s bid to annex 
the mandate of South West Africa (Namibia) rather than submitting it as a trusteeship. In almost 
simultaneously running committee meetings dealing with the South African Indian question and 
South West Africa, India’s fight against racial discrimination became linked to an argument 
against aggressive imperialism; evidence from each used to bolster the other.137  
In a continuation of the rhetoric surrounding Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit’s campaign at the 
Charter conference a year before, anticolonial and antiracist activists around the globe 
considered India’s leadership and the implications of their case against South Africa a test for the 
UN Charter’s idealistic language of rights and freedoms; a hopeful precedent for future 
international scrutiny of other countries’ racist policies and imperial aggression. African 
American observers correlated the “trial” of South African racism at the UN with a possible 
future trial of U.S. racism and the Jim Crow South.138 Also, the African National Congress and 
South African Indian passive resisters welcomed a verdict on South Africa’s racist ideology and 
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imperialist desires at the world “tribunal” of the United Nations.139 The possibility of India’s 
draft resolution passing provided evidence to back up the notion that the UN was categorically 
different than the League of Nations, and not just because this time around the United States had 
committed to the organization’s success. Nationalists objected not only to continued colonial rule 
at the League, but also the exclusionary politics of that organization. The presence of a 
delegation representing the (almost) independent India averted similar reactions in 1946, lending 
the UN an air of inclusion—the colonized alongside imperial powers—unlike any other 
international organization in the past.  
For other stakeholders, the implications of India’s case against South Africa were more 
threatening. The British were loath to have a “family quarrel” between Commonwealth members 
aired on a global stage.140 Some legal scholars, in line with the South African and British stance, 
warned of the ramifications of the General Assembly overreaching its jurisdiction at its very 
inception. What South Africa and its supporters had argued was a domestic issue best suited for 
the International Court of Justice could open the door to further critique of South Africa’s and 
others’ racist policies.141 And in South Africa, white peoples’ anger over UN condemnation 
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marked a turning point in the country’s political landscape, leading to a renewed consolidation of 
white supremacist ideology there.142   
As the debates surrounding South Africa became subsumed within broader disputes over 
race, empire, and human rights, the elevated stakes for all concerned were reflected in 
heightened emotion both at the Assembly and in newspaper coverage. For those who were 
invested in the UN fulfilling its promises to protect human rights and promote self-
determination, the emotional language invoked at the UN, especially when expressed by 
delegates from once-colonized nations, was celebrated as evidence of change. Conversely, for 
those defending the status quo through a dependence upon rational, legal decision-making, 
emotional displays signified an irrational, politicized, dangerous response. Embedded in the 
narratives of imperialist ideologies is the notion that the control of emotion is linked to 
civilizational progress.143 This “grand narrative” produces a dichotomy wherein “emotion” 
marks a dividing line between civilized and savage, maturity and childishness, masculinity and 
femininity, white and other—and in this case, legal and political.144 Historians of emotion make 
a compelling case for emotion as category of analysis, given that, as Nicole Eustace argues, 
“emotional expression is a fundamental form of social communication critical to the exertion and 
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to the contestation of power.”145 Martin Francis makes a further case for linking political and 
cultural histories through the analysis of emotional discourse when he argues that emotion is part 
and parcel of the discursive economy of formal politics, one that shapes the contests for power 
and the nature of political outcomes.146 
 This chapter argues that the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 was the ground 
upon which competing “emotional communities” clashed both inside and outside the meeting 
rooms over issues concerning empire and race.147 The traditional emotional community of high 
international diplomacy, a space largely created by white western male diplomats and their 
mimics who valued logic and control, was disrupted when a new and more emotive diplomacy 
expressed through postcolonial representatives evolved through the debates over South Africa’s 
racial oppression and imperial desires. On one side of the Indian complaint against South Africa 
was the presumption of a legalistic and “unemotional” diplomatic rhetoric deemed appropriate 
for international assemblies. South Africa’s Jan Christiaan Smuts and Britain’s Sir Hartley 
Shawcross in particular were appalled by what they perceived as overly emotional manipulation 
brought to the issue; a position that in part drove their effort to maintain the debate within “legal” 
parameters and precedence and push the resolution to the Sixth (Legal) Committee and on to the 
International Court of Justice.148 However, for many other delegates and outside observers, 
South Africa’s continued adherence to the rhetoric of white supremacy and the civilizing mission 
put it grossly out of step with the post-war shift toward human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Smuts’s reputation as a world statesman and his authorship of the idealistic UN Charter 
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Preamble could not insulate his country’s policies from angry comparisons to Nazism and the 
Jim Crow U.S. South. And the South African delegate G. Heaton Nicholls’s efforts to explain 
South Africa’s position in the racialized terms of the civilizing mission precipitated the most 
personally scathing exchanges of the session and generated an increase in newspaper coverage.  
When it came time for the interim Indian government to select a head of delegation for 
the first UN General Assembly scheduled to meet in New York City in October 1946, Vijaya 
Lakshmi Pandit was the top choice of both the British and Indian leadership.149 Though this 
would be ostensibly India’s first independently selected delegation to an international 
conference, with India still officially under British rule, the appointment “had to be confirmed 
by…London” and “credentials sent from the Court of St. James’s.”150 Pandit’s performance in 
1945 during the UNICO in San Francisco had demonstrated her effectiveness as an international 
diplomat. In the few whirlwind weeks surrounding the UNICO, Pandit had drawn large 
audiences, impressed world leaders, and drawn a great deal of press attention. Her personal 
charm and family connections, intelligence and wit, Western bearing and Eastern exoticism 
produced a compelling identity during that unofficial debut on the world stage. Possibly 
“influenced by the inconveniences for himself and his Government of her self-appointed role at 
San Francisco” and keen to avoid the power struggles that ensued over her unapproved 1945 trip, 
the Viceroy to India Lord Wavell insisted Pandit head the 1946 UN delegation.151 Gandhi and 
Nehru concurred. In her memoirs Pandit remembers: “I was not to argue with any of the three 
men. A decision had been taken in the best interests of India, and nothing more was to be said.” 
Upon accepting the position, Gandhi then told her he had selected her to “handle” the treatment 
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of South Asians in South Africa on the UN agenda, since he “knew that I would do it as he 
would wish,” using truth and ethics as a guideline. When she met with Lord Wavell that same 
day, he told her that her “name had come to mind as soon as Gandhiji suggested inscribing the 
South African item on the Agenda.” Pandit’s effective embodiment of a modernized Indian 
nation provided an occasion for a familiar collaboration between British and Indian (male) elites 
over the ground of Indian womanhood. Though Pandit expresses bitterness in her memoirs about 
the ultimate failure of the UN to live up to the promises of its Charter, she remembers the 
successful vote against South African discrimination in 1946 as “a moment in time when it 
seemed possible to remold the world to a design in which justice, equality, and opportunity 
would help establish the peace for which exhausted humanity had yearned.”152 Indeed Pandit 
herself embodied those possibilities as she carried the question of South African racialized 
discrimination against Indians to the United Nations, what was described by one delegate at that 
time as “the highest and most far reaching rostrum in the world.”153 
Leading the Indian delegation, Pandit came to occupy the emotional center of opposition 
to the South African and British legalist argument, allying herself with and being embraced by a 
multi-racial global audience seeking justice through the United Nations. Pandit’s race and gender 
immediately differentiated her from the white male-dominated diplomatic community, and her 
calls for justice and an end to oppression from such a prominent stage drew crowds who flocked 
to meeting rooms to witness this Indian woman standing up to imperialist power. The only 
female head of a delegation, Pandit both embodied and symbolized an emerging postcolonial 
culture at the UN and the changes coming to post-war world governance. Her strategic uses of 
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race, gender, and emotion, and the ways in which those categories were attributed to her, 
influenced the outcome of the debates. African American observers in particular capitalized on 
the emotional drama to ally with Indian nationalist representatives like Pandit. 
To understand more fully why this historical moment has held such import it is essential 
to investigate the friction between powerful white, colonial diplomacies and the possibilities of a 
new postcolonial diplomacy that centered the question of race and colonialism through racially 
diverse delegations. Taking seriously emotion as a historical force co-constitutive of race and 
gender reveals a new understanding of the structures of power at work in the earliest moments of 
the UN General Assembly. India’s claim for South African Indians was the first test case for 
human rights as enshrined in the UN Charter, and the battle for that case was carried out in 
competing and highly gendered emotional discourses at the site of the UN. The drama both 
shaped the contest for power and the nature of the political outcome at the birth of the General 
Assembly. It was this highly visible global public spectacle that, to some extent, impacted the 
fates of party politics at home and helped shape the founding moments of UN postcolonialism. 
 
“It is not to be supposed…that this session of the General Assembly will be tranquil and 
unexciting.” 
Times of India, 24 October 1946 
 
Apart from any particularly controversial issues, the 1946 UN General Assembly was 
infused with an emotional politics derived from its post-war context. In the period immediately 
following the Second World War, promises made by the colonial powers, horror over Nazi 
atrocities, and the specter of atomic war helped foster a renewed urgency to the perception of 
interdependence between nations and peoples and the drive to end racism and colonialism. 
Member states and observers around the world placed great hope in the possibility of the newly 
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formed United Nations to contain conflict and establish a permanent peace. When the founding 
member states met in London in January 1946 to begin the process of bringing the UN Charter to 
life, the session took place in a city bearing stark evidence of the war’s brutality and many 
delegates expressed the importance of the UN’s mission by evoking the horrors endured during 
the war under Nazi occupation, a “descent into hell” that had destroyed cities, towns, and farms, 
and exterminated millions.154 The UN offered a salve to the wounds of war; a way to make the 
extreme sacrifices worthwhile. “Surely,” the Canadian delegate Louis Saint-Laurent insisted, 
“this organization is the protest, uttered as with one voice by all civilized peoples, against futile 
mass slaughter and against the mass destruction of material wealth created for the benefit of 
mankind.”155 India’s delegate characterized the UN like a phoenix rising out of the ashes of the 
League of Nations.156 And other delegates believed that the Charter, while imperfect, was 
nevertheless better, bigger, and stronger than the League’s Covenant, and offered realistic, 
practical means to safeguard peace.157 
Alongside these messages of hope delegates voiced concern that the words of the Charter 
and the meetings of UN bodies would not be enough to ensure success—there would need to be 
action. They emphasized that the workings of the General Assembly were public on a global 
scale: that the “eyes of the world” were watching raised the stakes of their endeavors.158 As “the 
highest and most far reaching rostrum in the world,” the General Assembly was a “magnetic pole 
attracting all eyes and towards which converge the hopes of all nations in the world, which see 
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this organization as the ultimate court of appeal for the salvation of mankind.”159 Some portion 
of the “millions” to whom the delegates referred included war refugees, famine victims, and 
others seeking action on material solutions to post-war emergencies; other observers were 
anxious for a policy to control atomic power and the creation of political and judicial 
mechanisms to prevent future global war. But another significant portion of these “untold 
millions” were those seeking the implementation of the ideals of human rights, fundamental 
freedoms, and self-determination enunciated in the Atlantic Charter and the UN Charter. In the 
wake of the war’s destruction, when “the rights of the human person” and the “fundamental 
concept of life on our planet” had been at stake, delegates argued there was now a need for an 
“international moral code.”160 This conviction was summarized most vividly by the Brazilian 
delegate: “If the guns are to be silent forever, the heart of man must first be disarmed; it must be 
drained of all prejudice as to race, nationality and religion; it must be purged of the sin of 
ambition and pride; and it must be filled instead with hope and brotherly feeling.”161 
When delegations met again for the second part of the General Assembly session in New 
York in late October 1946, the new organization was emerging fitfully within the jagged ends of 
war. The Nuremburg Trials had ended on October 1, and the Paris Peace Conference only on 
October 15, which had forced a delay of the Assembly’s opening. Having focused largely on 
procedure at the London session, in New York the UN now faced debates over major, divisive 
issues including the control of atomic power, disarmament, and the fate of Palestine. Despite 
these divisions and difficulties, UN delegates continued to publicly express unanimity on two 
significant points: the future of world peace depended upon their success, and the eyes of the 
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world remained focused on their deliberations. These two presumptions both united the delegates 
in common cause and altered the emotional tenor of the Assembly itself. Alistair Cooke, 
journalist for the Manchester Guardian, conveyed the sense that the second part of the first 
session was “fateful”: “If it fails the United Nations will be damned as misbegotten…That is 
why, though many delegates have voiced portentous hopes for this meeting, [British delegate] 
Mr. Philip Noel-Baker was not too fanciful in calling it ‘probably the most important meeting 
ever held in the history of mankind.’”162   
Noel-Baker’s concerns at the UN focused mostly on issues such as armaments and 
atomic power, but for others the “hope of the world” invested in the UN lay not only in the 
control of the implements of war, but in the potential for the Charter to alter the relationship 
between imperial powers and dependent peoples and to end racial discrimination. Before the 
Assembly session even began, the Indian case against South Africa was identified as the trial 
case to determine “how much solid substance” there was in the Charter’s language of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, while simultaneously challenging the limits of its language on 
domestic jurisdiction.163 Opponents and proponents of the South African Indian case early on 
identified the stakes involved, including the possibility of “international discord of a particularly 
explosive nature.”164 As the South African Indian case preceded through the mechanisms of the 
organization under intense international press coverage, conflicting discourses on issues of race, 
colonialism, and the meaning of the Charter came to dominate the emotional center of a summit 
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already deemed of global importance. The two central protagonists, Pandit and Jan Christiaan 
Smuts, used public statements immediately prior to the session to establish their differing 
positions in the strongest possible terms, foreshadowing the vehemence of the coming debates. 
Speaking to the Belgian Parliament in mid-October Smuts warned of UN “Busybodies” 
interfering in domestic affairs, “Ideologists may use UNO for their purposes as a platform for 
publicity and propaganda,” which could shake confidence in the organization and impede its 
“prospects of good service for peace.”165 Invoking the ideology of European civilizational 
superiority, Smuts urged confidence in “’Europe, the concept of Europe, its unity, its glory, and 
renaissance…There lies the true road to wholeness, to sanity, to our lasting peace.”166 Asked to 
respond to Smuts’s speech in a press conference immediately before leaving India for New York, 
Pandit wholly rejected his arguments. “’The fate of the world depends on the fact that all nations 
must cooperate as equals in reshaping the future. If this basic fact is unrecognized, the human 
race is doomed,’” she warned.167 In an enunciation of multi-racial solidarity that would mark her 
time at the UN, Pandit declared, “’The black man today is on the march. The racial issue in 
South Africa breeds the germs of a World War III.”168 The issue for both sides went well beyond 
the scope of the question; the specter of war lending it added emotional weight. 
The first serious challenge to the Indian resolution by South Africa and its supporters 
began in the small, crowded General Committee meeting with Smuts’s request to strike the item 
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from the agenda completely. He argued that the language in Article 2(7) on domestic jurisdiction 
protected South Africa from intervention. His position garnered little support.169 The “heated 
interchanges and parliamentary maneuvering” over the next two-and-a-half-hours focused on 
Britain’s Sir Hartley Shawcross’s proposal to have the item sent to the Sixth Committee 
(Legal).170 This proposal was the first of many efforts led by South Africa, Britain, and the 
United States to preempt a vote on the floor of the Assembly in 1946 by asserting that the matter 
was a legal issue and should be decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, 
India and its supporters continued to argue that as a human rights question India’s case was both 
legal and political, which would allow for debate in the First Committee (Political and Social) 
and a vote on the floor of the General Assembly.171 The wide gulf between the two sides 
prompted a debate that “was as tense as such things ever get without an open explosion into 
personalities.”172 In the end the General Committee voted to have the item heard by a Joint 
Committee of the First and Sixth Committees, evidence of the structural impact the opposing 
opinions had on the function of the Assembly at the outset. 
The day following the contentious General Committee debates, Pandit delivered her 
opening speech to the Assembly. Representing a nationalist Indian delegation with a vocal 
anticolonial and antiracism agenda, and as the first woman to address the UN in opening 
remarks, Pandit’s rise to the podium was weighted with historical significance. Her speech 
“before a hushed and crowded hall” brought a message of hope and inspiration on behalf of an 
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aspiring postcolonial state that Pandit emphasized had at long last assumed its rightful place in 
international politics. 173 She pledged India’s dedication to speak on behalf of those millions 
looking to the UN for peace and freedom by fighting against racism and imperialism in all its 
guises. “The sufferings, the frustration, the violation of human dignity and the challenge to world 
peace, freedom and security that empire represents must be one of the prime concerns of this 
parliament of the world’s peoples,” she proclaimed. It was for these reasons that India had 
brought the issue of the treatment of Indians in South Africa to the UN. Neither “local nor 
narrow,” the South African Indian case related directly to the cause for which the war had been 
fought. “The bitter memories of racial doctrines in the practice of States and Governments are 
still fresh in the minds of all of us,” she said. “Their evil and tragic consequences are part of the 
problems with which we are called upon to deal.” Her speech ended with a call to delegates that 
acknowledged the role of emotion within the formal politics of the UN’s work: “Let us recognize 
that human emotions and the needs of the world will not wait for an indefinite period. To this 
end let us direct our energies and, reminding ourselves that in our unity of purpose and action 
alone lies the hope of the world, let us march on.”174 
Foreshadowing the extended ovation Pandit would receive after her final dramatic 
comments on the South African Indian resolution in December, her opening speech elicited a 
remarkable emotional response at the Assembly. “[T]hunderous applause,” the “most 
enthusiastic” of the Assembly to date, greeted the conclusion of her speech “from the assembly 
and the galleries.”175 By all accounts her speech was considered “brilliant” and compelling.176 
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The Calcutta (Kolkata) newspaper The Statesman reported to Indian readers that Pandit’s 
“appeal” was covered prominently in both New York and Washington newspapers.177 It was not 
only her words that compelled, however. As fellow Indian delegate Justice Chagla commented 
tellingly after the session, “’her charm, beauty, and eloquence literally swept the United Nations 
off their feet.’”178 U.S. papers in particular conveyed a romanticized, orientalist attraction to 
Pandit, directly linking her physical beauty, physical stature, and “native dress” with her 
effectiveness as a diplomat. A Boston Globe reporter identified her as one of the two most 
compelling orators at the UN, “her clear, gentle but bell-like voice” able to hold the “minds of 
those in the great hall.”179 Another observed that Pandit’s “colorful native attire, poise, and 
delivery quickly attracted the attention of delegates, public, and press alike—as a pleasant 
contrast to the three days of masculine oratory” that had come before.180 This was reinforced 
especially in comparison to Smuts who reportedly sat silently, staring at his hands while the 
“fragile but militant” Pandit made her “eloquent plea” on behalf of the oppressed.181 “This old, 
famous statesman, confronting the new voice of India in the person of this graceful woman,” a 
Boston Globe reporter commented, “was a sight to be seen.”182 The notion that Pandit embodied 
“the new voice of India” in contrast to the silent, seemingly isolated Smuts was a powerful 
observation that carried throughout press coverage of the debates.   
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Even when male Indian delegates briefly took the spotlight, Pandit ultimately remained at 
the center of the gendered emotional discourse. A case in point is Sir Maharaj Singh’s role in 
spearheading the almost unanimous opposition to South Africa’s request to annex the mandatory 
territory of South West Africa (Namibia) rather than submitting it as a trusteeship under the UN 
Charter.183 As Smuts and Singh exchanged increasingly personalized barbs throughout the course 
of the debates at the Trusteeship Committee, the two sides revealed their positions on issues of 
race, empire, and the purpose of the UN Charter, raising tensions in the weeks before the Joint 
Committee met on the question of South African Indians. Drawing on the right to self-
determination, Smuts insisted that the inhabitants of South West Africa had freely expressed 
their desire for incorporation through referenda (for whites) and tribal meetings (for natives). 
Smuts argued that the region was already unified geographically and culturally with the Union of 
South Africa, and so annexation would fulfill “an historical evolution” for the mandated 
territory.184  
Singh, who claimed expertise on the issue given his three years as the Indian 
representative to South Africa, refuted Smuts’s statements, arguing that the Union practiced 
racial discrimination against South West African natives through segregation, 
disenfranchisement, limitations on movement and choice of occupation, and limited access to 
arable land. Newspaper reports highlighted Singh’s personalized responses to Smuts. The New 
York Times deemed it “a vehement attack,” while the Times of India called Singh’s “slashing 
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attack” both “incisive and challenging.”185 In one “dramatic moment” Singh reportedly turned to 
other “non-European delegates sitting nearby” telling them that if they visited South Africa they 
would be subject to segregation in restaurants, on public transportation, and in movie theaters.186 
Delegate after delegate supported India’s opposition to annexation in their respective opening 
comments.187 Having observed these “barbed words” directed at South Africa, one reporter 
reflected, “One could feel sorry for [Smuts] the warrior who seemed to sense that the shadows 
were beginning to fall across his greatest dream, white supremacy.”188 James Bottomley, the 
British representative, was the only delegate to speak in support of the South African proposal.189 
Despite the overwhelming opposition to annexation by delegates to the Trusteeship 
Committee, Smuts responded explicitly to what he called an “indictment” by Singh who, Smuts 
claimed, had “given a one-sided and distorted picture of the situation in the Union.” Expanding 
on an argument laid out in South Africa’s memorandum submitted in defence of their treatment 
of Indians, Smuts challenged the legitimacy of India’s claims to speak on behalf of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms given India’s own deep caste and religious divisions. Singh’s charge 
of discrimination, Smuts argued, “came with ill grace from the representative of a country like 
India where social discrimination was the very basis and pattern of society.”190 The rather bland 
official summary of Smuts’ comments fails to adequately convey the character of Smuts’s 
response, which was referred to in news reports as “a devastating reply” and a “blistering attack 
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upon India.”191 Smuts offered detailed descriptions of the “social ostracism and humiliation” 
endured by India’s depressed classes, and the “terrifying phenomenon” of communal clashes that 
had killed or injured thousands in the last few months.192 “’I speak not in anger but in pain and 
sorrow and in deep sympathy with India’s suffering millions,’” Smuts was quoted as stating, 
“’but no less in deep solicitude for the people of South Africa.’”193 This emotional attack on the 
Indian position swayed no supporters in the committee room.   
The day following Smuts’s response the U.S. delegation announced their unwillingness 
to support annexation, essentially dooming the request. Still, Singh “felt obliged to reply” to 
Smuts’s remarks “since it had contained a criticism of the Indian statement” from earlier in the 
discussion. Singh’s comments reiterated his direct knowledge of conditions in South Africa, and 
replied to criticism of the Indian caste system by contrasting the direct representation of 
“depressed classes” in local and central governmental bodies in India compared to the very 
minor indirect representation of natives in South Africa.194 After the meeting Singh took one last 
personal swipe at Smuts, “’I do not in the least object to the vehemence of the language used [by 
Smuts]. I feel he must have been piqued at the fact that an Asiatic delegation was the first to 
protest against his proposal to annex South-west Africa.’”195 Over the course of seven 
Trusteeship Committee meetings, Singh and Smuts “continued the acrimonious exchange” over 
minority rights, annexation, and India’s caste system, resulting in what a Rand Daily Mail report 
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concluded was likely “one of the most gruelling [sic]” weeks Smuts had ever experienced.196 
Another U.S. periodical reported Smuts “was visibly shocked, humiliated and dejected by the 
sharpness and virtual unanimity with which the delegates around the conference table assailed 
his government.”197 Smuts’s private correspondence affirms this impression. Before the Joint 
Committee meetings on the South African Indian question began on 21 November, he already 
had conceded defeat in at least one private letter. Calling his “mission to U.N.O. a failure,” he 
wrote, “I can but bow my head and accept the blows which come my way.”198 The emotionally 
charged language and increasingly personalized attacks on both sides served to heighten the 
drama unfolding between India and South Africa at the Assembly and in the international press 
as the Joint Committee meetings approached. 
 
“The storm which has been brewing for some weeks over the problem of Indians in South 
Africa broke violently yesterday over General Smuts’s head.”         
Rand Daily Mail, 23 November 1946 
When the Joint Committee of the First and Sixth Committees met it had only one item to 
discuss: “The treatment of Indians settled in the territory of the Union of South Africa.” With 
Pandit representing India and Smuts again leading the South African delegation, these debates 
quickly overshadowed the heated exchanges between Singh and Smuts at the Trusteeship 
Committee. Observers had been disappointed earlier in the month when “[i]n ten seconds of 
hushed drama” Smuts had elected not to deliver a pre-circulated speech on the floor of the 
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Assembly when the General Committee’s proposed agenda came up for debate.199 As a result, 
the Joint Committee meetings were the first time that Pandit and Smuts appeared in face-to-face 
debate. Anticipation was high and the meetings produced a surge in coverage of the issue facing 
the committee. The small, “low-roofed, red-carpeted committee room” was not large enough to 
contain the number of spectators who filled the room to over-flowing in order “to hear the battle 
between India and South Africa.”200 The space was “heavy with cigarette smoke and was as 
uncomfortably warm as the engine-room of a tramp steamer,” creating an “oppressive 
atmosphere [that] tended to increase the feeling of tension” in the room.201 The crowds were not 
disappointed. As the debates unfolded under close scrutiny, the major players’ discourse 
increased in intensity, and one particularly “shocking remark” precipitated the most passionate 
and bitter exchanges at the Assembly, propelling Pandit further into the center of the gendered 
emotional discourse.202 
 Surrounded by an Indian contingent that overflowed its allotted seats, Pandit opened the 
first day of debate with a speech that, in one admiring commentator’s estimation, “violated all 
the rules of diplomatic protocol which forbid the voicing of unpleasant truths, especially if they 
deal with the treatment of ‘backward’ peoples by nice, noble white people.”203 Pandit “presented 
India’s case in a soft, low voice,” and read her statement “in a clear deliberate tone.”204 As she 
spoke, Smuts “sat quietly,” listening “attentively, moving his hands only now and then to brush 
                                                
199 “India’s Complaint Against South Africa,” The Statesman, 2 November 1946, 1. See “Smuts Delays Statement 
on Indians,” Rand Daily Mail, 1 November 1946, 1; “Discussion by UNO Of The India-Union Problem,” Times of 
India, 2 November 1946, 9; and “Smuts Withdraws Speech,” The Passive Resister, 11 November 1946. 
200 “Seven Countries Attack South Africa in UNO,” Rand Daily Mail 23 November 1946, 9; “Obligations of South 
Africa,” Times of India, 27 November 1946, 7; “India’s Plea Against S. Africa Debated by U.N.O. Assembly: 
Dramatic Duel Between F-M Smuts and Mrs. Pandit,” The Statesman, 23 November 1946, 1. 
201 “Nicholls Defends S.A. in Forthright Fashion at UNO,” Rand Daily Mail, 27 Nov 1946, 9. 
202 “Personalities at UNO: Editorial,” The Statesman, 2 December 1946, 4. 
203 “Seven Countries Attack South Africa in UNO”; Walter White, “People, Politics and Places: Strike at the Heart,” 
Chicago Defender, 23 November 1946, 15. 
204 “India’s Plea Against S. Africa Debated by U.N.O. Assembly”; “Seven Countries Attack South Africa in UNO.” 
  75 
aside the fog of smoke put up by M. Manuilsky [Soviet delegate] who chain-smoked cigarettes 
throughout the proceedings.”205 Pandit did not focus on legal issues, but instead called attention 
to the moral dimensions of the issue.206 In “gently phrased but telling accusations,” she argued 
that by passing the Ghetto Act, South Africa had violated the principles of fundamental freedoms 
and ran counter to the resolution against the abolition of racial and religious persecution passed 
unanimously by the General Assembly the previous week.207 Presenting the treatment of Indians 
as a “world problem,” Pandit called on the UN “to exercise their collective wisdom and to 
employ their moral sanction in the interest of justice.” She also preempted expected criticism of 
Indian social conditions, calling that a “dangerous” and “unjust” argument given that “India was 
doing her utmost to remedy as quickly as possible the social evils which were the heritage of the 
past.”208 
 After a “flurry of conversation” following the end of Pandit’s speech, “an expectant 
silence fell again” as Smuts delivered his opening remarks. Reporters described an intense 
atmosphere: “The only sound in the room was the slow, even-toned voice of General Smuts, and 
the only movement was that of the translators, in the glass-fronted cubicles behind General 
Smuts who were turning the speech into Russian, Chinese, French and Spanish.”209 After 
congratulating Pandit for the “ability and gravity” of her speech, Smuts re-emphasized the point 
he had made in his speech to the Belgian Parliament and which animated his and Shawcross’s 
determination to have the case sent to the International Court of Justice: “the exploitation of 
domestic issues by foreign States as a political weapon would determine, to a large extent, the 
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future issues of peace and war.”210 In “quiet but emphatic tones,” he stressed that the Charter 
language on domestic jurisdiction disallowed all UN intervention in domestic affairs with the 
exception of Security Council enforcement.211 Furthermore, because the 1927 and 1932 Cape 
Town Agreements between South Africa and India were “joint communiqué,” they did not create 
treaty obligations that would justify interference. In answer to the claim that the language of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms could justify intervention in domestic affairs, Smuts 
argued that at this time there was no specific “international recognized formulation” of rights, so 
no specific obligations existed under the current Charter. In any case, he denied that South Africa 
had in fact “infringed any of those elementary human rights.”212 “At the conclusion of his 
statement,” Smuts, “raising his voice slightly, moved his formal resolution” to refer the 
resolution to the Court.213 “When the statesman who wrote the noble words of the preamble to 
the Charter” ended his speech, “there was little applause.”214 
 The remainder of this first meeting of the Joint Committee was spent debating the Chair’s 
proposal to create a sub-committee to determine the legal question, rehashing the arguments set 
forth in the General Committee meeting the month before.215 The Argentinean delegate was the 
only committee member to speak in the Chair’s defense. Emotions ran high for the many 
delegates who agreed with Pandit’s contention that this was a worldwide issue and well within 
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the Assembly’s purview. While shouting his position, Manuilsky’s “waving arms almost 
knocked off” Smuts’s glasses.216 Delegates argued that no sub-committee was needed to 
determine the competency of the General Assembly to hear the issue; international treaties had 
been violated, which moved the matter out of domestic jurisdiction. Furthermore, the principles 
of the Charter were not being applied by South Africa, even though by signing the Charter 
member states “had made a certain renunciation of their sovereignty.”217 Once again 
comparisons to Nazi policies were made when the Iranian delegate reminded the committee that 
“the common struggle against hitlerism [sic] and fascism was that those regimes were based on 
racial discrimination.”218 Wellington Koo (China) warned in particularly vivid terms that failure 
to take action would leave “a running sore…in the body politic of the world.”219 After the 
meeting adjourned without a decision, people crowded around Pandit to shake her hand and 
congratulate her for her speech.220 
The second meeting of the Joint Committee, once again host to a “standing room only” 
crowd, would prove to be highly contentious, embroiling all sides in increasingly dramatic and 
personalized exchanges.221 Indian delegate M. C. Chagla opened the debate, emphasizing the 
history of negotiations between India and South Africa on the issue and pointing out South 
Africa’s obligations as a signatory to the UN Charter.222 According to The Statesman, Chagla 
turned to speak directly to Smuts, drawing a provocative parallel between South African policies 
and Nazi Germany:  
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On behalf of my countrymen, I express deep gratitude to FM Smuts for not—to use an 
expression which has rather painful connotations—liquidating my community in his 
country. If I may summarize FM Smuts’ arguments, they come to this: ‘In my own 
country I can do what I like. I can treat a racial minority as the Germans treated the Jews. 
I can shut them up in ghettos. I can violate the principles of the Charter and yet the UNO 
cannot call me to order.’223 
 
If the Indian resolution was defeated, Chagla warned, “it would mean that the United Nations 
was prepared to tolerate the doctrine of a master race, which so many nations fought victoriously 
in the last war at tremendous cost.”224 Overshadowed by print coverage of subsequent meetings 
and intense focus on Pandit, Chagla’s comments nonetheless increased the tension in the Joint 
Committee room. The Rand Daily Mail reported that many delegates, anticipating a strong 
reaction from South Africa’s G. Heaton Nicholls, kept an eye on him throughout Chagla’s 
“insistent and sarcastic speech,” “almost as a looker-on stares at a man who has been hit in the 
face to see whether he will hit back and start a fight.”225 
With tensions high, “the pink-complexioned and white-haired septuagenarian” Nicholls 
spoke to defend his country’s position against what he referred to as the exploitation of a 
political weapon by the Indian government.226 His speech marked yet another ratcheting up of 
the emotional discourse in the committee. Early in his comments Nicholls argued that the picture 
presented of South African conditions “’is as false as those who painted it,’” when in fact the 
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South African policy to promote evolutionary progress in the natives had proven successful.227  
Pandit, rising from her seat, interrupted him with “a heated protest”: “’I object! No member has a 
right to say this!’”228 Once the Chair brought the room back to order, Nicholls spoke for another 
hour articulating the white supremacist ideology of racial evolution underpinning South Africa’s 
“great experiment in human government,” an experiment that was threatened by the presence of 
the South African Indian population. It was important to understand, he argued, that until the 
Europeans arrived, there had been centuries without any evolution in central and southern Africa. 
Because their “religious customs formed a serious counter-influence to the spread of 
Christianity,” the presence of a growing Indian population in South Africa, had been “alarming,” 
especially to the inhabitants of Durban. He also echoed Smuts’s philosophical standing on the 
definition of fundamental rights, arguing that contrary to claims made in support of the Indian 
resolution, “[p]olitical rights are not fundamental. Such an argument,” Nicholls continued, “was 
tantamount to saying that the more progressive races should be retarded by the less progressive 
if, in fact, they constituted a majority.”229 His comments reportedly brought Pandit to her feet on 
at least one other occasion and “caused busy whispered consultations between most of the chief 
delegates and their advisers time and time again.”230 After the meeting adjourned Pandit told a 
reporter, “’The delegate for South Africa was intolerably rude and I am surprised that anyone in 
this August Assembly should lower the level of debate in the manner in which he has done.’”231 
Nicholls opened debate at the third meeting by offering an apology to “’the charming 
lady’ heading the Indian delegation” for the “false” comment, stating it “was in no way a 
                                                
227 Nancy MacLennan, “Court Test Urged on India U.N. Case,” New York Times, 26 November 1946, 12; and 
“Delegates Bitter Over African Case,” New York Times, 27 November 1946, 6; Nicholls, Joint Committee, 17. 
228 “Indians in South Africa: Sir H. Shawcross’s Advice,” London Times, 26 November 1946, 4; MacLennan, “Court 
Test Urged on India U.N. Case.” 
229 Nicholls, Joint Committee, 17-21. 
230 “Nicholls Defends S.A. in Forthright Fashion at UNO.”  
231 Newcomb, “South Africa on Defensive.” 
  80 
personal reflection on any members of the Indian delegation.”232 But the damage had been done. 
Pandit, who later recalled thinking Nicholls’s “aim seemed to be to humiliate India by 
accusations that were entirely irrelevant,” took full advantage of the opening for a counter-attack 
against the white supremacist rhetoric of the civilizing mission.233 In a meeting marked with 
“[l]aughter and recrimination,” Pandit utilized the content and tone of Nicholls’s speech to “flay” 
South Africa’s racial ideology and “excoriate” the history of British imperialism.234 Expressing a 
feeling of insult on behalf of her delegation, she took particular exception to the way in which 
Nicholls used his speech “’by attempting to ridicule’” Indian social and religious customs.235 In 
response to his comment on Indian polygamy, “she smilingly remarked: ‘I was not aware that 
polygamy, whether sanctioned by law or not, was confined to the East.’ Delegates and spectators 
burst into gales of laughter.”236 Pandit also used his words against him to challenge the notion 
that Christianity assumes the inferiority of non-white peoples. Were Jesus Christ alive today, she 
pointed out, he “would be a prohibited immigrant” to South Africa under the Immigration Act of 
1933.237  Furthermore, the “claims made for European civilization in South Africa” were hollow, 
given the “barbaric state of the native inhabitants.” “[F]ortunately for the world” the British 
Empire from which white South Africans claimed descent, “was now in process of 
liquidation.”238 Nicholls had “contended that segregation was essential to Western standards of 
life,” but the question facing the committee, Pandit argued, was “whether Western civilization is 
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going to be based on the theory of racial supremacy or whether the barriers imposed between 
men and women on grounds of color are to be broken down and justice and equality to be 
considered the due of all.”239 In submitting their resolution, Pandit denied that the Indian 
delegation had utilized the issue “as a lever in her political struggle against the British”; they 
“were fully conscious that grave and momentous issues were involved and that on their proper 
solution would depend the future of a large section of the human race.”240 “Some spectators 
applauded loudly” at this comment.241 In conclusion, she expressed hope “that the discussions 
would not be influenced by passions and prejudices, but that an attempt would be made, with 
understanding and good will, to remove a blot which affected all nations equally.”242 At the end 
of the meeting, delegates once again “crowded round Mrs. Pandit and expressed” their 
support.243 
Nicholls’s comment and Pandit’s response became the focus of press coverage, with 
particularly gendered discourse infusing editorial responses from Calcutta (Kolkata) and 
Johannesburg. The Rand Daily Mail editorial board had responded immediately to Nicholls’s 
first speech, chastising him for “poor debating” by taking on a role “a little too dramatic for the 
occasion,” and correctly predicting that the “false” phrase “was certain to cause quite an 
unnecessary ripple on the never very restful waters of Lake Success.” The board dismissed 
Pandit, referred to only as “the woman leader of the Indian delegation,” as an unequal opponent. 
Her comment on Nicholls’s rudeness was described as “a woman’s way of accusing the 
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delegate,” much as a Lady Macbeth had done when “stung by her husband’s tactless 
observation.”244 The Statesman took a slightly different view, arguing that “Mrs. Pandit and the 
rest of India’s delegation” were right to feel personal offense at Nicholls’s “shocking remark,” 
which had crossed from “the critical to the offensive.” Not be forgotten, however, were Chagla’s 
“extravagant” comments that were better suited to “the language of a school debating society 
where young boys are eager to be clever in speech, not of the Parliament of Man.”245 Tempering 
this perspective slightly in an editorial three days later, The Statesman conceded that the “lack of 
decorum” on the part of “India’s spokesmen” had been provoked by remarks that “bordered on 
the scurrilous.” The outcome was not all bad, however: “Despite the lowering of the standard of 
debate by such unedifying episodes, these general exchanges probably cleared the air and 
permitted outsiders to form an independent opinion, which the event shows to be not 
unfavourable to India.” A moral victory had been won simply by having the case heard.246 
With Nicholls’s “false” statement the dynamite in the South African Indian issue had 
exploded, and in one reporter’s estimation the Joint Committee “reached more bitter depths than 
any committee in the history of UNO.”247 The next two meetings consisted of vigorous debate 
over content and procedure, and revealed in highly emotional registers the struggles for power 
over the subjects of race and empire. Pandit verbally attacked both the imperialism represented 
by Britain’s Shawcross and the racism Nicholls continued to defend, further solidifying her 
position as defender of the oppressed. Shawcross, calling for “an impartial and dispassionate 
examination of the facts,” “pleasantly rebuked” Pandit for her comment about the “liquidation of 
the British Empire,” reminding her paternalistically, “’India would not be free to make her plea 
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to the United Nations if this British Commonwealth had not played its part in defeating the 
Germans.’”248 Pandit, in turn, “vigorously criticized” him for supporting South Africa on the 
issue.249 Referring to Shawcross’s “international reputation as Britain’s chief prosecutor” at the 
Nuremburg trials, she remarked cynically, “’Today he is a defendant in a similar case—only a 
really brilliant lawyer could do something like that.’” Nicholls and Pandit also “argued 
passionately” with each other according to news reports.250 Insisting he “did not sneer at Indian” 
religion or social customs, Nicholls pointed out he was emphasizing the difficulties facing the 
South African government “in its use of the native population.”251 “The abolition of 
discriminatory measures in South Africa,” he insisted, “would result in exploitation of the 
natives, who would soon lose their land to Indians and Europeans. Equality of rights would thus 
oppose the aims of the Charter.”252 In response, Pandit “denounced” Nicholls for claiming the 
question at hand was different from the fundamental freedoms in the Charter when in fact this 
was “a great moral problem.”253 “There could be no question of ‘fundamental’ and ‘non-
fundamental’ freedoms,” she insisted, “freedom was indivisible, and should be enjoyed by all 
peoples, whatever their colour.”254 
At the final Joint Committee meeting, it was obvious much negotiation had taken place 
outside the meeting room. Pandit opened debate with an “ameliorating speech.”255 “Speaking in 
soft warm tones,” she withdrew the harsher Indian draft resolution in favor of a more subdued 
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joint French/Mexican resolution.256 Smuts, speaking for the first time since the first Joint 
Committee meeting, “Stoutly…opposed the resolution.”257 Reiterating his stance that the matter 
was protected by the domestic jurisdiction clause, he called again for a court decision, and in a 
new maneuver said he would agree to have the Court send “a commission of enquiry to South 
Africa so as to establish the true facts in order to arrive at its determination of the law.” 
Demonstrating the insult taken by the tenor of the debates, he emphasized, “After an attack 
which had included a suggestion that the Government of South Africa occupied a position 
comparable to that of Nazi war criminals it could not agree to an enquiry of any political 
body.”258 Chagla responded that Smuts had made no real concession and that while India would 
consider allowing the General Assembly to send a commission of enquiry, it would continue to 
reject Court participation. Debate once again “sparkled with procedural fireworks.”259 In the end 
the Chair ruled that the resolutions would be voted upon in the order in which they were 
submitted to the Committee, placing the joint French and Mexican resolution first. The 
Committee passed the joint resolution 29 to 19 against with 6 abstentions. When the meeting 
adjourned Pandit was yet again “overwhelmed with congratulations” as “delegates crowded 
round her.”260 
Immediately following adjournment, in an encounter reported in the United States, India, 
and South Africa, Pandit edged her way through the crowd to Smuts and shook hands with “the 
loser in the hard-fought battle” in a gendered gesture of deference.261 In response to his question 
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regarding her satisfaction with the vote, she replied only that she was glad the issue had gotten its 
hearing. Smuts complimented her for her “very good” statement, but admonished her for 
referring to “’South African war criminals,’” a reference she “quickly denied.” “’What I said,” 
she corrected, “was ‘Crimes in South Africa were similar to those which led to war.’” He replied: 
“’God forbid.’” As he turned to leave he “said warmly: ‘My dear child, you and I have to fight 
hard the world.’”262 In her memoirs Pandit recalls a similar encounter in the delegates’ lounge 
when she approached Smuts to ask his “’pardon’” if anything she had said “’was not up to the 
standard Gandhiji had imposed’” on her. She remembers Smuts taking both of her hands in his 
and saying, “’My child…you have won a hollow victory. This vote will put me out of power in 
our next elections, but you will have gained nothing.’”263 The Times of India “hoped that the 
handclasp…was the symbolic beginning of more harmonious relations between the two great 
countries.”264 In fact, the encounter was symbolic of much more. Seeking Smuts’s “pardon” in 
such a public manner allowed Pandit to demonstrate respect for the elderly statesman, while at 
the same time emphasizing India’s win on the point. Smuts’s reaction, far from conceding the 
point, reiterated his position as a paternalistic imperialist. Referring to Pandit as a child, Smuts 
highlighted not only their age and gender differences, but he also presumed a superior 
understanding of the consequences of the vote.  
 
“The emotions are strange masters.” 
 By the time the resolution “The Treatment of Indians in Union of South Africa” reached 
the floor of the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 1946, various bodies of the 
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Assembly had been occupied with India’s complaint for weeks. Beginning with the official 
request for an agenda item in June, and stretching through days of increasingly tense committee 
meetings in late October and November, the final plenary vote on the subject was now imminent.  
Opening the debate, Smuts contained his remarks to the legal argument South Africa had pressed 
throughout the session: that the International Court of Justice should rule whether the Assembly 
had jurisdiction given the language of domestic jurisdiction enshrined in the Charter. A “mere 
political forum” such as the Assembly, he argued, had no right to “pass judgment” on a juridical 
question. Because no sovereign state should be denied its right of access to the courts, the only 
option was to send the matter to the Court for an advisory opinion. “To condemn a Member State 
of the Organization on very grave charges by such a vote would,” he argued, “be monstrous.”265 
His speech was met with silence.266   
In contrast, Pandit delivered a wide-ranging, emotive speech that inspired enthusiastic 
applause from the Assembly. In an appeal “to the conscience of the world,” she stated that India 
had brought this issue “before the bar of world opinion” only after years of negotiation, protest, 
and appeal. South Africa had indicted itself with its own words, and as a signatory of the Charter 
that state was obligated to honor its commitments. Rejecting the legal argument altogether, she 
argued the issue was now a question of “the defense of the law, ethics and morality of nations.” 
If the Assembly was blocked from action because of the domestic jurisdiction clause, “the 
Charter would be a dead letter, and our professions about a free world, free from inequalities of 
race, free from want and free from fear, an empty mockery.” Far from what Smuts deemed “a 
mere political forum,” the delegates to the General Assembly “are the trustees of the future, 
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architects of a new world.” “Millions of voiceless,” she declared, “are looking to us for justice, 
and it is only on the foundations of justice that we can create a new world order.”267 
Inspired by Pandit’s soaring, idealistic language, many delegates who followed her 
responded in kind to the emotion she had expressed, and concurred that the issues at stake in the 
South African Indian resolution resided at the heart of the UN project. De la Colina of Mexico 
argued that human rights and fundamental freedoms had been purposefully inserted throughout 
the Charter and there was no doubt that this language forbid discrimination. “It constitutes a 
postulate of the new international order,” he insisted, “despite the protagonist of racialism.”268 
The Philippine delegate called on his peers not to turn their backs on India on this moral question 
by sending the resolution to the Court.269 Invoking the history of World War II and Nazi 
discrimination, the Polish delegate stated simply, “we cannot remain indifferent.” “Failing to 
accept the resolution would deny justice to India, justice to Asia, justice to coloured people.”270 
But Britain’s Shawcross took issue with the emotional turn in the debate and specifically targeted 
Pandit for his derision, characterizing political appeals to emotion as irresponsible and dangerous 
diplomatic tactics: 
We have heard, yesterday and today, some very brilliant appeals to our emotions by 
practiced political orators. They have very rightly been applauded. Yesterday, we allowed 
Field-Marshall Smuts, who has devoted his whole life to the service of liberty and 
humanity, to pass in silence. The emotions are strange masters. But, this is not a matter 
for stirring up our emotions, which are so easily stirred up. This is a matter which we 
must try and deal with quite coldly and dispassionately and with a full sense of 
responsibility, not only to our political followers, but to our own Organization and, 
perhaps not less, to the Indians in South Africa. 
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The question according to Shawcross was how the domestic jurisdiction clause related to human 
rights and freedoms, which had to be decided authoritatively by the Court. “To give an emotional 
and a political answer to that question is to strike at the very roots of the rule of law,” he intoned. 
“Mrs. Pandit has said that all she asked was justice. But is that all that is asked for here, or is 
what is sought an emotional political verdict swayed by eloquence and oratory?”271 
Later that evening in a second session of the plenary that ultimately stretched until almost 
one in the morning, Pandit rose as “the chamber applauded her heartily” to respond to 
Shawcross’s comments and make one final plea on behalf of the resolution.272 Her comments 
marked the apex of the debates’ emotional discourse:  
[W]ith all the sincerity at my command, the gratitude not only of the people of India and 
the Indians in South Africa, but of the millions in every country whose hearts have been 
warmed and whose minds are eased by this impressive expression of world opinion in 
defence of justice and fundamental human rights…We shall remember this and know, in 
a way that cannot be forgotten, that justice, truth, and the oppressed have friends in every 
country and under every climate. This is all I want to say. I shall make no appeal. I left it 
with your conscience yesterday. I am content to let it rest there.273 
 
She was reportedly moved to tears.274 The response in the room was electric. In “the warmest 
demonstration yet” of Pandit’s popularity at the Assembly, a “burst of clapping greeted the end 
of her remarks and continued until she had reached her seat.”275 
 When the final vote was taken past midnight, it was “an intensely dramatic moment.”276 
“A hush fell” as votes were taken by voice.277 When the chair announced that the resolution had 
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achieved the necessary two-thirds majority, “there was a mighty roar of applause that drowned 
out the rest of the announcement. Delegates rushed to Mrs. Pandit to congratulate her.” 278  
Kumar Goshal, writing for the Pittsburgh Courier, bemoaned the lack of widespread radio 
coverage because simply reading about the events at the UN failed to convey the “sheer theater” 
in the room when “the verdict went against Smuts.”279 One paper reported that the response was 
“the greatest display of enthusiasm and satisfaction yet recorded by the United Nations General 
Assembly.” 280 The Indian delegation was “jubilant,” and “[i]t was some minutes before order 
was restored.”281 Not everyone was excited with the outcome, of course. Shawcross’s frustration 
with the context of the debates spilled over into his comments on the agenda item addressed 
immediately following the South African India vote. “I am happy to think,” he snidely remarked, 
“that the present matter is not one which is likely to arouse feeling or take up the time that was 
occupied by the last question.”282 
Extra-UN reaction to the South African Indian resolution’s passage was as contentious 
and intense as the debates themselves, reflecting the competing interests of stakeholders in the 
debates over racial discrimination at the birth of the UN. For opponents, the presumption of a 
UN diplomacy based on western, masculine logic was overwhelmed by what Smuts labeled a 
“flood of emotion” on the issue of race expressed by the “multi-plex” Assembly, a thinly-veiled 
reference to the UN membership’s racial diversity.283 Like Shawcross’s vehement criticism of 
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Pandit’s appeal during the debate, critics of the Assembly’s “political” decision expressed anger 
and fear over the consequences of an uncontrolled (and uncontrollable) passion taking over the 
Assembly. In an analysis published just days after the final vote, Washington Post commentator 
Barnet Nover wrote that the debate over racial discrimination had been “a highly emotional 
explosion,” where “representatives of nations, races and people who have felt themselves the 
victims of racial discrimination gave vent to long pent-up feelings of anger and irritation against 
those who have deemed themselves superior beings.” But, he wondered, had this idealism 
“opened a Pandora’s box whose contents may plague the U.N. for a long time to come”?284 
Certainly the New York Times editorial board believed so. Still referring to racial discrimination 
in South Africa as “alleged,” the Times’s reaction was one of outrage at the “political blunders” 
that undermined two founding principles of the UN Charter: sovereign equality and domestic 
jurisdiction.285 The Washington Post conceded that the “remarkably free” enunciation of the 
“deep concern of millions of people all over the world” about racial discrimination proved that 
the General Assembly was “unbossed,” but the decision against South Africa had also “created a 
precedent that might keep the United Nations in a constant state of turmoil.”286 
The “flood of emotion,” emanated at least in part from the person of Vijaya Lakshmi 
Pandit, culminating with her “fortuitous” tears before the final vote.287 Some observers 
wondered: had this striking, eloquent Indian woman somehow manipulated the emotions of the 
mostly male Assembly? Skepticism at the power of her tears circulated in South African political 
discourse enough to prompt President of the African National Congress A.B. Xuma to assure a 
                                                
284 Nover, “Fifth Freedom.” 
285 “U.N. and Sovereignty,” Editorial, New York Times, 12 December 1946, 28. The editorial board’s view was in 
line with the main concerns of the great powers coming out of the Dumbarton Oaks conversations (see Roger 
Norman and Sarah Zaidi, Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice [Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 2008], 114.) 
286 “World Forum,” Editorial, Washington Post, 17 December 1946, 8. 
287 Lloyd, “’A most auspicious beginning,” 148. 
  91 
joint African/Indian audience in February 1947 that the win was attributable to justice at the UN, 
not sentiment. “No woman’s tears were shed,” he declared.288 Distrust of Pandit’s uniquely 
feminine diplomacy endured well past the debate itself. At the 1947 General Assembly a reporter 
declared Pandit “as practiced and experienced in staging her appearances before the Assembly as 
anyone in Hollywood…She knows what to say and how to say it, and she twists votes out of men 
who very likely had no intention whatever of voting as she wanted them to. She is a fiery, 
emotional speaker who knows the tricks of oratory and uses them with consummate skill.”289  
In stark contrast, India’s proponents lauded the Assembly’s decision, embracing the 
legitimacy of India’s “notable triumph” and its meaning for the power of global multi-racial 
solidarity through the UN.290 The vote was often cast as “a personal victory” for Pandit.291 The 
prospect of liberation from the interrelated problems of racial oppression and colonialism seemed 
more promising to anticolonial and antiracist observers when UN delegates from Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America spoke out on the floor of the General Assembly against aggressive imperial 
expansion and the violation of human rights. The Passive Resister called the vote “a complete 
victory not only for the Indian people but also for democratic peoples throughout the world and a 
victory for the United Nations’ Organisation itself.”292 South African Indians, an external 
emotional community with perhaps the most at stake in the UN debates, glorified Pandit’s 
embodiment of their local cause on the global stage. A full-page editorial cartoon in The Passive 
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Resister in mid-November depicted Pandit as goddess-like, her stern but dignified visage filling 
the sky above a small, anonymous, jack-booted embodiment of “racialism” standing on the 
ground, hands raised in a gesture of fearful surrender. Beside Pandit’s image hovers a quote from 
her opening speech: “Millions look to us to resist and end imperialism in all its forms, even as 
they rely on us to crush the last vestiges of fascism and nazism.”293   
Another keenly interested community with unique attachments to the issues of race and 
empire embedded in the South Africa cases was the African American press. Coming in the 
midst of rising violence and terrorism against Blacks in the United States, which the federal 
government had failed to stem, the language of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
UN Charter pointed to the possibility for international action against racial discrimination in the 
United States. While the U.S. government worked to insulate its domestic racial relations from 
international scrutiny, activists were working to do just the opposite.294 The birth of the United 
Nations provided Black activists a focal point for organizing with like-minded individuals and 
organizations around the world—and the selection of New York as the UN’s permanent home 
heightened the possibilities for engagement. Penny Von Eschen’s and Carol Anderson’s work 
document the major African American rights organizations’ involvement in, and reaction to, the 
1946 debates, demonstrating the significance of the “wins” to the movement and its leaders 
including Max Yergan, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Walter White. But what made this moment of 
possibility “visible and defining” was in part the emotional tenor of the print culture discourse 
surrounding it. The Black press was heavily invested in the outcome at the Assembly; their 
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readers constituting one particularly anxious section of those “eyes of the world” looking to the 
UN for justice.295 
While most in the Black press capitalized on the drama of the South African debates to 
ally with Pandit and other Indian nationalists in common cause, some observers were skeptical of 
the UN’s capacity to act. A few directly challenged India’s legitimacy based on its own history 
of caste discrimination and imperialism. Prominent Black intellectuals expressed the most 
skepticism about the UN’s possibilities in the lead up to the October start of the Assembly, 
convinced that the organization, dominated by Anglo-American imperial power, would fail on 
issues of human rights and colonialism just like the League of Nations. Writing for the NAACP’s 
Crisis, George Padmore, for example, deemed the change from the League’s mandate system to 
UN trusteeship as “a purely technical transaction…modified and refurbished to accommodate the 
conflicting ideologies of the Great Powers.”296 India’s success throughout the session, however, 
tempered critical attitudes by early December. The Jamaican writer A. M. Wendell Malliet 
initially lacked confidence in any “so-called world organizations composed as they are of…men 
of evil intentions, bad faith, and hypocritical purpose.” As early as the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference (1944) he had “damned the whole thing as an institution which was being conceived 
                                                
295 Press coverage was by no means the only way that African Americans left their mark on the first UN sessions.  
Just a few weeks before the official Indian petition reached the UN Secretariat in June, the National Negro Congress 
(NNC) had delivered its own petition calling for UN intervention on behalf of the 13 million Black Americans 
subject to prejudice, violence, and discrimination (National Negro Congress, A Petition to the United Nations on 
Behalf of 13 Million Oppressed Negro Citizens of the United States of America [New York: National Negro 
Congress, 1946]). The UN did not respond to the NNC petition, but activists believed that with the right formulation 
the UN would ultimately hear the U.S. case. Throughout the fall of 1946 Du Bois and his allies kept a close eye on 
the India/South Africa debates while they worked on a more extensive NAACP-sponsored petition to submit to the 
UN the following year. See Du Bois, ed. An Appeal to the World: A Statement on the Denial of Human Rights to 
Minorities in the Case of Citizens of Negro Descent in the United States of America and an Appeal to the United 
Nations for Redress (New York: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 1947); and 
William L. Patterson, We Charge Genocide: The Historic Petition to the United States for Relief From a Crime of 
the United States Government Against the Negro People (New York: International Publishers, 1951). 
296 George Padmore, “Trusteeship: the New Imperialism,” Crisis, October 1946, 302. 
  94 
in iniquity and would, therefore, be born in sin.”297 But Malliet believed in the possibility of 
change at the UN. He conceded that out of the losses of World War II had come “the Atlantic 
Charter, the promise of the Four Freedoms, and finally the Charter of the United Nations,” which 
affirmed the “fundamental human rights and the dignity and worth of the human person so 
eloquently.”298 Knowing no help would come from the “Anglo-Saxon nations,” he prayed “that 
at least one black or brown man” at the UN would step in to force the proposal to annexation of 
South West Africa to be dropped and address South Africa’s “black stain of dishonor on human 
civilization.” After the session ended, Malliet expressed a more positive note about the prospects 
for the UN. Smuts’ “humiliating defeat” was “a victory,” and Malliet was relieved that the vote 
on the Indian case against South Africa “ended in a verdict of ‘guilty.’”299 
St. Clair Drake, a sociologist and activist writing for the Pittsburgh Courier, voiced the 
most explicit skepticism not of the UN itself, but of India’s role as a leader in the fight and its 
relationship to Black Africa/ns. His short essay in August 1946 is a critical complication of the 
response of the Black press to India and race issues. In contrast to the dominant discourse of 
triumphal solidarity at the UN across multi-racial lines, Drake called into question India’s 
commitment to racial equality, pointing to the ways in which Indian and African solidarities 
were, in Antoinette Burton’s formulation, “strained at best across the landscapes of 
decolonization.”300 While he was impressed by Pandit’s “warmth” toward the Black community 
during her 1945 U.S. visit, and acknowledged that Mudaliar, India’s lead delegate at San 
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Francisco, had spoken “openly and consistently against color prejudice,” Drake pointed to 
troubling instances of Indian discrimination and exploitation at home and abroad. In U.S. 
colleges Indian students had “a tendency to shun Negroes as though they were lepers.” In India, 
there was “one theory of the origin of Indian caste which says that the upper caste was originally 
a superior white people who had to organize a caste system ‘to protect their blood’ against 
inferior Indian blacks.” Drake also expressed concern about the history of exploitative Indian 
moneylenders in eastern and southern Africa. Where the Indians fully committed to racial 
equality when its leaders protested against British mistreatment themselves but not natives? 
“When Gandhi and Nehru support the fight against jim-crow [sic] of Indians in Africa, but fail to 
speak out against the terrible exploitation of Negro natives there (some of it by Indians),” Drake 
warned, “we have reason to fear for the future.”301 
In a second guest column after the opening round of General Assembly speeches, Drake’s 
tone had softened and he expressed tentative hopes based on what he had witnessed. The Haitian 
delegate Dr. Joseph Charles had risen to speak of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. Liberia’s 
Attorney General C. Ahayomi Cassell, told “the world that ‘both the living and the dead are 
crying out loudly for peace, peace.’” And Pandit’s speech had reassured Drake even more 
because she had “warned the assembly not to ignore the voice of non-European peoples, for there 
are far more of them in the world than there are Europeans.” He conceded, “I had some hard 
words to say about India the last time I wrote a guest column in this spot,” but having seen 
Pandit speak and hearing of Indian participation in the African mineworkers’ strikes in South 
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Africa, he applauded “this new-found solidarity of Indians with their black brothers.” Hopefully 
Pandit would “keep it up.”302 
For most observers in the Black press, Pandit fulfilled their hopes for the UN and more.   
For many, Pandit’s fight against Smuts became a proxy through which the battle between racism 
and human rights, colonialism and liberation, the old world and the new were fought. The 
emotional discourse that dominated this press coverage over the course of the debates heightened 
when she was cast as the heroine of the story.303 South Africa had long been identified as the 
worst perpetrator of white supremacy within a domestic U.S. rhetoric of Jim Crowism.304 And in 
the context of the war, South African racism was figured as the continuation of the spirit of 
Nazism. Smuts in particular was considered an executor of aggressive British imperialism, made 
clear by his desire to annex the territory of Southwest Africa rather than transferring its mandate 
to the trusteeship system. In contrast, Pandit was a thrice-imprisoned follower of Gandhi, 
Nehru’s younger sister, and the only female head-of-delegation at the Assembly. Smuts, at once 
the author of the Preamble and the face of white supremacist ideology, was an easy target for 
anti-colonial and anti-racist vitriol, especially in contrast to the “diminutive and charming” 
Pandit who represented the voice of the colonized and thus became a “valiant” figure speaking 
back to power.305  
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Observers in the Black press seemed to take special pleasure in heaping condemnation on 
Smuts in relation to both the South West Africa and South African Indian questions. His 
leadership and person were conflated with the British imperial project, prejudice and violence 
against people of color, and the hypocrisy of western civilization’s rhetoric of democratization 
and rights in light of its ugly history of racism, violence, discrimination, and disenfranchisement.  
UN disapproval of the methods of racial superiority Smuts stood for repudiated homegrown U.S. 
racists by philosophical affiliation; he was often compared to U.S. white supremacist politicians 
such as Mississippi Senator Theodore Bilbo and Secretary of State James Byrnes.306 With 
Bilbo’s position in the U.S. Senate under scrutiny through two separate investigations, he was 
considered currently “on trial” in the same way that Smuts was figured as “on trial” at the UN.307  
Beyond this domestic figuring, Smuts was also cast as “one of the most dangerous men in the 
world.” “Jews never faired worse under Hitler than blacks fare now in the Union of South 
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Africa,” according to a Pittsburgh Courier editorial.308 Calling Smuts the “long reigning 
Rasputin of South Africa,” the Cleveland Call and Post declared his statement that South Africa 
would maintain Southwest Africa as a mandate if the UN refused his request for annexation, 
“Gestapo-like.” The prejudice against Indians “alone,” the editorial board argued, “makes the 
Union of South Africa most unfit to annex any other area or even exert trusteeship over the 
land.”309 The Chicago Defender’s editorial board and opinion writers focused especially on the 
deeply hypocritical chasm between Smuts’s standing as an “elder statesman” in the West, and 
the fact that he was “one of the world’s most unregenerate imperialists and racists.”310 Other 
writers utilized even more extreme descriptors with which to target Smuts – “Jackass,” “senile 
old vulture,” and “fossilized old slave-driver” – pointing to the heightened emotional stakes 
attached to the coverage of these cases.311   
Pandit provided the perfect contrast to Smuts. Like Smuts she often was conflated with 
her nation and the causes for which she stood and the hyperbolic language used to describe 
Pandit closely rivaled Smuts’s demonization. Pandit was variously described as an 
“impassioned,” “fragile but militant,” “brilliant silvered-tongued orator.”312 One Baltimore 
African-American journalist referred to her in quasi-religious terms as “India’s ‘Joan of Arc’” 
fighting against Smuts, the “Supreme Racist.”313 W.E.B. Du Bois also found inspiration in 
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Pandit’s success against the South African leader, calling on “Every Negro organization in the 
United States…to send an official note of thanks” to her for the success of her “repeated and 
impassioned attacks upon that Great Hypocrite, Jan Smuts.” Faulting the Liberian and Haitian 
delegations for not doing enough to stand up for human rights, Du Bois wrote, “Many American 
Negroes will ask how it happened that the Negroes of the world had to be defended by an Indian 
while the rest of the colored world was apparently silent.”314 In a February 1947 editorial, the 
Chicago Defender seconded Du Bois, conceding that Pandit deserved the “appreciation and 
gratitude of all members of the minority races. She was the only delegate to the United Nations 
to speak with feeling and deep conviction against the disabilities under which African natives are 
forced to live.” Because the (male) Liberian, Haitian, and Ethiopian delegates were unable to 
speak freely, Pandit’s “crusade [was] more significant…[she] pressed not only for freedom of 
India but freedom of all oppressed peoples. We have in her a true friend whose voice will be 
heard often.”315 
Within this rhetoric of multi-racial solidarity over issues of such import, display of 
emotion was justified and expected. The fight to end the violence and humiliation endured 
through racist discrimination and aggressive imperialism was not an issue for dispassionate 
assessment and legalistic wrangling by cold diplomats as espoused by Smuts and Shawcross et 
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al, but a deeply personal fight for the future dignity of millions of humans around the world. For 
the African American press, therefore, Pandit’s tears were not manipulative; they were a 
powerful, acceptable reaction to the subject of debate. The drama of her appeal contrasted with 
the reaction of Smuts who was often described as sitting “silent” and “impassive” throughout the 
debates.316 While to his supporters Smuts’s impassivity indicated an experienced statesman’s 
dignity and control, to others it was an expression of detached impotence in the face of his 
loss.317 Pandit’s “pleading tearfully” was characterized as a culmination of her successful proxy 
fight against Smuts, an expression of the significance of the issue to victims of racist 
oppression.318 Passionate and militant, Pandit had invoked her tears when it mattered most.319  
In the contemporary moment, the debates surrounding the South African Indian 
resolution and its successful passage over U.S. opposition and against strong British protest 
signified a meaningful shift in the power structure of the postwar world order. Some legal 
scholars condemned the Assembly vote, claiming it undermined the principle of domestic 
jurisdiction and created an activist United Nations. The General Assembly had rejected a strictly 
legal interpretation of the Charter’s language on domestic jurisdiction, which set a precedent of 
placing international concerns before determining the legal extent of a state’s competence; an 
expansion of political obligations beyond that practiced by the League of Nations.320 The 
prominent legal scholar Hans Kelsen, in a critique of the UN Charter before the first General 
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Assembly, had predicted correctly that the language on human rights and fundamental freedoms 
included in the UN’s founding document could be used to justify intervention in domestic 
affairs.321 As Carol Anderson’s work demonstrates, the U.S. government for one worked to 
undermine future attempts to create mechanisms for enforcement in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in large part to avoid these kinds of international condemnations of racial 
discrimination and violence in the United States. However, even though the final resolution had 
no enforcement mechanism and ultimately failed to alter South Africa’s racist legislation, the 
momentous decision nevertheless rewarded the hope invested in the UN by the “eyes of the 
world.”322 India had “blazed a path others would follow,” placing race and empire prominently 
on the international stage.323 In response, many observers were inspired to push for UN 
intervention in other instances of racial discrimination and imperial aggression, highlighting the 
global significance of this historical moment for a variety of external players.324 
The resolution’s passage also impacted contemporary politics at home and the political 
lives of the main protagonists. The Indian delegation, representing a nation on the verge of 
independence, had won a prominent moral victory, an important boost to Nehru’s international 
prestige as he struggled to maintain control in the face of raging communal violence and the 
increasing likelihood of partition.325 Jan Smuts, however, returned to South Africa to face 
reinvigorated political opposition from all sides. The South African Indian movement, inspired 
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by the international support for their local cause, redoubled their efforts, recruiting new passive 
resisters to challenge all aspects of the Ghetto Act.326 Stronger multi-racial alliances also 
developed between South African Indian organizations and the African National Congress 
particularly around issues of labor conditions and racial segregation. Unable to overcome his 
“miscalculation” in the face of changing rules of diplomacy and international concern about 
racism, Smuts’s United Party ultimately lost to the white supremacist National Party in the 1948 
elections, which ushered in the official system of apartheid.327 The statesman who had been an 
influential empire loyalist for decades, an avid supporter of a strong League of Nations, and the 
framer of the UN Charter Preamble would never again regain his previous level of international 
leadership.   
Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, like the (nearly) postcolonial state she represented, was 
ascending on the world stage. Celebrated in India, the United States, and South Africa, Pandit 
was soon to become an Indian diplomat to three of the Great Powers, the first female to preside 
over the UN General Assembly, and a leading Indian politician in her own right.328 The 
characterization of Pandit’s success at the UN as mostly attributable to feminine charm and 
oratorical skills by contemporary observers has infused the scholarship on India at the United 
Nations, largely erasing Pandit’s historical role as an important figure in the struggle for power at 
the birth of the United Nations. But as Cynthia Enloe argued in the now classic Making Feminist 
Sense of International Politics: Bananas, Beaches, and Bases, making women visible alters the 
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terms of debate and reveals “the amount and varieties of power at work” in international 
politics.329 Though she was not writing about high politics, Enloe’s statement nevertheless holds 
true within this chapter’s cultural reading of the UN. Within the contestation for power over the 
meaning and implementation of the UN Charter, Pandit’s embodiment of a colonized female 
actor expressing emotion through political arguments about racism and imperialism challenged 
the western cultural conception of dispassionate masculine diplomatic negotiation. Her savvy 
shepherding of these debates through the discourse of India’s aspirational postcolonial leadership 
on the global stage influenced the political outcome that fall and permanently altered the culture 
of the General Assembly itself.  
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3 
RESISTING THE GLOBAL STAGE: POSTCOLONIAL NATION-BUILDING,  
THE INVASION OF HYDERABAD, AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, 1948 
 
 
 
It has been said that this was aggression, that we went deliberately, 
without any provocation, and that by sheer force were doing certain things 
which were wrong. Anybody who has to use force—and my country even 
more than any other abhors the use of force—anybody who has to use 
force must thing a hundred times, and a thousand times, before force is 
invoked…The march of events, the compulsion of events, has at last 
exhausted its patience and has obliged it to take action. 
India delegate to the UN Security Council, 16 September 1948 
 
 
Over the course of two afternoons in May 1949, Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, 
Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, made an impassioned presentation to the United Nations 
Security Council on India’s September 1948 invasion of the large southern princely state of 
Hyderabad. The case had appeared on the Council’s agenda just days before the invasion, but 
eight months later the Council had yet to hear a full report. The situation, Khan argued, merited 
UN intervention to secure international and regional peace, protect the Muslim minority in the 
state from further persecution, and settle the legal question underpinning the entire case: 
Hyderabad’s status before India invaded.330 Khan claimed that with the British withdrawal from 
the subcontinent in August 1947, all of the princely states were granted independence with the 
option to remain that way or accede to either Pakistan or India. The hereditary Muslim leader of 
Hyderabad, the Nizam Osman Ali Khan (the Nizam), declared his state’s independence in June 
1947 based on that juridical fact. India, unwilling to allow such a large state in the center of the 
country to remain separate, had put economic and political pressure on the Nizam to force 
accession. When that failed, the Indian government fabricated a crisis to justify intervention, and 
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with superior military force launched a police action code-named “Operation Polo.” India’s far 
superior armed forces defeated Hyderabad’s opposition in mere days. Now under military 
occupation, the Muslim minority had been subject to atrocities, including arson, raiding, looting, 
mass murder, and rape. Many were now homeless and destitute. Muslims from Hyderabad’s ex-
government were still under house arrest. Press censorship was almost total. The situation, Khan 
argued, threatened the already fragile peace between India and Pakistan, and undermined the 
international principle that the weak should be protected from the strong. He appealed to the 
Council to get the situation back to the status quo before invasion, and allow the people of 
Hyderabad to exercise self-determination. At the conclusion of Khan’s speech, the Security 
Council chair’s question, “Does anyone wish to speak?” was met with silence.331 The meeting 
adjourned and the case of Hyderabad was never again addressed by the United Nations. 
Khan’s speech in 1949 marked the official end of the efforts to hold the Indian 
government accountable through the UN for its actions during and after Operation Polo, though 
most international interest in the subject had faded months before. The standoff between the 
Nizam and India had garnered increasing international attention in the summer of 1948 with 
alarm over possible instability on the subcontinent. The issue loomed large for a short time in the 
press, but its swift conclusion and the lack of Security Council action ended most coverage 
within weeks. Outside the view of organized international scrutiny, the retaliatory deaths of 
thousands of Muslims in the months following the invasion went unexamined; the process of 
integrating Hyderabad into the Indian state over the next several years went unchallenged. On 1 
November 1956, Hyderabad State itself ceased to exist when it was partitioned into three 
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linguistic regions, which were merged into Andhra Pradesh, Mysore, and Bombay, as part of a 
larger project to reorganize Indian states along linguistic lines after independence.332 
The silence that greeted the end of Khan’s speech in 1949 has been maintained in the 
scholarship on Indian independence and the early years of the United Nations. This is partially 
explained by the existence of the more violent and longer-lasting history of the conflict over 
Kashmir and the on-going UN mission there. In the telling of those histories, Hyderabad is 
characterized as a stepping-stone on the way to the main event. Furthermore, the invasion of 
Hyderabad was only discussed at a handful of meetings with no action taken by the Security 
Council, making it a minor event in the larger histories written about the UN. The Hyderabad 
case also fits poorly into the Congress nationalist narrative that seeks to present the Nehru years 
as the golden age of international diplomacy at the UN. The inability to hold the subcontinent 
together at the moment of independence had a disturbing impact on the development of the 
postcolonial national imagination, unsettling the surety with which the new government had 
hoped to established itself internally and externally.  
By rejecting the global stage of the UN despite Hyderabad’s efforts to embrace that 
scrutiny, the history of the event was effectively silenced. These silences on the invasion of 
Hyderabad have produce a discordant absence in the historical archive and have had a lasting 
impact on the interpretation of the overlapping histories of the early years of the UN and the 
newly independent Indian state. Despite its short-lived appearance at the UN, the Hyderabad 
case offers important insights into both India’s emergence as a postcolonial nation-state on the 
global stage and a small yet still significant moment in the early life of the UN Security Council. 
By challenging the legal right of Hyderabad to be heard at the Council on what India deemed a 
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domestic issue, the Indian delegation drew on arguments in exact contradiction to those it 
continued to make in the case of South African race policies. Rather than working to expand the 
purview of the UN, in this case India sought to protect those limits more often invoked by the 
traditionally recognized colonial powers. Small states working in opposition to India such as 
Pakistan and Argentina were unable to gain traction on the issue through the Security Council 
mechanism despite warnings that failure to act would undermine the mission of the UN itself. As 
a result, India was able to enact aggressive internal imperialism without interference and the 
Council’s inaction added to growing skepticism on the part of observers and member states of 
the organization’s ability to ensure collective peace.   
Unlike the South African case highlighted in the previous chapter where the Indian 
delegation led by Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit embraced the “highest rostrum” of the UN to project 
the postcolonial state’s diplomatic aspirations, the Indian government explicitly resisted the 
global stage throughout the Hyderabad crisis, asserting the prerogative of their new independent 
status to attend to this “domestic” concern on its own terms. In this case, the Indian government 
and its UN representatives invoked the language of fear and existential threat to justify armed 
aggression against the Muslim-led princely state. This attitude by any UN member state 
undermined not only the prestige but also the very project of collective security within the still-
emerging institution. But the fact that the belligerent state in this case was India – a member so 
often leading a passionate fight for justice through the UN – made these actions even more 
stunning to observers. Editorial boards of newspapers in Pakistan, the United States, and Britain, 
for example, were critical of India’s actions and the failure of the Security Council to intervene. 
Evidence suggests that opinion makers in major English-language papers in the United States 
and Britain, concerned with the success of the UN to maintain order in the post-war world, fell in 
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line quickly with India’s official narrative. This benefitted the new Indian state’s desire to handle 
Hyderabad independently within the context of the on-going power struggle with Pakistan. It 
also helped excuse the UN Security Council for its inaction, protecting an image of its 
effectiveness (at least in the short term). The case reveals the limits of the UN’s power and its 
inability (or unwillingness) to implement the ideals of the Charter in every instance based on 
operational concerns. Already embroiled in complicated and precarious peacekeeping missions 
in Palestine and Kashmir, and in the growing conflict between the Soviet Union and the West, 
the Security Council had little to gain by prolonging the Hyderabad case in the fall of 1948.  
Historical silence on the Council’s failure to prevent the invasion and forcible accession 
of the princely state provides a stark contrast to the Indian South African case of 1946 addressed 
in the previous chapter. The win against South Africa remains an important part of the narrative 
of the history of human rights at the UN and the history of India’s early diplomacy there. As I 
have shown, the history of the postcolonial Indian state’s emergence on the global stage was 
made in part through Pandit’s leadership in the fight against South Africa on behalf of diasporic 
Indians there. Not so for the case of Hyderabad, which male members of the Indian delegation 
dealt with as minimally as possible, going so far as to not send a representative to several 
meetings. Rather than externalized nation-building through moral leadership on the global stage 
as had been the case with South Africa, with the invasion of Hyderabad, India expressly rejected 
international intervention in order to enact internal nation-building through authoritarian 
discourse and martial law. In spite of this and other counter examples, the dominant Indian 
nationalist narrative worked to characterize independence as gained through decades of non-
violent action and through a highly principled commitment to morality and justice.333 The 
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triumph of 1946 sits at a unique moment in India’s history between its known past (colonialism) 
and an uncertain future (independence) when the emerging postcolonial state could be at its most 
idealistic and inspire the most hope around the world. By 1948, the idealistic anti-colonial 
leaders were at the helm of a new state that had become embroiled in the often brutal realities of 
the present. As a working state in 1948, independent India no longer functioned within the 
hypothetical and it adjusted its domestic and foreign policy accordingly. 
 
Fractured Independence 
The violence, displacement, and suffering endured by millions of South Asians in the 
weeks and months following Pakistani and Indian independence cannot be overstated. The 
massive population exchange across the northwestern border and the concomitant outbreak of 
massacres, kidnappings, rape, and looting there, as well as violence in cities across the region, 
posed almost insurmountable challenges to the two newly created states. The haste with which 
the process of decolonization took place between February and August 1947 was breathtaking, 
and the announcement of the still-disputed Radcliffe Line just after independence contributed to 
a volatile situation that already had produced sporadic communal violence over the preceding 
year. In the months following 14 and 15 August, the subcontinent emerged into independence on 
unstable ground. But it was not only the violent upheavals and displacements caused by Partition 
that created political instability in the subcontinent in the months that followed. The suspicions, 
frustrations, and fears that existed between India and Pakistan were exacerbated by the conflicts 
over the princely states Junagadh, Kashmir, and Hyderabad. These three states were not 
contiguous and did not work in concert to negotiate with either Pakistan or India. Nevertheless, 
they were interrelated in that they were sites of conflict over land and power in a moment of 
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extreme instability. The timeline of events in these locations in the months following 
independence is a startling array of almost daily diplomatic and military maneuvers as the 
contesting sides attempted to gain control of rapidly deteriorating situations. While in high-level 
talks with Hyderabad, the Indian government was simultaneously responding to Junagadh’s 
declaration of accession to Pakistan and the Indian military was increasing its presence in 
Kashmir in anticipation of conflict there. Decisions made in each case impacted and were 
informed by events in the others. 
The incongruity of the official British approach to the problem of the princely states at 
independence produced a situation primed for conflict. All of the states combined covered over 
500,000 square miles, and an estimated 90 million people—almost one-third of the total 
population in the subcontinent—lived under the rule of hereditary, feudal princes.334 These states 
controlled their internal administration and the inheritors of titles ruled in succession sometimes 
over generations, but the British had maintained a relationship of suzerainty that pointedly 
denied the rulers direct control over foreign affairs, communications, or defense. Since the mid-
1800s, the princes had been subject to economic pressure, administrative manipulation, and land 
acquisition depending on ever shifting circumstances on the ground. Eric Beverly refers to these 
uneven relationships between the states and the Raj as “sovereign yet subordinated,” leaving the 
states in an “ambivalent legal position” even before decolonization.335 As Indian independence 
became an accepted inevitability in 1946 and 1947, the British balanced their promises to the 
Indian National Congress and the Muslim League with their relationship to these semi-sovereign 
states. Unilateral repudiation of the treaties with the states could lead to requests for 
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compensation for ceded lands, and could open the British to accusations of disloyalty. The 
Labour-controlled British government was willing to pay that price, having decided by early 
1946 that their pledges would have to be renounced.336 Section 7 of the Indian Independence Act 
granted them independence at the time British withdrew, about which public and private 
assurances on this point were made throughout the summer of 1947. The Viceroy of India Lord 
Mountbatten told the Chamber of Princes in no uncertain terms the “States have complete 
freedom—technically and legally they are independent.” But this statement was immediately 
followed by a qualification wherein Mountbatten said he would “discuss the degree of 
independence which we ourselves feel is best in the interests of your own States.”337 This 
“somewhat schizophrenic air,” in Ian Copland’s characterization, led to directly conflicting 
messages being conveyed to the states.338   
With the aim of establishing military and economic power at home, the newly established 
independent Indian government wanted to step directly into the role of paramount power left 
vacant by the British at the time of independence with the goal of full accession by all states. As 
such, they echoed the British-led schizophrenic position on the states.339 Though Pakistan’s 
Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah accepted the option of independence for the states as 
set out in the Indian Independence Act, India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru disagreed, 
asserting that if not accession, some arrangement had to be made to bring the states into one or 
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the other Dominion.340 After both Travancore and Hyderabad declared independence in early 
June 1947, the All-India National Congress Working Committee declared an official policy of 
refusal to recognize any states’ declaration of independence, enshrining the principle of 
accession by any means into the independent Indian government’s policy. The formidable elder 
statesman Vallabhbhai Patel was put in charge of the new Ministry of States. He, along with 
experienced civil servant V.P. Menon, set out to attain the complete accession of all princely 
states within India’s territory based on the assertion that anything less than complete 
geographical cohesion would threaten the stability of the subcontinent.   
In light of the strong stance by the new Congress-led Indian government, Hyderabad’s 
aspiration for independence highlights just how much was up for grabs in the first year of Indian 
independence. Comprising over 80,000 square miles with 16 million inhabitants, over 80 percent 
of whom were Hindu, Hyderabad was by far the largest of the princely states. It alone had the 
infrastructure, economic resources, and administrative organization to possibly maintain 
independence long-term.341 But its position in the middle of India, bisecting the fledging state 
from north to south and east to west, made the possibility of its independence unthinkable.342 An 
independent Hyderabad would create not just two competing nation-states on the subcontinent, 
but three, further eroding Indian control within its own borders and creating danger and rivalry 
beyond those borders. The new Indian government’s ability to successfully incorporate 
Hyderabad – sometimes referred to in an emotional rhetorical flourish by the Indian leadership as 
either the “stomach” or the “heart” of the country – also held political and symbolic importance. 
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Democratic rule for the people of the princely states had been incorporated into the Congress’s 
goals for decades.     
Though Pakistan also dealt with many states’ accessions, the problem was mostly India’s 
as the new state faced the prospect of independence without internal geographical coherence if 
the hundreds of princely states were not persuaded to accede. In the weeks leading up to 
independence, Patel and Menon, together with Mountbatten deployed “a potent mix of charm, 
bullying, and cajoling” to convince the princes to accede.343 By 15 August 1947, in what 
nationalists triumphantly call a “bloodless revolution,” the vast majority of princely states had 
acceded to either India or Pakistan.344 Most had little choice in the matter, as “[t]hose with a 
predominantly Hindu population and a Hindu dynasty were compelled by force of circumstances 
to accede to India; similarly, Muslim States, by reason of geography, communal identity and 
relative weakness had no alternative but to accede to Pakistan.”345 Some leaders also acceded 
because of “patriotism, the advice of their ministers, the pressure of popular political leaders in 
their states, and a sense of abandonment” by the British. But a number of states held out against 
quick accession.346 In addition to Travancore and Hyderabad, Kashmir also declared 
independence. The small state of Junagadh on the Kathiawar Peninsula acceded to Pakistan, and 
“at least a dozen other major states” failed to sign accession agreements before the British 
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withdrawal.347 Of these, Junagadh, Kashmir, and Hyderabad proved to be the most troubling to 
the Indian government’s project of integration at all costs.   
Hyderabad did not have the military capacity to face the far superior Indian Army, but 
this imbalance did not undermine the Nizam’s decision to remain independent. Embracing the 
promise of independence enshrined in the Indian Independence Act, the Nizam appointed a trade 
commissioner in London, engaged in talks with the French about a diplomatic mission there, met 
with the Portuguese to discuss leasing port access in Goa, and placed an order with 
Czechoslovakia for arms and ammunition.348 He also laid claim to a special relationship with the 
British government and the Crown based on his long-standing loyalty, the existence of treaties 
between himself and London, and Hyderabad’s status as the largest state in the subcontinent. In 9 
July 1947 letter, the Nizam called on his “old ally, the British Government” to support his 
decision to refuse accession, insisting upon his right to maintain a working relationship with the 
Indian government while remaining internally independent.349 Two days later a delegation from 
Hyderabad, which included Sir Walter Monckton, long-time adviser to the Nizam, and the 
Nawab of Chhatari, then the Prime Minister of Hyderabad, met in Delhi to discuss the state’s 
future with Mountbatten and Menon, who would lead India’s negotiations with Hyderabad 
throughout. The Indian side was unwilling to consider independence, pressing only for 
accession.350  
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The Nizam’s continued faith in the British and Mountbatten in particular – despite 
conflicting messages – was offset in part by Jinnah’s support for Hyderabad.351 In early August 
1947, with the Nizam’s approval and reportedly behind Monckton’s back, a Hyderabad 
delegation met with Jinnah who encouraged them not to agree to accession with India and gave 
them assurances of Pakistan’s support. Jinnah, it was reported, wanted Hyderabad not as a 
neutral party but as an active ally in case of a war between India and Pakistan.352 Writing 
anonymously for the Times of India after Hyderabad’s surrender, “An Ex-Official of Hyderabad” 
claimed that in 1947 “Jinnah had made it clear that if Hyderabad thought its cause was righteous 
it should die to a man.” However, he had also advised the Nizam to be reasonable in his 
negotiations with India and to move toward a more democratic government.353 Whether or not 
Jinnah promised Pakistani military support was subject to many rumors.354  
The Nizam’s declared intent to remain independent was informed by more than a 
stubborn desire to protect his own feudal rule (as was the characterization often used by the 
Congress-dominated Indian government and extreme Hindu nationalists).355 Partition created 
unique problems for Hyderabad, which had ties to India and Pakistan, and the Nizam wanted to 
maintain good relations with both governments. His decision also was complicated by internal 
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Hyderabadi politics. Though over eighty per cent Hindu, the princely state was ruled by a 
powerful Muslim minority, which included the increasingly influential role of the Majlis-i 
Ittehad Muslimin (the Ittehad) led by the dynamic and controversial Kasim Razvi. By acceding 
to India, the Nizam would have angered the Muslim minority. On the other hand, accession to 
Pakistan could have alienated the large Hindu population. Academic research after Hyderabad’s 
integration has concluded there were comparatively minor communal tensions inside the state 
despite the imbalance of power, lending credence to the Nizam’s concerns.356 In addition, the 
problems posed by Hyderabad’s geographical position wholly inside Indian borders would have 
been substantial.357  
 Talks in September failed to result in a treaty, but by 20 October 1947, the two sides had 
agreed on the language of a one-year stand-still agreement under the terms of which India would 
maintain “all agreements and administrative arrangements” regarding Hyderabad’s external 
affairs, communications, and defense that had previously existed between the Nizam and the 
British Crown. Hyderabad could have agents-general (without full diplomatic powers) posted in 
foreign capitals. For the year of the agreement all disputes arising would be dealt with through 
arbitration.358 On 22 October the Nizam’s negotiation team returned to Hyderabad to finalize the 
agreement with the Nizam.359 What occurred over the next several days became a pivotal 
moment in the India-Hyderabad conflict, heightened the fear surrounding the negotiations, and 
played a prominent role in India’s claim that its “police action” in September 1948 was 
necessary to save the Nizam and the state from Muslim “fanatics.” 
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The Nizam met the delegation and his Executive Council for three days to discuss the 
draft of the Standstill Agreement. The Council ultimately voted 6-3 in favor of the agreement, 
suggesting only trivial changes. The following day the Nizam began drafting a collateral letter to 
accompany his signature on the document. According to a British report, at approximately 3 a.m. 
on 27 October, the day Monckton and Chhatari were to return to Delhi with the documents, “a 
crowd, estimated at about 20,000 and composed of a mixture of ordinary Muslims and hired 
assassins, collected round the houses which the Nawab of Chhatari, Sir Sultan Ahmed and Sir 
Walter Monckton occupied and which were all adjacent. No Hyderabad police were seen at any 
time.”360 The three were evacuated by the military several hours later and informed to delay their 
departure to Delhi. Two days later Monckton and Ahmed went alone to meet with the Nizam, 
who shared with them the telegram he was sending to inform Delhi of the creation of a new 
delegation based on the “changed political situation here.” Ahmed’s last ominous words to the 
Nizam before he left the room were reportedly, “‘This will be the end of you.’”361   
Mir Laik Ali, an industrialist with no previous political position, took over as Prime 
Minister on 30 October. Formal meetings between India and the Hyderabad delegation, now 
headed by Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung, Minister of Foreign Affairs, began again under much 
different circumstances. Within days negotiations had already broken down when it became 
apparent the barely three month old independent Indian government would not offer concessions 
beyond that to which they had agreed previously.362 Tensions were mounting outside the 
meetings as well. There were “reports of border incidents, arrests across the frontier, security 
measures on both sides and, above all, rumours of an armed clash and ill-conceived 
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preparations.”363 The threat of Indian military aggression loomed. Indian troops were engaged in 
heavy fighting in Kashmir. And India had proved its willingness to use military force to ensure a 
reluctant state’s accession when it took forcibly control of Junagadh’s administration on 
November 9. Days later, Patel, the most vocal advocate for full accession, insinuated that if 
Hyderabad did not fall into line it would meet the same fate as Junagadh.364   
The Standstill Agreement between Hyderabad and India, signed on 29 November, closely 
resembled the October agreement.365 For one year India would maintain control over Hyderabadi 
foreign affairs and communications but would withdraw its troops from Secunderabad within a 
few months time.366 The Nizam maintained his sovereign rights and was made responsible for 
internal peace and security. He also indicated his willingness to move the Hyderabad political 
system toward responsible government. The Ittehad’s leader Razvi, in a public address, called 
the agreement the “best possible terms” as it did not interfere with Hyderabad’s independence. 
But ever cautious, he urged the state to “muster sufficient strength to resist any attempt to 
relegate it to a position of inferiority to the Indian Union.”367 The Times of India editorial board 
was satisfied with the terms of the agreement, expressing relief that “saner counsels [had] 
prevailed over so-called ‘mulki’ hot-headedness in the Nizam’s capital and that…India, despite 
considerable provocation, [had] been at pains to be conciliatory in the interests of a peaceful 
solution.”368 
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The Conflict Escalates 
Despite the successful negotiation of the Standstill Agreement, the events of late October 
had marred relations between India and Hyderabad. The fact that a public demonstration backed 
by the Ittehad had successfully delayed the agreement led the Indian government to more 
strongly correlate the Nizam’s refusal to accede with the political context of Partition and Hindu-
Muslim conflict.369 Many on the subcontinent and around the world feared that the extreme 
violence in the weeks surrounding independence would again flare up, destabilizing the newly 
established Indian and Pakistani governments. In Indian discourse, the possibility of Hyderabad 
coming under the rule of “fanatical” pan-Islamists enhanced the domestic and foreign policy 
arguments against independence for that state. If the Nizam was indeed under the control of 
Razvi and the Ittehad, how could India ever feel safe? Historical accounts and contemporary 
scholars differ on the level of influence Razvi had over the Nizam, though by all accounts the 
relationship was close. The Indian government, however, consistently portrayed the October 
1947 events as a coup d’état placing Razvi in de facto control.370 In the months leading up to the 
September invasion, public statements and governmental exchanges coming from the Indian 
leadership increasingly identified Razvi’s Islamic radicalism and the actions of the Razakars as 
primary reasons why Hyderabad’s independence was untenable. On the other hand, Hyderabad’s 
negotiation committee and the Nizam himself continued to emphasize the princely state’s unique 
legal position, and portray India as an aggressor determined to achieve a singular goal by any 
                                                
369 See Taylor Sherman, “Migration, Citizenship, and Belonging in Hyderabad (Deccan), 1946-1956,” Modern Asian 
Studies 45:1 (2011): 89. 
370 Monckton’s biographer wrote that the Nizam knew of and consented to the coup d’état, though Monckton was 
unsure whether it “was because he had been frightened by the Ittehad, or whether he approved of their aims; but in 
any case he refused to disown Razvi” (H. Montgomery Hyde, Walter Monckton (London: Sinclair-Stevenson Ltd., 
1991), 141). 
  120 
means. These two positions came to dominate the discourse on the conflict up to and through its 
brief appearance on the Security Council agenda. 
Negotiations continued in the spring of 1948 in the midst of rising tensions with both 
sides accusing the other of breaking the Standstill Agreement.371 Statements coming out of the 
two capitals undermined the chances for a peaceful resolution. The Ittehad’s and the Razakar’s 
rhetoric of Hyderabad as a Muslim state along with the recruitment of Muslim men to fight there 
colored New Delhi’s perception of possible threats.372 In March and April, reports circulated in 
India of Razvi publicly declaring in cold war terms that a Muslim force would push from 
Hyderabad all the way to Delhi with Indian Muslims as a “’fifth column in any showdown’” 
between the two states.373 Another round of talks broke down in April, and reports of border 
skirmishes and incidents of Razakar attacks increased. Indian readers were overwhelmed with 
fear-invoking headlines about bombings, attacks, looting, and arson. Other headlines raised the 
spectre of the gendered violence of Partition with reports of Hindu women and children 
kidnapped or raped at the hands of Muslim men.374  
Speaking at a Congress Committee meeting at the end of April, Nehru assured his 
audience that India did not want a war with Hyderabad. On the other hand, India “would not 
tolerate any foreign Power in her midst.”375 By June, the discussion of military intervention 
within the Indian leadership was increasing. Patel, supported by most of the Indian Cabinet, 
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hardened his desire to use military action against the state sooner rather than later. But Nehru, 
Menon, and Mountbatten continued to urge restraint.376 However, the Indian government had to 
balance military commitments between Hyderabad and Kashmir, where clashes continued.377 
Writing to Patel in early June, Nehru urged him to only consider military involvement “when the 
Hyderabad Government or their Razakars, etc. make it impossible for us to desist from it!”378 
Nehru did support increased pressure “all around Hyderabad,” though, so if “further provocation 
of a major kind [occurred], we shall be justified in taking further action.”379 
Internal public and political pressure was mounting on the government to take assertive 
action against Hyderabad.380 Beginning with the Nizam’s declaration to remain independent in 
early June 1947, the Times of India had been a mouthpiece for a Hindu nationalist-inflected line, 
arguing vociferously for Hyderabad’s accession and urging the Indian government to force that 
conclusion as soon as possible.381 The Times also played a role in giving wide circulation to 
rumors of communal violence, internal unrest, and the influx of Muslim fighters into Hyderabad 
as early as August 1947.382 In 25 May, the editorial board considered the Hyderabad problem “A 
Running Sore,” where “trouble of the most dangerous kind…is spreading like a disease in 
conditions which are all too unstable.” The time had come for action “adopted and executed with 
                                                
376 Menon, The Integration of the Indian States, 363; Hyde, Walter Monckton, 147; and “108: Sardar Patel to N. V. 
Gadgil Advising Firm Action in Hyderabad, Patel Papers, Navajivan Trust, 21 June 1948,” in The Collected Words 
of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Vol. XIII, 142. 
377 Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India, 80-81; and “93: Nehru to Sardar Patel Regarding Reservation of 
Seats in Hdyerabd Legislature for Muslims, Patel Papers, Navajivan Trust, 27 May 1948,” in The Collected Words 
of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Vol. XIII, 128. 
378 “102: Jawaharlal to Sardar Patel Suggesting Delay in Military Action in Hyderabad for Time Being, Sardar’s 
Letters Mostly Unknown, 6 June 1948,” in The Collected Words of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Vol. XIII, 136. 
379 Ibid., 136. 
380 Candidus, “Indian Political Notes,” Times of India, 6; “’Compromise is Futile,’” Times of India, 21 May 1948, 5; 
Candidus, “Indian Political Notes,” Times of India, 27 May 1948, 6; and “Fruitless to Quibble,” Editorial, Times of 
India, 3 June 1948, 6. 
381 See “Swift Action,” Editorial, Times of India, 21 June 1947, 6. 
382 See “Secunderabad Trouble,” Times of India, 19 August 1947, 7; and “’Hyderabad, People’s Common 
Heritage,’” Times of India, 15 November 1947, 7. 
  122 
restraint but with firmness.”383 Editorials throughout the summer advocated military intervention 
over negotiation. A June editorial warned that with Razvi threatening to “amputate not merely 
the nose but the head and heart of Hyderabad to spite the face of the Indian Union,” an 
agreement had to be reached or there would be dire consequences.384 When talks broke down in 
mid-June, the board wrote, “Even should the worst happen—which nothing yet suggests—to the 
solidarity of the Indian Union, nothing can save Hyderabad, save contemporary commonsense, 
from complete liquidation.”385 
Across the border in Pakistan, the editorial board of the Lahore English-language daily, 
The Pakistan Times, grew increasingly critical of India’s handling of the Hyderabad crisis, 
arguing a line opposite of that held by the Times of India. A mild editorial in late June called 
India’s policy in Hyderabad and Kashmir merely anti-democratic, evidence of “India’s attitude 
of wanting to grab and hold all that it could.”386 But critique escalated in early July in response to 
public statements made by Patel, accusing him of practicing fascism through his “black record of 
coercion, intimidation and oppression” toward the states.387 An 11 July editorial lashed out even 
more harshly with the opening: “The hydra-headed monster of Indian fascism has gripped 
Hyderabad in its vicious coil.” Admittedly not a fan of “the medieval despotism which the ruling 
house of Hyderabad symbolizes,” they nevertheless had sympathy for the Nizam’s situation in 
the face of the “Fascist tactics” used by “Pandit-Patel & Co.”388 And on 3 August, after Winston 
Churchill demanded British intervention in the crisis during a debate with British Prime Minister 
Attlee in Parliament, The Pakistan Times published an editorial urging the world to turn its 
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“attention to the new menace of Hindu Fascism in India.” Invoking Cold War imagery, the 
editorial asked: “Does the voice of Hyderabad reach [Attlee] from behind the iron curtain, which 
India has built around that State?” Hitler, Mussolini, and others had “met their doom, leaving, 
amongst others, a zealous convert in Pandit Nehru.”389 Calling the Indian administration “rabidly 
communal,” a 29 August editorial wrote that the life of the Muslim minority in India was 
suffering under the “engine of repression” that included arrests for “either spying for the Nizam 
or fostering pro-Pakistan propaganda,” and persecution along the lines of that endured by the 
Jews under Nazi Germany. “Much as Pandit Nehru may shout from the housetops that India is a 
secular, democratic State where every citizen…enjoys equal opportunities, the persecution of the 
Muslim minority furnishes damaging evidence to the contrary.”390 
 As events unfolded toward what most assumed would be armed conflict, the issue 
became more visible in the United States and Britain, two powerful states with vested interests in 
stability on the South Asian continent where concerns about the Kashmir conflict had been 
increasing as well. In hindsight we know that Hyderabad failed in its bid to remain independent, 
and perhaps its inclusion in the Indian state seems inevitable given that government’s will to 
establish a unified state and its far superior military might. But until the Nizam’s surrender in 
September 1948, this was not a foregone conclusion. No doubt Kashmir rightly dominates the 
historical memory of both Partition and the battle over the princely states, but it is important to 
understand that in this period Hyderabad often resided alongside Kashmir as one of the two 
dominant threats to the subcontinent’s stability.391 At times Hyderabad was even considered the 
more trenchant problem. In a Manchester Guardian editorial on how India had faired in 1948, 
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Hyderabad is identified as one of three major issues India had faced along with Kashmir and 
Gandhi’s death.392 In the weeks leading up to India’s invasion, the New York Times and The 
Times (London) both believed the Kashmir situation was closer than Hyderabad to a workable 
cease-fire that could lead to a final settlement of the dispute.393 And just four days before the 
Indian invasion began, the New York paper wrote: “Of the two disputes” it was Kashmir “that 
seems to offer the better hope of a peaceful solution.”394 
The sense of urgency to resolve the conflict between India and Hyderabad was fed by 
fears that a direct military clash would set off region-wide violence on a scale larger than that 
witnessed at Partition.395 As early as November 1947 outside observers expressed fears that the 
conflict “might spread the flames of communal warfare to South India.”396 Another breakdown 
of talks in June had led India to escalate the economic blockade around the state. Border clashes 
also increased tensions, which was reflected in press coverage outside the subcontinent. In the 
opinion of The Manchester Guardian, “Hyderabad [had] displaced Kashmir as the centre of 
gravest danger in India.” Though the editorial board agreed that India had a strong case and the 
Nizam should have accepted past offers made by Delhi, India was in fact the source of the 
current problem. It was no secret that the larger state could easily subdue the smaller, but if it 
were to do so it would set off “a sickening butchery” of Hindus there, which would spread to 
attacks on Muslims elsewhere on the subcontinent.397 Philip Noel-Baker, Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, conveyed his concerns to Attlee at the end of July that there was a 
real risk of “violent communal reactions” in the whole of India, if India used force as had been 
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“unmistakably threatened.”398 The same concern was expressed in a 29 July British Cabinet 
Meeting.399 According to V. P. Menon, a section of advisers to the Indian government also used 
the “bogey of large-scale communal disorders” to argue for continued patience. A skeptic, 
Menon thought these fears “exaggerated if not illusory.”400 Patel, too, “thought these fears to be 
false” and personally guaranteed the safety of all Muslims in India.401 But throughout August, 
journalists and editorial boards warned the “conflict could easily put in peril relations between 
Hindus and Muslims throughout the land.”402 Robert Trumbull predicted in the harshest of terms 
that “India would again be drenched in blood” if the government forces invaded Hyderabad.403 
Related to these worries was the concern that an attack on Hyderabad could draw other 
Muslim states into the conflict. In late August, rumors circulated in India, Pakistan, and the 
United States that Syria planned to sponsor Hyderabad’s case at the United Nations, a possibility 
that would both raise the profile of the case and complicate the already tangled legal questions 
involved.404 According to a report from Beirut, Syria never intended to publicly sponsor the case. 
The Lebanese Prime Minister informed the UK source “that the Arab Governments had been 
careful not to intervene on a religious dispute i.e. Moslem versus Hindu and it was for that 
reason that initiative had been left to Lebanon which as a State with a Christian minority was in a 
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better position to act than a purely Moslem State.” Though Lebanon “had offered their good 
offices in the dispute,” events had unfolded so rapidly that at this point “[h]e proposed to wait 
until he arrived in Paris for United Nations Assembly meeting when he would review the 
possibilities of action.”405 Given the fact that Hyderabad had chosen to take their case to the 
Security Council where Lebanon did not have a vote, the possibility of intervention was limited. 
The prospect of Pakistani involvement remained an open question. 
Despite increasing international awareness and concern over the issue, Indian leaders 
continued to position the issue as a solely domestic concern. As the conflict escalated in late 
summer 1948, their public rhetoric increasingly drew on nationalist feeling by embracing the 
metaphor of Hyderabad as the heart of India – an essential part of a thriving Indian nation from 
which the new state’s very existence could be challenged by Muslim foes.406 Hyderabad’s 
geographical position had been part of India’s argument for accession since the beginning of 
negotiations, but that location became more closely identified with India’s ability to physically 
survive at all in the months preceding Operation Polo.407 In April at the Congress meeting in 
Bombay, Nehru emphasized this argument. Not only would Hyderabad pose a constant threat to 
India, but it could also provide a location for Pakistani support. India could not tolerate this, 
“right in her middle.”408 Addressing a crowd of over 25,000 in early June, Nehru reiterated, 
“’The geographical position of Hyderabad is such that it cannot remain out of India.’” Without 
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specific mention of Pakistan, he assured his audience India had no intention of coercing 
accession unless Hyderabad were to become a base for an enemy state.409   
With the publication of the Government of India’s White Paper on Hyderabad on 11 
August 1948, the geographical location of “the middle” had been transformed for a domestic 
audience into the more emotive “heart” of India – a matter of life and death for the nation. 
“India,” the White Paper begins, “is not a mere geographical expression but an economic and 
political entity,” with the states an integral part of that whole. By “negotiating constitutional 
relationship[s]” with the states, the government was not playing “power politics” or following 
“any expansionist policy,” it was working to create “organic unification” to guarantee “all-
compelling defence and internal security.” Drawing on a quote from the historian Sir Reginald 
Coupland’s 1943 report, The Future of India, the White Paper expressed how “vital” unity was 
to India’s existence: “’An India deprived of the States would [lose] all coherence… India could 
live if its Moslem limbs in the North-West and North-East were amputated, but could it live 
without its heart?’” The Paper went on to present evidence that the Nizam intended “to develop 
an independent theocratic fascist State in the heart of India which…[was] intended to form a 
base for subverting the loyalty of the Muslims in India to the Indian Dominion.” The United 
States could not tolerate the same in Colorado nor could the British in Worcester, could they?410 
Upon presenting this document to the Constituent Assembly, Patel warned: “compromise would 
mean suicide.”411 
                                                
409 “Need to Increase Production; Pandit Nehru’s Call to Country; ‘Hyderabad Must Accede to India,’” Times of 
India, 3 June 1948, 1. 
410 Government of India, White Paper on Hyderabad, 1948 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1948), 3; Ibid., 40; 
Ibid., 10. 
411 “India Government’s White Paper on Hyderabad,” Times of India, 11 August 1948, 5. See also, “’Standing 
Threat to India’: Mr. Patel’s View of an Independent Hyderabad,” The Manchester Guardian, 11 August 1948, 8; 
“Full Fact,” Editorial, Times of India, 11 August 1948, 6; “Hyderabad Accused by India,” Irish Times, 11 August 
  128 
Hyderabad’s location in the “heart” of India played a prominent role in Nehru’s speech to 
the Constituent Assembly on 7 September, his last, best effort to convince his domestic audience 
of the need for Indian action. He first pointed out the anachronistic nature of Hyderabad’s 
continued feudal rule in a time of democratization in the subcontinent. “It was inconceivable to 
us that…in the heart of India which is pulsating with a new freedom, there should be a territory 
deprived of this freedom and indefinitely under autocratic rule.”412 The larger issue was the 
maintenance of peace and stability, which was not possible with a “’mounting wave of violence 
and anarchy.’”413 Hyderabad had to be a part of India, he argued, because anything else would 
create “an ever present fear of conflict.”414 India had been patient, perhaps too patient. “No 
country situated as India is would have tolerated these warlike preparations by a State in the very 
heart of India.”415 After detailing some of the more horrifying incidents being reported out of 
Hyderabad, Nehru urged the government not to: 
permit such atrocities to continue to be perpetrated with impunity within the 
geographical heart of India, for this affects not only the security, honour, life and 
property of the law abiding inhabitants of Hyderabad, but also the international 
peace and order of India. We cannot have a campaign of murder, arson, rape and 
loot [sic] going on in Hyderabad without rousing communal passion in India and 
jeopardising the peace of the Dominion.”416   
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The only way to ensure Hyderabad’s internal security and therefore India’s security was 
for Hyderabad to disband the Razakars immediately and allow Indian troops to return to 
Secunderabad.417 Thus was India’s final public ultimatum delivered.   
 
Hyderabad at the Security Council: Invasion and Evasion  
 With the possibility of invasion looming, the leadership in Hyderabad finally sought 
official international intervention in late August 1948. The first communication to the United 
Nations was a letter sent to the President of the Security Council on 21 August, bringing the 
Council’s attention to the “grave dispute” that had developed, which was “likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.” Drawing on Article 35(2) in the UN Charter, 
the letter asserted that Hyderabad was being threatened through an economic blockade and the 
violation of its boundaries to give up its independence. It warned that India’s actions undermined 
not only the state’s existence, but also “the peace of India and of the entire Asiatic continent, and 
the principles of the United Nations.” The President circulated the letter to members of the 
Council, but no action was taken due in part to the fact that the Council was in the midst of a 
transition from Lake Success, New York, to the Palais de Chaillot, Paris, where the major UN 
bodies would be meeting that fall. The day after Nehru’s ultimatum was delivered in September, 
the Security Council received a second letter from Hyderabad asking “to become a party to the 
Status of the International Court of Justice in order to facilitate the peaceful solution” of the 
dispute.418 Again, the Council took no action.   
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In the meantime, speculation about an imminent invasion circulated widely in the U.S. 
and British press.419 On the 9th, the editorial board of the New York Times asserted that though 
the conflict threatened the peace of the subcontinent, the Nizam was being insensible in his 
refusal to agree to accession. “The idea that such a State could remain independent, with its own 
armed forces, foreign service, tariffs, and so on, seems as about as sensible as if Minnesota or 
another of our states should seek such status here.”420 The Chicago Tribune echoed the Indian 
government’s argument that intervention was necessary “to liberate” the Hindus in Hyderabad 
from the Razakars, “fanatics” who were “terrorizing the Hindus” and were only “responsive to 
orders from a wild-talking fanatic [Razvi].”421 
Between 7 August and 21 September 1948, The Times (London) produced more editorial 
comments on the Hyderabad-India dispute than other major newspapers in the United States and 
Britain. The Times’ opinion on the matter was also more strident than its counterparts, providing 
clear support for the vocal British Conservative Party opposition to Indian aggression. On 7 
August, the board warns, “Time is desperately short.” India could “press home its advantage at 
the cost of bitterness and bloodshed,” but instead should “save the day and open up again the 
prospects of a fruitful partnership with Hyderabad.”422 In a reflection on the first year of Indian 
and Pakistani independence a week later, The Times again referred to the “grievous and perilous” 
situation “where the special claims and circumstances of the NIZAM clearly call for tolerance and 
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statesmanship, if justice is to be done and a quickly spreading conflict to be escaped.”423 Ten 
days later the situation had yet to be resolved, and the board warned that the increasing tensions 
there were undermining the possibilities of a settlement in Kashmir. “The interest taken by 
Pakistan in the Hyderabad dispute has in turn only served to strengthen the suspicion of the 
Government of India that the NIZAM is trying to create a rallying-point for Muslim disaffection 
in the heart of the Union.” Hyderabad needed to be settled or a stalemate could happen in 
Kashmir.424 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s death on 11 September 1948, offered yet another opportunity 
for The Times to warn its readers about the consequences of conflict breaking out between India 
and Hyderabad. With Mohandas Gandhi and now Jinnah’s passing, Nehru was left with “the fate 
of their work in his hands.” He had to know that if Indian forces invaded it “might plunge the 
whole continent to disaster.” For the first time, the editorial board stated explicitly their position 
that a resort to force by Indian “will not be excused…the right of the NIZAM OF HYDERABAD to 
choose freely unfettered by force or pressure, cannot be denied.” They also emphasized a critique 
that Indians took very seriously and that precipitated comments and debates in India, namely the 
relationship between Gandhi’s philosophy and the current Indian government: “It is still within 
the power of MR. NEHRU to choose the way of peace,” the editorial concluded. “There can be no 
doubt of the course which [Nehru’s] guide, the dead MAHATMA, would have chosen.”425 
In the early morning of 13 September, India launched its invasion of Hyderabad. That 
afternoon, Zahir Ahmed, Secretary-General of Hyderabad, sent a telegram to the President of the 
Security Council asking for the dispute to be put on the agenda at the earliest possible date. 
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“International peace, fundamental principles of the Charter, and the duty to prevent widespread 
bloodshed demand immediate consideration of the matter,” he wrote.426 A day later it was 
decided that the earliest the Council could meet on the subject was on the 16th.427 
Critical editorial comment flowed, criticizing India for acting like a colonial power and 
refusing international mediation at the UN. Summary of editorial coverage in major Anglophone 
newspapers demonstrates what was at stake for the Indian postcolonial state’s aspirations for 
global moral leadership if the Hyderabad issue remained on the global stage. The Times 
(London) considered India’s invasion a “deplorable use of force” that put the “peace of the 
Indian continent…in danger.” It argued India should have agreed to the Nizam’s offer of third 
party intervention in the form of arbitration, a plebiscite, or the UN Security Council. Instead 
India hid “[b]ehind the smoke-screen of propaganda,” obscuring the Nizam’s legal standing 
because the government was “convinced that it is unsafe to allow a Muslim-ruled state to exist in 
the heart of the Deccan.” India’s determination to treat this a domestic matter reveals that 
government’s hypocrisy in the face of its relationship to the UN: “Its use of force against a 
weaker neighbour which resists its claims comes badly from a Government that owes its 
existence to the principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”428 The Pakistan 
Times, openly hostile to Operation Polo, held nothing back in the condemnation of military 
intervention. Referencing Robert Clive and Warren Hastings, two prominent figures in the late 
18th century British imperial project in the subcontinent, the editorial claims these two did no 
more than India has now done in Hyderabad. In fact, “Hitler’s invasion of Poland was in no way 
less justified.” India claimed they were acting as liberators on a mission of peace to bring 
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“happiness and freedom” to the people, but “a Government as oppressive and Gestapo-ridden as 
Hitler’s must possess a tremendous amount of impudence to don the robes of a liberator.” The 
invasion of Hyderabad could be called nothing less than “a cold-blooded crime.”429 
India’s multi-pronged invasion proved overwhelming to Hyderabad’s inferior defenses, 
and the “police action” became even more visible in the international press. The New York Times 
had a much more critical opinion of the situation than it had held previously. The editorial board 
acknowledged India had a good case regarding Hyderabad’s location and feudal system, but they 
were not “convinced by India’s list of grievances and ‘atrocities.’” “The invasion of a 
neighboring state ‘to restore order,’” the editorial argues, “has an ancient odor that is all too 
familiar.” The editorial also called into question the international community’s ability to keep the 
peace. The legal questions of the case “will not be answered by Indian tanks and aircraft. Nor 
will they be answered by India’s mere insistence that they do not exist.” The “situation clearly 
calls for international action,” which the Security Council could set in motion.430 The 
Washington Post editorial board wrote three opinions between 15-19 September, commenting on 
the invasion and its implications for India and the United Nations. The opinions in many ways 
leaned to the Indian position calling the “acts of terrorism…by the so-called Razakars, a quasi 
organization of Moslem fanatics” “pretty well substantiated.”431 They also agreed with India’s 
legal argument that Hyderabad was not in fact independent. However, those issues did not 
persuade the board that India’s “appeal to force so precipitately.”432  
The Manchester Guardian called India to task for not being more patient, but was highly 
critical of the behavior of Muslims inside Hyderabad. The board believed that “the fundamental 
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trouble clearly lies in the social and racial structure of Hyderabad, in the indefensible claim of 
the small Moslem minority to preserve their privileges, and above all in the readiness of the 
extremists among the Moslems to enforce their point of view by ruthless intimidation,” 
threatening both Hindus and modern Muslims, and preventing the Nizam from coming to a 
settlement. He should have started toward responsible government and placed Hindus in 
administration after the standstill agreement was signed, but he did not, in large part because the 
“Razakars—a sort of Moslem storm troopers” were against those changes. The best solution was 
for both sides to agree to Security Council oversight of a plebiscite and the terms of accession.433 
No matter the level of criticism, observers agreed this case deserved a hearing at the UN. 
The Security Council did finally meet on the subject of Hyderabad on the afternoon of 16 
September 1948. India’s invasion of the state was already four days old, but the Council resisted 
an emotional response in favor of legal debate. Council representatives were hesitant to take up 
the agenda item given the difficult legal questions. Before discussing the invasion itself, the 
Council first had to determine if Hyderabad had the legal right to bring a case to the Council 
based on UN procedural rules. Would placing the question on the agenda “imply a certain view 
of the juridical status of the parties,” as the Chinese delegate asserted?434 Only the Argentinean 
delegate, José Arce was adamant that the Council take immediate action, referring to the lives 
that were at stake. The “Security Council is aware that, in a part of the world, one country 
appears to have invaded another, that fighting is taking place there and people are being killed 
and wounded. That is a situation which the Security Council must remedy,” he argued.435 Still, it 
took one hour of debate before the committee voted to approve the agenda item. 
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At this point Ramaswami Mudaliar (India) and Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung (Hyderabad) 
came to the Security Council table prepared to argue both the legal and moral aspects of their 
respective cases. With his opening words Jung immediately laid out the rhetorical strategy that 
would be utilized to support Hyderabad’s position throughout the agenda item’s life at the 
Security Council. He built his argument around the ugly fact that Hyderabad was a small 
independent state being invaded by a stronger state, which was using allegations of “anarchy and 
disorder” to justify their actions. This “brutal invasion,” he said, had “shocked the conscience of 
the world,” and because its military defenses were weak, Hyderabad would have to defend itself 
“here, before this high organ of the United Nations and before the public opinion of the world. 
For the world has been stirred to deepest apprehension by this premeditated act of war emanating 
from a State which has based the claim to its own independence on high spiritual ideals of non-
violence.” The Council, he urged, needed to listen to the “anguished cry of the people of 
Hyderabad” and take “swift, authoritative, and determined” action “to stop this threat to 
international peace and justice.”436   
Jung went on to ask the Council to intervene in the current situation and study the 
circumstances leading up to the invasion including the economic blockade, the language in the 
Standstill Agreement on maintaining order, and the White Paper’s reference to fascist and 
communist agitation inside the State. All of India’s actions, Jung argued, had been predicated on 
their desire to force Hyderabad to give up its independence. He then expanded on the legal 
arguments supporting Hyderabad’s legitimacy as an independent state with the right to bring 
such a case to the UN. Citing Mountbatten’s assertion from July 1947 that the States had 
“complete freedom technically and legally,” Jung emphasized Hyderabad’s desire to maintain 
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independence while also being committed to “the most integrated co-operation with India.” The 
reference to arbitration in the Standstill Agreement alone made it acceptable for the Security 
Council to hear the case. “Hyderabad has now chosen to submit to arbitration—in its widest 
sense—by this high organ of the community of nations,” he concluded.437 
Mudaliar presented India’s case in a briefer statement designed to undermine the 
Hyderabad delegation’s credibility. He aimed to convince the Council of Hyderabad’s dependent 
status in which case the relations between India and Hyderabad would fall under domestic 
jurisdiction and outside the purview of international intervention:  
I wish to make it clear that in my Government’s view Hyderabad is not competent 
to bring any question before the Security Council; that it is not a State; that it is 
not independent; that never in all its history did it have the status of independence; 
that neither in the remote past nor before August 1947, nor under any declaration 
made by the United Kingdom, nor under any act passed by the British Parliament, 
has it acquired the status of independence which would entitle it to come in its 
own right to present a case before the Security Council.438   
 
Beyond this, Mudaliar sought to correct the “wrong impression” that India’s invasion “was 
aggression, that we went deliberately, without any provocation, and that by sheer force were 
doing certain things which were wrong. Anybody who has to use force—and my country even 
more than any abhors the use of force—anybody who has to use force must think a hundred 
times, and a thousand times, before force is invoked…The march of events, the compulsion of 
events, has at last exhausted its patience and has obliged it to take that action.”439 Before the 
invasion India had received “harrowing tales of death, of arson, of loot, of rape, by what were 
called the private armies in Hyderabad…encouraged or countenanced by the Government of 
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Hyderabad.”440 It was from this perspective that the situation had to be put before world opinion.  
The meeting then adjourned until the following Monday to allow delegates time to analyze the 
situation and receive instructions from their governments.441  
The following day the Nizam surrendered to Indian forces. The Hyderabadi regular 
forces had offered little resistance to the superior Indian military, dissolving quickly under the 
multi-pronged assault. Reports on the fighting coming out of Hyderabad described the Razakars 
as putting up the strongest opposition, but they too were unable to stop India’s march toward 
Hyderabad City and Secunderabad.442 The Washington Post referred to India’s successful 
invasion as a “Soiled Victory,” but conceded that the only thing the UN could do at this point 
was “censure” India for the invasion “and then insist on a plebiscite to legitimatize the 
situation.”443 The New York Times seemed resolved to the fait accompli India had achieved, 
characterizing the invasion as a relatively minor conflict that was carried out against minimal 
resistance allowing India to implement whatever policies they chose. Relieved that Pakistan took 
no position, they commented, “When the Indian Union resorted to force it took a gamble that 
could conceivably have set a flame that might have taken years to quench.” Major outbreaks of 
violence in Hyderabad and the subcontinent were averted, and the Security Council was now let 
off the hook regarding this tricky situation.444 The Manchester Guardian argued that it was now 
time for India to act generously toward Hyderabad in order to avert “a great disaster.” Though 
India disputed Hyderabad’s ability to bring the issue to the Security Council, “why should not 
                                                
440 Ibid., 20. 
441 Cadogen (UK), SCOR, No. 109, 21. 
442 For a detailed account of the operation from the Indian perspective, see Armed Forces of the Indian Union, 
Operation Polo: The Police Action Against Hyderabad, 1948 (Delhi: Historical Section, Ministery of Defence, 
Manager of Publications, Government of India, 1972).   
443 “Soiled Victory,” Editorial, Washington Post, 19 September 1948, M14. 
444 “Cease-Fire in India,” Editorial, New York Times, 18 September 1948, 16. 
  138 
India now itself invite the United Nations to organise and supervise the plebiscite,” which all 
agree will likely go in India’s favor?445 
The London Times’ criticism of India did not fade with Hyderabad’s surrender. In 
unequivocal terms the board declared: “The Indian Union can have no claim to sovereignty over 
Hyderabad.” By imposing its will on a weaker nation, India had violated moral principles. “It is 
tragic that the rulers of a nation which only a few months ago recognized Mr. Gandhi as its 
lasting inspiration in public policy should have chosen, for reasons of state, to go against all that 
he preached and practised. Only one course of action can restore the good name of India” – agree 
to follow an international decision on the issue.446 This is the same line of argumentation as that 
delivered by Winston Churchill in Parliament in late July, one that resents India’s independence 
itself.447 India from this perspective had not taken over from the British in the case of the 
princely states, as that government claimed, but was in fact going against its own stated 
principles and enacting its own form of imperial aggression. The ability to criticize in this vein 
can be characterized as almost gleeful, a sort of post-imperial schadenfreud. This attitude was 
met in India by a defensive government and public who were offended by any British criticism 
of India’s actions toward consolidation and stability, and were quick to defend their continued 
adherence to Gandhian ideals within a new context. 
The final highly critical editorial from The Times came on 21 September. The board 
accused the Indian public, which supported the invasion unlike many observers abroad, of being 
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“oblivious of all but narrowly nationalistic, and even communal, considerations.” Interestingly, 
the board seemed to let Nehru off the hook, calling his attitude toward Hyderabad “generous,” 
and instead put the blame for the “ruthless use of force” on more obviously aggressive Patel and 
Menon – who “now find their most formidable opponent at their mercy.” Even a plebiscite that 
goes in India’s favor at this point, the editorial argued, would not be above suspicion.448 It is 
important to note that by 1 November, The Times board had backed off on their strongest 
critiques of India’s actions, conceding that the Indian government had put their power to 
effective use: the administration in the state was back up and running smoothly, order had been 
restored, and the military was conducting itself well.449 
The Pakistan Times editorial stance after the Nizam’s surrender turned away from India’s 
crimes and toward suspicion of the Nizam himself. An article published on 17 September asked 
the question, “Nizam in League with Indian Govt?” How else to explain the “easy walk-over by 
the Indian forces” unless the Nizam had actively supported the invasion? Major-General El 
Edroos, head of the Hyderabad military, never even brought the army into the fight, and there 
was the fact of the Nizam seeking negotiations with Delhi outside the normal negotiating team in 
August.450 Neither confirming nor denying the assertions of this conspiracy theory, The Pakistan 
Times nevertheless sowed more doubts by pointing out that El Edroos was accepted as a member 
of the new Cabinet established after the invasion. “Whether Hyderabad’s surrender was brought 
about by force or trickery,” the editorial continues, “India cannot absolve herself of the guilt of 
unprovoked aggression.” This behavior was in direct contrast to Pakistan’s policy of non-
intervention in the States. The Security Council, they argued, should continue to investigate the 
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matter “even though the complainant has been bludgeoned or bribed into silence.”451 Suspicions 
over the Nizam’s complicity in his own defeat continued to circulate through the paper’s 
pages.452   
The Times of India editorial on the surrender was titled simply, “Happy Ending.”453 
When the Security Council met again to discuss the case on 20 September, the Indian 
army had occupied the princely state for three days, and the Council had received, through the 
Indian delegation, a telegram from the Nizam “ordering the withdrawal of the Hyderabad case 
from the Council.”454 As Jung had warned at the previous meeting, the timing of India’s invasion 
and the swiftness of its advance had presented the Council with a fait accompli. The question 
now was whether the delegations would be willing to take action given India’s current 
position.455 Zahir Ahmed, speaking on behalf of the Hyderabad delegation, stated that though the 
press had reported the surrender, the delegation had not yet received any direct instructions from 
the Nizam. As a result he urged the Council not to dismiss the case, and hoped “a solution may 
be found which will take into account the vital interests of both parties, the principles of 
international justice and morality, and the authority of the United Nations.”456 Mudaliar, again 
representing India, assured the Council that the Nizam had not produced the telegram under 
pressure by the Indians. Troops had entered Secunderabad, order was being maintained, and the 
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civil administration was operating as before with the full cooperation of the Nizam and his 
forces. “Our position has been that our troops had to enter Hyderabad in order to prevent 
atrocities which were being committed on Hyderabad soil; to prevent border incidents; to prevent 
repercussions in the provinces adjoining Hyderabad and indeed in the rest of the Dominion of 
India,” Mudaliar stated. “That our forces have entered without much trouble is an indication not 
of the lack of preparedness of the other side, but of the overwhelming good-will to which the 
people of Hyderabad extended to our forces.”457 He concluded by reiterating that India did not 
think Hyderabad was competent to bring the issue to the UN. Both Cadogen and the U.S. 
delegate Philip Jessup pointed out that since the situation had not changed the legal question at 
hand there was little the Security Council could do. They suggested an adjournment for a few 
days, with the warning that the UN membership would be watching and expecting India to 
uphold its stated intent to allow the people of Hyderabad to decide the position of its state.458  
As Cadogen moved to officially propose adjournment, José Arce of Argentina interjected 
with an angry condemnation of India’s actions in Hyderabad. He challenged the stated reasons 
for invasion, the claim to domestic jurisdiction, and India’s contradictory stances in the cases of 
Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir. “I shall make no attempt to conceal my surprise at these 
events and, if I may say so, at the attitude of the Council,” he began. India, he pointed out, had 
resisted the Council at every turn. The government had offered no information to the Council 
that was not readily available to the public, and had not produced any documentation to justify 
their position on Hyderabad’s legal standing. Drawing a cutting parallel to another colonial 
invasion, Arce compared India’s claim that once they were in control of Hyderabad the people 
would have their chance to express their will to a song sung by Mussolini’s troops at Addis 
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Ababa. “I believe it was called Faccetta nera (little dark faces),” he said, “and naturally, in this 
song the troops promised the people of Abyssinia that they would obtain all they wanted as soon 
as Italy had gained control.”459 Given the situation, Arce was sure that India’s claim of the 
Nizam’s cooperation was “perfectly true, for it is rather hard to refuse cooperation when it is 
demanded with a loaded pistol and a foot on your neck.” Arce also made a direct criticism based 
on India’s past representations at the UN. India’s attitude on domestic jurisdiction in this case, he 
argued cynically, seemed “difficult to reconcile” given the fact that, “if I remember correctly, 
[the delegation] has once or twice raised the question of the Indian minority in South Africa.” 
India had clearly invaded because the Nizam would not agree to accession, and though Arce 
respected the Government of India, he had seen India “upholding one theory regarding Junagadh 
with one part of the library and the opposite theory on Kashmir with the other part of the 
library.” He concluded:  
I wish to express my doubts and also a feeling of sorrow because…the United 
Nations are following the same path as the League of Nations; and I fear that what 
I have said so often will be shown to be true; that the Big Five, as they are called, 
do not require any privilege and do not require the veto, because in reality they 
possess a natural veto—the veto of force, of superiority, and the right given by 
[arms].460  
  
After Arce concluded his comments, he received some support from the representatives of other 
small states. The Colombian delegate expressed his concern that if Hyderabad were to disappear 
as a state, the UN principles of “the condemnation of any forcible acquisition of territory, and the 
self-determination of peoples” would be compromised.461 The Syrian delegate, Azm, expressed 
his desire for the item to stay on the agenda and proposed the creation of an ad hoc committee to 
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study the issue. However, the Latin American and Middle Eastern voices could gain no traction 
in the meeting in the face of permanent members’ protection of India.  
 By the time the Security Council met again on the agenda item at the end of September, 
the Nizam had reconfirmed his earlier telegram revoking the authority of the Hyderabad 
delegation’s authority.462 Those delegates nevertheless continued to challenge the validity of that 
claim. The discussion at the meeting opened with the question of the Hyderabad delegation’s 
credentials and whether they should be asked to speak given those doubts. This was the first time 
“the validity of the credentials of a delegation” was debated at the Council, and “addresses on 
both sides were strong and emotional” throughout the four-hour debate.463 Was the cable from 
the Nizam authentic? If so, the Council needed to abide by his decision to withdraw the case. If 
not, the juridical question stood, and the delegation should still be allowed to present their 
case.464 At this point Arce again urged the Council to take action not only on the basis of 
obligations in the Charter to maintain peace and to the member nations to avoid the threat of 
force. “I can see no reason for burying our heads in the sand,” he admonished. India had 
admitted clearly what it did and unless the Nizam was to “appear in person before us, 
unaccompanied by anyone” Arce would not “give credence to any letter or cable bearing his 
signature.” Information from the sheep had only come through the wolf, and it was the duty of 
the UN and the Council to “protect the little fish from being devoured by the big fish.” India had 
offered no proof to challenge the fact that as of 15 August 1947, Hyderabad was an independent 
state. Therefore, the Council should request a cease-fire and ask India to withdraw its troops. “I 
shall never vote for the withdrawal of this item from our agenda,” Arce proclaimed, “and I 
                                                
462 “Secretary-General, United Nations, 22 September 1948,” Select Documents on Asian Affairs, V. 1, 354-355. 
463 “Hyderabad Minister Makes Appeal in U.N.,” New York Times, 29 September 1948, 10. 
464 See statements by Cadogen (UK), El-Khouri (Syria), and Urdaneta Arbelaez (Colombia), 360th Meeting: 28 
September 1948, SCOR, No. 112, 1-7. 
  144 
believe that the only definite steps” possible are through investigation and asking India to abide 
by the UN Charter. “I shall accept the decision of the majority of the Council,” he conceded, “but 
I can never agree that a State, even if governed by a dictator who represents only a minority, 
should be suppressed by force…No State may be destroyed in that way.”465 
Cadogen again refused to allow Arce’s criticisms to drive the debate. The Chair 
acknowledged it was not the authenticity of the telegram per se that was at question, but the fact 
that the Nizam may not have been a free agent when he wrote it. In the absence of other 
suggestions, he proposed to invite both parties to the table again to discuss only the validity of 
the letter before the discussion went any further. At this, Arce expressed his exasperation with 
the proceedings, arguing that the Council had already allowed itself “to become a court with 
parties debating on both sides of the table,” lowering its prestige. Why prolong the situation by 
inviting anyone to speak on the matter, he wondered? The only question that should be on the 
table was whether or not the agenda item should be removed.466 Urdaneta Arbalaez of Colombia 
concurred. “The problem before us now is not exactly a legal one. It is rather a question of a de 
facto situation,” he commented. With no way to know if the second letter from the Nizam was 
signed under pressure, nothing would be gained by allowing the parties to speak at this point.467 
Cadogen suggested that the Hyderabad delegate could come to the table to address his challenge 
to the validity of the Nizam’s letter, and the Indian delegate could respond. With no objections, 
Mudaliar and Jung joined the table. 
The Hyderabad delegation to this point had not had the opportunity to present their full 
case to the Security Council, and Cadogen specifically asked Jung not to address what rights or 
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wrongs the government of India may have committed, but to confine his comments “to factual 
statements” that could help the Council judge whether or not the Nizam was a free agent when 
he signed the last letter.468 Jung pointed out that in order to support his claims he had to provide 
the broader context of the conditions in Hyderabad and requested fifteen minutes to make a fuller 
statement. “[I]t is quite likely that after this question has been decided I may no longer have a 
chance to speak to the Security Council,” Jung explained in language indicating an emotional 
tone, “and I should certainly like to unload my mind before I withdraw from the Council table.” 
He and his delegation had not acted on the communications from the Nizam because the issues at 
stake in the Hyderabad case involved “a wider principle…which directly affects the United 
Nations as a whole.” India had not invaded to maintain order. “There is no one in this room who 
deep in his heart does not know that” claim was “but a pretext,” that descriptions of the 
Razakars’ excesses were “a gross and deliberate exaggeration,” and that India had premeditated 
the war on Hyderabad “as part of the national policy in pursuance of the idea of creating a 
uniform and united India.” India’s conduct was that of “a conqueror.” The state had taken over 
the administration of the military, the police, and the civil government.469 India was in the 
process of annexing Hyderabad, and the Security Council should send observers while the 
mechanisms for a free vote were set up, and intervene to help establish a settlement between the 
two states. This fight for Hyderabad’s independence and dignity was also being waged to defend 
the UN Charter, Jung argued. Getting to the heart of the issue he asked, “If the United Nations 
allows this invasion and the extinction of a State, on the pretext of maintaining order, what legal 
aid and moral authority will it possess to prevent such action in the future?”470 
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Mudaliar responded to Jung’s comments defensively, offering point-by-point refutations 
of “the series of attacks…suggestions, innuendos and reflections” against the Indian 
government.471 He pointed out that in fact this was the first time in the last eight months that the 
Nizam had been a free agent, as the Nizam had made clear in a 23 September broadcast when he 
stated that India had restored to him the freedom to rule.472 Ever since the October coup d’état, 
Mudaliar argued, “Gangsterism won the day, the Nizam was rendered helpless.” Now released 
from the Razakars, he was free to rule his dynasty, make decisions on behalf of his people, and 
help calm the disturbance that had taken over in the last eight months. Dismissive of Arce’s 
critiques, Mudaliar said, “I think the Security Council, which is essentially intended to promote 
peace, will be doing the only right and justifiable thing by refraining from indulging in technical 
discussions and casuistry about independent States and invasion, and Italy and Abyssinia, and 
the big fish and the little fish.” If asked, he could show the Council thousands of telegrams from 
Muslims and religious associations all over India “offering thanks… because the canker” that 
had been dividing Hindus and Muslims had finally been removed. “The Hyderabad difficulty,” 
he concluded, “which was embittering relations and poisoning the atmosphere, has happily 
ended.”473 When he finished his comments no further discussion was held on the issue, and 
Cadogen adjourned the meeting.474    
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The Security Council did not address the Hyderabad issue again for two months, after 
Pakistan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs requested permission to participate in future discussions 
on Hyderabad and reported on a deterioration of the situation there, asking for “urgent action by 
the Council.”475 Given his vocal criticism of India and the Council’s handling of the case in 
September, the fact that José Arce presided over the Security Council in November could have 
altered the fate of the agenda item. But according to British reports, Arce “was apparently shaken 
by Mudaliar’s arguments” at the 28 September meeting, and when the issue came up his 
approach was studiously neutral.476 Pandit, in a maneuver demonstrating India’s deliberate 
distancing from the agenda item, had informed Arce in writing that there was no Indian delegate 
available to address the issue “because [the Indian government] had understood that this question 
would not be considered at any time or for whatever new motive.”477 At the meeting Hyderabad 
was bumped down the list in order to discuss the more pressing India-Pakistan question. By the 
time that discussion ended the Council had already been in session for three hours, and Arce 
asked the members how they proposed to proceed. After a brief discussion and without 
objections the chair agreed to postpone before discussing Hyderabad.   
The case showed up again as the fourth item on the Council’s 15 December agenda. After 
briefly describing the documents he had received pertaining to the issue, the Chair (now Van 
Langenhove of Belgium), invited Pakistan’s representative, Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, to 
speak on the issue.478 He informed the chair that in order to cover all of the relevant material his 
comments could take up two full Security Council meetings. Van Langenhove suggested that 
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since the session in Paris was coming to an end they should postpone until they returned to Lake 
Success. Though the Syrian delegate suggested putting it on the agenda for the following two 
days, the Chair pointed out that many people, including Khan, were leaving Paris. The agenda 
item was yet again postponed without a full discussion. 
 The next and last time the Hyderabad item made it onto the Security Council agenda was 
19 May 1949 by which time India’s annexation of Hyderabad was to all intents and purposes 
irreversible. By the time Khan finally presented the full case to the Council, India’s nationalist 
narrative had already come to dominate the history of the invasion aside from works produced by 
Pakistani scholars and those in the Hyderabad diaspora.479 India had published a propaganda 
piece in the spring of 1949 to demonstrate how positive their interventions and procedures had 
been since the invasion. The story it tells is one of a new government that had brought a chaotic, 
outdated, corrupt, and sometimes violent State into order through projects ranging from irrigation 
projects and road building to dealing with the Razakars and establishing the basis upon which to 
build responsible government. The narrative was one of an enlightened Indian state bringing 
modernity, rationality, and secularism to a place that had been kept in feudal circumstances for 
centuries.480  
In V. P. Menon’s account of the invasion, occupation, and integration of Hyderabad he 
claims, “There was not a single communal incident in the whole length and breadth of India 
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throughout the time of the operation.”481 Another historical account asserts: “Mercifully, Polo 
produced no reprisal killings.”482 But the process of integrating Hyderabad into the Indian state 
was not as calm and stable as the government and contemporary scholars have claimed. As 
Sherman has shown, the new administration had to determine how to deal with the juridical 
system and the large number of detainees held in the wake of the invasion; balance the 
administrative roles necessary for a transition to democracy; and calm the agitation of the 
Razakars and the Communist uprisings in Telangana.483 To do so, they had to be innovative and 
flexible in order to deal with an extremely dynamic and sometimes volatile situation.484 The all-
India communal violence that had been feared never erupted after the invasion, but quite quickly 
there was internal violence including the destruction of mosques and buildings, rape, and murder. 
Pakistanis and others attempted to bring this violence to the light of day through newspaper 
coverage, the Security Council, and diplomatic entreaties. The Pakistani paper the Dawn printed 
letters from Hyderabad describing “large scale atrocities” by the Indian army against the Muslim 
population. An October 20 editorial described in Cold War terms an “Iron Curtain” being 
dropped over Hyderabad preventing the world from learning about a “bloodbath of Muslims” 
estimated at over 100,000.485 A letter to the editor of the Washington Post in early December 
attempted to bring the atrocities against Muslims to the attention of the outside world. In this 
letter, Kamaluddin Ahmad called the situation a “genocide…the cruelties and mass murders 
done by the Indian army and the Hindus are shown to be worse than those practiced by the Nazis 
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under Hitler’s regime.”486 The British government considered Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat 
Ali Khan’s efforts to bring the atrocities to its attention “a great deal of exaggeration.”487 Nehru 
continued to assure both the Pakistanis and the British that the reports were false, though no 
Pakistani press or observers were allowed into Hyderabad.488     
The historical record confirms unequivocally that reports of violence against Muslims 
were not exaggerated, and leaders in the Indian government participated in actively suppressing 
that information. In response to charges of atrocities, the Indian government sent Pandit 
Sundarlal and Qazi Muhammad Abdulghaffar on a tour of Hyderabad in November and 
December 1948 to gather information. The report they produced confirmed “large-scale killings, 
rape, and destruction and seizure of Muslim property” particularly in the western Marathwada 
Districts.489 The horrors conveyed in the Sunderlal Report are breathtaking, and include first-
person accounts of massacres, torture, rape, and arson. In just one example among many, in the 
western Hyderabadi villages around Shahpur Taluka an estimated 5,500 people were killed or 
committed suicide over a two-day period, and most Muslim homes and mosques in the area were 
destroyed.490 Though parts of the Report may have been smuggled to Karachi in 1949, the Indian 
government’s suppression was successful; it was never made public until Omar Khalidi 
published portions of the report in 1988 through a U.S. publisher.491 In addition to these 
atrocities, the Indian government had set up concentration camps to hold tens of thousands of 
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detainees, including thousands of surrendering troops. An estimated 17,000 civilians, and as 
many as 21,000 men designated Arab, Afghan, or Pakistani who along with their wives and 
children were held in camps surrounded by barbed wire as they awaited possible deportation.492 
Aziz refers to these events as “an unprecedented holocaust” unleashed in “a forest fire of 
massacres, plunder and horrifying savagery.”493 In contrast, the official Indian government 
summary of Operation Polo concludes: “The irresistible advance, joined with the exemplary 
behaviour of the Indian forces towards the civil population irrespective of religion or creed, 
nipped the guerilla menace [referring to the Razakars] in the bud and prevented prolonged 
resistance in the countryside.494 
In his article in the American Journal of International Law in 1950, Clyde Eagleton 
wrote with distain and frustration about the Security Council’s failure to act on the issue of 
India’s invasion and the forcible incorporation of Hyderabad. With the “Question of Hyderabad” 
at the time of the article still on the Council’s agenda despite the fact that the Council had done 
nothing, he deemed it “thus far the worst failure of the United Nations” both politically and 
legally.495 In his opinion, the Indian position was completely without legal merit, and the only 
way they avoided international intervention was through political maneuverings, an assessment 
that is difficult to dispute though India’s argument also struck a chord with a number of 
delegations. First, India was savvy about the timing of the invasion. Operation Polo began after 
the Hyderabad letter reached the Security Council but before 15 September, the date Zahir 
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Ahmed proposed in his 21 August telegram to Cadogen.496 Apparently India hoped that by acting 
quickly they could have the situation under their direct control before the situation became more 
visible on the international stage. In addition, by launching the invasion immediately after 
Jinnah’s death, the Indian government benefitted from the fact that no Pakistani leader was in a 
position to order military retaliation at that moment.497 Second, India used diplomatically 
acceptable delaying tactics to prevent the issue from being fully aired at the Council in the 
months following the invasion. Though Mudaliar was present to speak at the two September 
meetings, the Indian delegation did not send a representative to the November 24, December 2, 
and December 10 meetings. If not for the tenacity of the Pakistani delegation the case would not 
have been discussed at all after 28 September 1948. 
In addition, India had support at the UN from powerful interests working behind the 
scenes. According to Sultana Afraz, the Americans and the British did not want to get involved 
in either the Hyderabad case (or in Junagadh) because in the context of post-war problems and 
the larger Kashmir issue they chose “political expediency rather than consideration of fair play 
and justice.”498 Exchanges between the UK delegation in Paris and the Foreign Office in London 
reveal that India had political support behind the scenes working to prevent Hyderabad from 
getting a full hearing at the UN. The British and the Canadians developed a plan to remove the 
issue from the agenda. Cadogen reported that he would inform the U.S. delegate taking over 
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from him as chair that “we should not have any special reason for urging early resumption” on 
the matter. He also reported that the Canadian delegate was “authorised to propose, at an early 
stage, that Hyderabad representative be no longer heard.”499 Understanding that the Canadian 
delegate was proposing to remove the item altogether, the Foreign Office recommended they talk 
with the Indians first, as complete removal would likely only be approved if India agreed to 
allow UN observers in and voluntarily reported on the steps taken to ensure the people’s voice is 
heard.500 On October 3 the Foreign Office informed Cadogen of the fuller plan to get the item off 
the agenda. The Canadians and the Indians were to talk and then, at the next meeting, the Indians 
should volunteer to let in observers and the Council about the steps taken. Then, the Canadians 
would propose removing the Hyderabad appeal from the agenda.501 On the 6th of October 
Cadogen reported that the Canadians would not bring the issue up themselves, but “if it had 
come up he would have proposed removal of item from agenda [sic].” The Canadian delegate 
agreed reluctantly to speak to the Indians, and Cadogen understood that the Chinese supported 
the item’s removal as well. As to whether the Indians planned to invite observers into 
Hyderabad, it “now seems likely that the Indians have had second thoughts.”502 By 14 October, 
Cadogen reported that despite the Indian delegation’s impatience with the Council’s failure to 
remove the item from the agenda, it was unlikely the item would be addressed again any time 
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soon.503 With a lack of political backing from key Security Council delegations, supporters of 
UN intervention were bound to be disappointed.  
 Unlike the South African case championed by Pandit just two years earlier, the Indian 
government explicitly resisted the global stage in 1948, asserting the prerogative of their new 
independent status to attend to this “domestic” concern. For the Indian state, their goal had been 
achieved: to bring the princely state that sat at the “heart” of India into the political, 
geographical, and discursive boundaries of the nation. This ensured centralized state control over 
the whole of southern India and consolidated state power at home. The events of the “police 
action” then became folded discursively into the larger narrative of the spectre of Partition 
wherein the secular, “civilized” Indian state was obligated to protect the majority Hindu 
population of Hyderabad from violent, “fanatical” Muslim bands, and at the same time eliminate 
a possible site of enemy (read: Pakistani) organizing. This attitude by any UN member state 
threatened not only the prestige but also the future effectiveness of that still-emerging institution. 
The fact that the belligerent state in this case was India – a member so often leading the fight for 
justice through the UN – made their actions even more stunning to observers.  For the press, that 
point in particular was their contention with the Indian government’s actions and the failure of 
the Security Council to intervene. 
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4 
PERFORMING MASCULINITY: VIJAYA LAKSHMI PANDIT, INDIAN  
PEACEKEEPING, AND THE GENDERED EMBODIMENT OF NONALIGNMENT, 1953 
 
 
 
In electing India’s ‘goddess of victory’ the first woman president 
of its General Assembly, the United Nations has marked up 
another first for Mme Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit. 
Christian Science Monitor, 16 September 1953 
 
 
[I]n this baffling, ‘ideological’ battle of half-truths, untruths and 
distortions, the one person who has remained completely 
unaffected is the Indian soldier. He is the silent hero of this 
international drama that is being staged on the blood-drenched 
battlefields of Korea. 
Times of India, 9 November 1953 
 
 
 
When the United Nations General Assembly convened in New York in the fall of 1953, 
long-time UN reporter Alistair Cooke described the atmosphere as an “Icy Ballet of Despair” in 
which the “meek” delegates each “go up to the podium…recite their anxious survey of the 
world’s woes, and retire.”504 A number of pressing matters weighed on the representatives at this 
eighth meeting of the Assembly, especially the threat to the organization’s ability to function at 
all in the face of Cold War rivalries. The Korean War had dominated the previous three annual 
gatherings, and vicious debates over UN involvement in the conflict had placed East-West power 
politics into stark relief at both the Assembly and the Security Council. For three years troops 
had fought under the blue UN flag with little to show but a divided, wounded region. The 
idealistic goal of an international military force tasked with establishing peace between nations 
had cracked under the realities of a war fought over fiercely defended borders and deeply held 
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ideological beliefs. The Security Council was often deadlocked, and the General Assembly had 
become the location of bitter exchanges. As a result, many had become skeptical of the UN’s 
effectiveness as an instrument for peace. The Soviet bloc remained unwaveringly critical of the 
UN handling of the Korean conflict. These delegates made forceful denunciations of the United 
States’ efforts “to cloak the destructive, aggressive war against the peaceful population of Korea 
under the flag of the United Nations.”505 Others, such as the Dominican Republic’s delegate, 
continued to criticize the power of the veto to block progress in the Security Council.506 
Yet there also was hope in the air. The tone of most of the delegations’ opening speeches 
to the Assembly might best be described as cautious optimism tinged with nostalgia.507 After 
years of conflict, the long-sought Korean armistice had been signed in July; what had seemed an 
intractable problem now held the possibility of final resolution. The spokesperson from Egypt 
said it was not a victory for one side or the other, but rather “a victory for the Purposes and 
Principles of the Charter.”508 Many delegates from the Americas, the Middle East, and Asia, 
while acknowledging its shortcomings, expressed continued faith in the world organization. 
Western-oriented delegates especially found hope in the fact that many non-Communists UN 
delegates had worked together “to resist armed aggression by collective force” in Korea, with 
either direct or oblique critique of communist actions to undermine these efforts.509 And certainly 
the idealism invested in the birth of the UN still maintained rhetorical power. Out-going 
president Lester Pearson (Canada) acknowledged in his opening address “the inadequacy of our 
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own efforts in translating aspirations into reality” over the preceding seven years, but he believed 
the world community was still dedicated to “international efforts towards world co-operation.”510  
There was also optimism in the growing power of the nonaligned Afro-Asian bloc at the 
General Assembly, a natural outgrowth of UN postcolonialism. Due to the Security Council’s 
inability to overcome the power of the veto after the Korean War broke out in 1950, the General 
Assembly largely had taken over the maintenance of international peace and the settlement of 
disputes. Within this newly configured structure, the Afro-Asian bloc (sometimes referred to as 
the Arab-Asian bloc, and later the Non-Aligned bloc) had emerged as a dynamic force, balancing 
the two sides of the ideological divide and carving out a new, more influential position in 
international diplomacy for postcolonial states with India as a recognized leader. In his opening 
speech, the Indonesian delegate for one considered his country’s nonaligned position a 
“privilege,” allowing them to continue “to play actively a humble but independent part in 
seeking the middle road for mutual conciliation and understanding.”511 Others emphasized the 
changing role of the Asian, African, and Middle Eastern states in the power structure of the 
Assembly as a step forward for the organization.512  
Amongst those states most committed to nonalignment, India in particular had reason for 
optimism in the fall of 1953. Both at the General Assembly and in Korea, Indian representatives 
were enacting the nonaligned position, resulting in much optimism for the postcolonial state’s 
potential leadership on the global stage from New York and Delhi. In New York, Vijaya 
Lakshmi Pandit, once again serving as India’s head of delegation, was elected to serve as the first 
female president of the Assembly. This was a remarkable achievement made even more so in 
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hindsight given that only two other women have served in this position to date.513 Though the 
vote was delayed two hours by a Cold War scuffle over the People’s Republic of China’s right to 
replace the Republic of China at the UN, the outcome of the presidential vote itself was not a 
surprise. The United States, Pakistan, and other member states had expressed their support for 
Pandit’s election, essentially guaranteeing the honor would go to India. In her short acceptance 
speech, Pandit referred to the “choice as a tribute to [India] and a recognition of its profound 
desire to serve the” UN and the cause of world peace. It was recognition, too, she said, of the 
role women played in “this great Organization.”514 Certainly it was recognition of India’s 
leadership in Afro-Asian bloc, which the United States grudgingly acknowledged, though US 
policy makers despised the nonaligned position, “believe[ing] that India, in its foreign policy, 
was acting just like a frightened woman.”515 In the press conference after the meeting that night, 
Pandit was faced with a barrage of questions focused mostly on her clothing rather than how she 
planned to preside. Reacting to this belittling gendered gaze, she was reported to have asked the 
press “not to regard me as Exhibit A from India, but as someone who is trying to devote herself 
to her job and the promotion of peace.”516 Pandit had made it from the periphery of the UN at the 
Charter conference in 1945 to the center of Assembly leadership, yet she remained for some 
journalists and other observers less a skilled diplomat than a symbol of Indian womanhood – and 
an example of the femininity attached to India’s foreign policy position on the global stage.  
Simultaneously and half a world away, Indian diplomacy was being enacted by a very 
different set of actors. As Pandit assumed the presidency in New York, the Indian military was 
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embarking on its first postcolonial overseas mission in an early experiment in UN peacekeeping. 
The nonaligned position was now being tested with men’s boots on the ground. As the Korean 
conflict had dragged on, India’s refusal to side with either the Western or the Communist 
position had provided the Indian state with a unique opportunity to perform its stated foreign 
policy goals. Representatives at the UN – predominantly male – worked to mobilize a 
moderating position between continuing pressure from the United States for a military solution, 
and Soviet demands for foreign troop withdrawal and Communist Chinese membership at the 
UN. An Indian-led plan to deal with the repatriation of prisoners of war (POWs) devised by the 
controversial V. K. Krishna Menon had been influential in finally bringing both sides to 
agreement. Beginning just four days before Pandit’s election, the 6,000 soldiers of the newly 
formed Custodian Force (India) (CFI) began the process of taking over responsibility for close to 
23,000 unrepatriated POWs at the 38th parallel (the demilitarized zone or DMZ) in Korea. The 
mission’s motto: “For the Honour of India.” The soldiers and their leaders were hailed as heroes 
in the Indian press and are enshrined in Indian historiography as the forbearers of India’s 
commitment to UN peacekeeping.517 In an assessment after the CFI returned home, the Times of 
India wrote that the “mission…proved that India’s foreign policy is aimed at world peace and 
that the Indian army is a messenger of peace.”518  
This chapter begins with an analysis of the reaction to Pandit’s arrival at the center of 
General Assembly leadership. Now an experienced delegate and recognized leader at the UN, 
journalists and fellow delegates continued to marvel at the presence of this Indian woman within 
a highly masculinized space and place. For some, Pandit’s legitimacy was undermined by 
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suspicion that her gender, her affective bond with her brother or both prevented her from 
effective governance. The chapter then pivots to assess the arena of the competitive masculine 
postcolonial diplomacy of Nehruvian nonalignment that was inhabited by male diplomats at the 
UN and the soldiers of the CFI in Korea simultaneously with Pandit’s performance elsewhere in 
UN geopolitics. This is not only a story about India and its relationship with a developing UN, 
but also a history of peacekeeping through militarized action outside the borders of the state. 
Within the complexity of Cold War politics wherein femininity was attached to not just women 
but states and the behavior of men as well, the CFI offered a clear opportunity to test India’s 
resolve to manage geopolitical outcomes in Asia, one that was measured in gendered terms. 
Scholars identify India’s role in the Korean armistice as a key moment in India’s “golden 
age” of diplomacy, an example of the possibilities of nonalignment and proof of India’s 
commitment to peaceful negotiation.519 According to A. Appadorai, this was one of the times in 
the 1950s when “India’s voice was listened to with respect and she made an effective impact on 
the course of international developments.”520 In most scholarship on India and the Korean War 
outside Indian historiography, the CFI is lightly attended to. Histories concerned with the role 
India played as mediator in the Korean conflict generally end with 1952 when Krishna Menon 
used his many tactics of persuasion and negotiation to put together an (initially) successful POW 
resolution. When the CFI is addressed, the experiment in dealing with the non-repatriate POWs 
is generally regarded as a failure. India’s neutral position and military management of the 
prisoners was not enough to disrupt the ideological positions held by the opposing sides, each of 
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which effectively undermined the process of determining individual prisoner’s personal desires 
regarding repatriation. Violence and unrest amongst the prisoners themselves further destabilized 
the CFI’s work. 
Newspapers in the United States and Britain reported on the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission (NNRC) (chaired by India) and the CFI mostly in response to dramatic events – a 
hostage taking, a shooting, or especially tense debate at the NNRC. Not so in India. In three 
prominent regional newspapers – The Hindu (Madras), The Statesman (Calcutta), and the Times 
of India (New Delhi) – events in Korea and the Indian troops’ performance garnered dozens of 
editorial comments and almost daily coverage for a full six months, much of it front page news. 
The story played out like a melodrama, complete with heroes and villains, obstacles for the 
protagonists to overcome, and a triumphant return once the mission was complete. The troops 
were considered heroes and the chair of the NNRC, Lieutenant General K.S. Thimayya, and the 
commander of the CFI, Major General S.P.P. Thorat, both received awards for their service to 
the nation upon their return.521 At over six feet tall and nearly 200 pounds, Thimayya was an 
imposing figure whose charisma, humour, strength, and straightforward nature made him 
immensely popular with his soldiers and superiors alike.522 With his long ties to the nationalist 
movement, Anglicized education and erudition, and stature as a defender of the Indian nation at 
home, Thimayya had all the credentials necessary to perform the realpolitik of masculinized 
Indian postcolonial diplomacy at a moment of global crisis. At stake for the mission were India’s 
Gandhian legacy and the capacity of postcolonial Indian leaders to prove their fortitude when 
their credibility as “real men” was suspect. As this history shows, the Indian state worked to 
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manage the spectre of an effeminate India as Nehru sought to create and sustain a permanent role 
for India as the vanguard of the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN and beyond. 
 
Pandit as ‘Exhibit A’ 
The heavy press coverage and congratulatory messages in the UN delegates’ opening 
speeches after Pandit’s election as President of the General Assembly rivaled both the volume 
and tone of the rhetoric which had followed her performances in San Francisco in 1945 and at 
Lake Success in 1946. But beyond many references to those two defining moments, observers 
offered few concrete examples of Pandit’s accomplishments in Indian political leadership or as a 
former ambassador to Moscow and Washington. Instead, her presence was described through 
often metaphorical language infused with an orientalized gaze that diminished her substance by 
attributing so much power to her form. In the words of Phyllis Battelle: “Her eyes, her voice, the 
way she walks – regally even though her physical smallness is exaggerated by the engulfing silk 
Sari garb she wears – all have authority.”523 She had “built steam under the final drive abroad” 
for Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947.524 She combined the best of “East and West.”525 
She was glamorous and noble.526 The Christian Science Monitor and the Los Angeles Times 
labeled her India’s “‘goddess of victory.’”527 
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Many observers did celebrate the fact that a woman, and an Asian woman at that, had 
reached such a high diplomatic post at the UN.528 Fellow Indian UN delegate Rajeshwar Dayal 
later recalled that Pandit’s election was “a tribute to Indian womanhood.”529 El Salvador’s UN 
delegate was one of several who pointed out that the election represented “affirmation” of the 
UN Charter’s support for equal rights between men and women.530 Many also expressed respect 
for Pandit’s experience and ability. By 1953 she was highly experienced and highly visible on 
the global stage, having led the UN delegation many times over, and served as India’s 
ambassador to the Soviet Union (1947-49) and the United States and Mexico (1949-51). Her 
record impressed the Christian Science Monitor, which approved the Assembly’s decision to 
elect such “a distinguished successor to the distinguished individuals” who had preceded her.531 
However, no reporter (not even those writing for the Times of India) and only a handful of 
delegates focused on Pandit’s achievements at the UN or as an ambassador without reference to 
her feminine demeanor and embodiment of an acceptable, respectable Indian womanhood. As 
had happened at the birth of the UN, Pandit’s physical appearance and “native” dress continued 
to garner undue attention. Observers remained fixated on this “exotically different new President 
of the U.N. General Assembly.”532 
At the press conference after Pandit’s acceptance speech, her objectification based on 
gender and difference was immediately laid bare. Rather than substantive questions about her 
record or her plans as president, reporters were most curious about her clothing. Battelle 
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described Pandit’s assessment of “her newspaper audience” as almost sad when Pandit asked that 
they not regard her as “Exhibit A from India,” but as a person devoted to her job “and the 
promotion of peace.”533 The press, however, clearly considered Pandit’s dress and appearance 
important, with references to her gray sari and how it accentuated her “silvery” hair by both male 
and female reporters in papers as diverse as the Atlanta Daily World, the New York Times and the 
Boston Globe, the UK papers The Guardian and The Observer, the Australian Sydney Morning 
Herald, and the Times of India.534  
Remembering the press conference in her memoirs, Pandit described the questions about 
her sari as “almost unintelligent” and difficult for her to answer politely because she believed, 
“[n]o man would have been asked these meaningless questions by the world press.” She was 
frustrated that “after all the years I had been in public life, such inane queries” such as the color 
of her clothing “should be put to me simply because I was a woman.”535 Pandit’s irritation with 
this preoccupation did not prevent her from capitalizing on the attention, however. In “Writer 
Finds Mme. Pandit Real Woman Away from UN,” Battelle describes an interview with Pandit 
“in the pink-walled study of her three-room hotel suite on Park Avenue” later in September. She 
writes of Pandit discussing her daughters, grandchildren, and brother, and demonstrating to the 
reporter how she wraps her sari around herself “[w]ith quick, deft gestures of her little fingers.” 
Admitting to wearing Western clothing during her school days, Pandit said she now wore saris 
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because they “’are so much more beautiful, and so comfortable, one doesn’t need to wear girdles 
and things.’”536 Existing at the intersection of diplomat and celebrity, Pandit proved flexible in 
her approach to the orientalized gaze pointed her way.  
In addition to sexualized comments on her “slender figure molded into the statuesque sari 
of her people,” reporters strove to describe how Pandit’s “feminine charm” related to her 
leadership abilities.537 Because one person so rarely embodied these two categories at the United 
Nations, her legitimacy as both woman and diplomat were destabilized and in need of constant 
reiteration. In the words of an Australian reporter: “World figure that she is, Mrs. Pandit is also a 
woman, deeply feminine at that.”538 The Observer, which represented well Pandit’s record of 
political experience and opinion from her leadership in the INC and public health interests in 
India, to her Ambassadorships aboard, still expressed admiration for her abilities as both 
charming woman and diplomat in combination, stating that she was “usually dressed in pastel-
colored saris, which set off her distinguished looks to great advantage, yet she has contested the 
toughest American and Russian diplomats, emerging always unruffled and usually victorious.”539  
The connection between Pandit’s gender and her diplomatic ability also colored the 
congratulatory comments made by the majority of Assembly delegates (all male, and 
predominantly from Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia) in their general debate 
speeches.540 Pakistan’s Zafrullah Khan said that in electing Pandit “the Assembly has secured a 
president who in her person combines not only the charm and the grace that go with her sex, but 
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also great dignity and high intellect.”541 Others claimed her presidency would be successful 
because of the special ability of women to help settle human problems and maintain peace.542 
Egypt’s delegate offered up a prayer to emphasize that point: “Madam, may the Almighty guide 
your merciful woman’s hand so that it may, like a magic wand, transform the insecure and 
divided world in which we live into a better world where peace, law and justice shall reign.”543 
Her leadership was accepted, even celebrated, by most UN delegates in these public utterances, 
but that acceptance was predicated on the reiteration of a woman’s “special” leadership abilities. 
Though much smaller in number, there also were negative responses to Pandit’s election 
in some newspapers, opinions that were directly linked to disapproval of India’s nonaligned 
position and Pandit’s close relationship with her brother. The Baltimore Sun reported that one 
British newspaper had gone so far as to call on the UK to leave the UN in protest. Accusing both 
Nehru and Pandit of showing sympathy to Britain’s and America’s enemies, the paper warned 
that as president Pandit could “’make her sympathies felt to Britain’s and America’s cost.’” The 
UN never benefited the British anyway and now it was at risk of real harm.544 The Long Island, 
New York daily Newsday conceded that Pandit was “a charming and intelligent woman, an 
interesting addition to the United Nations General Assembly,” but argued that her reward was 
undeserved. Pandit was not just a diplomat; she was “the personal representative of her brother” 
who had taken a position of appeasement in the Korean conflict and “cozied up to Red China and 
Russia” during the war. “Allowing her to preside now,” Newsday concluded, “is an insult to the 
nations which fought” in Korea.545 The New York Times editorial board had a more moderate 
opinion on the subject, arguing there was reason to believe Pandit was not siding too much with 
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the communists. In 1952 after her cultural tour of China (discussed further below) she 
commented, “that Chinese Communism methods ‘did not fit in with her concept of democracy.’” 
And, she had educated two of her daughters in the United States. The open support of the British, 
the Americans, and the Soviets at the UN and her “charm, position and accomplishments” made 
her “the logical candidate [and] impose[d] on her a special kind of responsibility to wield the 
powers of her office with fairness and evenhanded justice.”546 
Henry Harris’s complex and at times conflicted assessment of Pandit in a long article for 
the Boston Globe brings together many of these threads. Gender and emotion remain central to 
Harris’s assessment of Pandit’s abilities, but his acknowledgment of her real record at the United 
Nations and within the Cold War context lead to a slightly more nuanced portrayal. The article 
opens with the fairly astonishing statement that that “The first woman president of the U.N. 
General Assembly…was at least partially justified in asking correspondents not to treat her as 
‘Exhibit A from India.’” Harris then devotes a large portion of the 1500 word article to attend to 
this question of Pandit as an “exhibit,” and how her gender, family, and demeanor impacted 
perceptions of her: 
[S]he herself, is somebody, no one here will deny. But it is also impossible for her to 
escape being to some extent an exhibit, as the first woman, and a very attractive one, to 
be president… as the sister of Prime Minister Nehru, an exceedingly controversial world 
figure; and as the representative of India, which seeks every opportunity to mediate the 
cold war…But it is hard for anyone of the feminine gender to dissociate herself from her 
sex, when she has raised three daughters…when she is always looking for gifts for her 
four grandchildren, and when she has often served as official hostess for her 
brother…Nor can Mme. Pandit deny something that is an open secret in the Indian 
delegation—that she is a good cook. 
 
Harris also offered a lengthy meditation on Pandit’s clothing on the second page of the article 
under the jumpline: “Mme. Pandit Wears ‘What Is Available,’ and on Her It Looks Very Well.” 
                                                
546 “Mme. President,” Editorial, New York Times, 16 September 1953, 32. 
  168 
The colors she chooses to wear “excellently set off her figure, her young features and white 
hair,” he wrote. And even the coat she wore over her sari at a General Committee meeting made 
her look “humble,” but did “not detract from her appearance.” These lengthy sections on 
appearance and clothing, set off from the rest of the article, read like a man’s observation of a 
woman rather than a journalist’s considered assessment of a diplomat. 
Harris is also critically concerned with Pandit’s “emotional” character. His article begins 
on page one of the paper just below the fold with the subtitle, “Are Her Tears Real?” He is 
referring, of course, to Pandit’s “moving” speech during the 1946 debates over racism in South 
Africa, which Harris agrees swayed the General Assembly on the Indian issue. Given her ability 
to affect opinion then and the previous year in San Francisco, Harris concedes she became “a 
force in her own right” at the UN, but he questions the legitimacy of that power. How sincere 
were “the restrained tears with which she occasionally punctuates her speeches?” he wondered. 
“How far do they represent her emotions and how far the native shrewdness she is known to 
possess?” Her emotion is not benign. He reports Pandit is known to have the “Nehru temper” and 
is capable of terrifying “many associated with the Indian delegation.” This, he argues, could 
undermine her ability to act as “a quasi-judicial force, [which is] something very difficult for an 
emotional person.” This language recovers the central pulse of the debate between Pandit and 
Smuts in 1946 when Smuts and others challenged Pandit’s supposed over-emotionality, claiming 
legitimate decisions should be based on unemotional, measured consideration. 
Harris wondered too about the limits of Nehru’s confidence in Pandit’s diplomatic 
abilities given the fact that he had called on Krishna Menon to negotiate the UN resolution 
“which broke the deadlock over prisoner repatriation” even though Pandit was then head of 
India’s delegation. Was there friction between these two diplomats as a result? Despite his 
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skepticism and misgivings about her personality, Harris concludes that Pandit does have the 
experience, skill, and inclination to fulfill her duties as President well. He points out that because 
India wants to continue to be a “world mediator,” it behooves her to “to act with great 
impartiality in the chair.” Also, as a newly independent nation, India enforced strict protocol in 
order to gain respect, something she would not want to undermine. Furthermore, she was an 
aristocrat, an educated daughter of a respected India lawyer, and she was not married off early – 
yet another reference to the acceptability of the Indian womanhood Pandit embodied. She served 
three sentences in prison doing “hard labor,” and is regarded in India “as an extrovert, eloquent 
and shrewd,” as opposed to her brother, “an introspective intellectual.” In the final assessment 
Harris believes Pandit can “dissociate herself from the Indian delegation” and lead fairly, a task 
perhaps made easier since ill-feeling was reported to exist between her and Krishna Menon, 
India’s new head of delegation. Though much of Harris’ article could lead a reader to think 
otherwise, he assured his readers he did not believe Pandit was merely “window dressing.” What 
she would do with her power, however, remained to be seen.547 
Several observers, including Harris, expressed optimism that Pandit could use her “skill 
and tact” to ease tensions between rival Cold War delegations.548 Pandit’s biographer Vera 
Brittain writes that Pandit “was regarded as peculiarly well qualified to bring a healing touch to 
existing pathological antagonisms” in this moment.549 But hope that Pandit’s position as 
president would help move the two sides toward a permanent peace proved generally unfounded. 
In a televised news interview days after the election, Pandit deflected questions about India’s 
relationship to the United States and her own plans for the Korean question at the UN saying, “as 
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head of the United Nations I am more or less a citizen of the world; someone who has to stay 
aloof and…help in…an impartial way the proceedings of the General Assembly. Therefore, it 
would not be possible for me to comment on any specific issue.”550 For the majority of the three-
month session, she followed through with this position and she did not lay claim to a powerful 
position on the Korean subject. Press reports covering Pandit’s tenure as president were more 
likely to be about speeches delivered or a luncheon held in her honor than for anything 
controversial happening at the General Assembly itself. Pandit no longer commanded attention at 
the UN as an outsider seeking access or justice at the world organization, and her increased 
responsibility required of her a different self-representation than in previous years. As a well-
known, more experienced diplomat her role had shifted within the increasingly complex and 
complexly gendered politics of the Cold War world.  
 
India, Korea, and Nonalignment 
Scholars and observers identify the fall of 1950 as the birth of the nonaligned position at 
the UN – a full three years before Pandit’s election at the General Assembly.551 When the North 
Korean army launched a surprise military surge south of the 38th parallel in June 1950, the UN 
Security Council had responded swiftly.552 Given the conflict’s Cold War origins, the threat of a 
Soviet veto would have stymied the Council's actions under normal circumstances. But the 
Soviets at that time were boycotting the Security Council to protest Communist China’s 
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exclusion from UN membership. Without the Soviet veto, the Council quickly passed a 
resolution that called for a cease-fire and instructed the UN Command to oversee a military 
withdrawal.553 In what some consider the first direct action by the emerging nonaligned bloc, the 
Indian and Egyptian delegations (then non-permanent members of the Council) abstained from 
that first rushed vote because they had not yet received instructions from their respective 
governments.554 Two days later the North invaded Seoul, and the United States and its allies 
were able to push through another resolution recommending “the Members of the United Nations 
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack 
and restore international peace and security in the area.”555 For the first time, soldiers from 
member states were to be organized into a military force under the auspices of the UN in an 
effort to end hostilities on the Korean peninsula, creating the United Nations Command (UN 
Command). Once the Soviets returned to the Council with their veto power, resolutions on Korea 
were no longer able to pass in the limited-membership and big power-dominated Security 
Council. Therefore, the United States and its allies shifted action on the Korean conflict to the 
more democratic General Assembly.556 The decision to take the issue to the Assembly created 
the circumstances through which new diplomatic configurations could take shape at the UN, 
establishing an alternative within Cold War UN politics that drew on the power of UN 
postcolonial affiliations – the Afro-Asian bloc. 
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Much was at stake ideologically and pragmatically for the Indian state in the Korean 
conflict. India’s foreign policy claimed a commitment to utilizing the ideals of the UN to prevent 
a broader war. Pragmatically, the domestic need for economic recovery and development 
necessitated help from both the Americans and the Soviets, which prohibited siding with either 
of the great powers.557 Neither financially nor militarily strong, India sought to occupy a middle 
ground from which to maintain ties with all in the hope of angering none. In Nehru’s words: “If 
we did align ourselves we would only fall between two stools.”558 In addition, India needed to 
maintain a working regional relationship with its powerful neighbor, China. Ideologically, 
nonalignment produced an Indian moral exceptionalism with its close association to non-
violence. In the words of one Indian nationalist scholar, nonalignment could be “considered 
specifically adapted to India; it is a policy which is inherent in the circumstances of India; in the 
past thinking of India, in the conditioning of the Indian minds during the struggle for freedom, 
and in the circumstances of the world to-day.”559 To advocate nonalignment at the UN, then, the 
postcolonial state not only protected its internal economic and political circumstances, but also 
bolstered its credibility as an inheritor of the ancient tradition of “Ahimsa” (non-injury) as 
embodied by the Gandhian non-violent independence movement.  
Despite this moral positioning, India’s official nonaligned foreign policy did not translate 
into universal approbation or adoration. In Andrew J. Rotter’s research on gender and foreign 
relations between South Asia and the United States in this period, he found that U.S. policy 
makers thought the Indian state “was acting just like a frightened woman,” as opposed to the 
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manlier Pakistan, which had embraced the American position in exchange for military aid. 
Further, Indian men were considered “passive, servile, and cowardly,” and “inclined to 
homosexuality.” Nehru himself was described by the CIA as emotional, hypersensitive, “volatile 
and quick tempered,” all of which helped explain the stance of “neutrality” in the Cold War.560 
These constituencies in the U.S. government viewed India’s decision not to contribute troops to 
UN forces in Korea as proof of this “passive and week-kneed” policy.561  
Despite this attitude, India was joined in its non-aligned position by countries from the 
Afro-Asian bloc and the Commonwealth, which also believed the UN should be a place for 
moderation in order to prevent a third world war. The Korean crisis became an opportunity to 
test India’s nonaligned position under high pressure. Immediately following North Korea’s 
invasion India worked at the UN and through direct diplomatic channels to mobilize a negotiated 
solution to the war and prevent its spread.562 In July 1950, Nehru made a personal appeal to the 
United States and the Soviet Union to start negotiations, proposing to bring the USSR back to the 
Security Council and give Communist China a seat, which the United States rejected it out of 
hand.563 Indian representatives also worked to build a coalition at the UN “to encourage U.S. 
caution in Korea,” including working with other non-permanent Security Council members to 
create a committee to study the Korea question.564 
Nevertheless, India’s position on military intervention continued to be characterized as 
weak. The United States and some of its allies wanted India to send troops to support the UN 
Command to back up India’s supposed opposition to North Korea’s initial aggression. But India 
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chose to send only ambulance field units.565 The official explanation for that decision was that 
the Indian army, “small and poorly equipped” was already “overwhelmed by dangers” inside and 
along its many borders.566 Clearly this decision was also made to allow India “to maintain a 
mediating role in the conflict.”567 By refusing to provide frontline soldiers, India could maintain 
an elevated moral position on Korea. In a message to UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, Nehru 
argued that in fact “India’s ‘moral help’ “outweighed” the petty military help of some other 
countries.”568 Ideologically, nonalignment provided the postcolonial state a solid platform from 
which to argue for an approach to solving international disputes without the use of force, an 
embrace of the ideals of the UN Charter. 
It was also true that India had, in Nehru’s words, “a rather special responsibility in regard 
to China.”569 Neither the British nor the Americans had diplomatic relations with the communist 
Chinese government, leaving them to rely on Indian sources to convey important messages back 
and forth. The Indian ambassador to China, K. M. Panikkar, became the conduit through which 
Chinese positions were conveyed to London and Washington and back again via the same 
route.570 His reports, however, were not considered reliable by the United States. In early 
October 1950, Panikkar warned that China would engage in the Korean conflict if the General 
Assembly approved UN Command action north of the 38th parallel. The resolution passed 
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nonetheless.571 When the Chinese had not taken any action by the middle of the month despite 
the fact that the UN troops occupied Pyongyang, Panikkar became the target of criticism in India 
and the United States.572 Dayal recalls that the American and British delegations dubbed him 
“Sardar Panicky”573 – a nickname that reflects the western perception of Indians’ lack of 
masculine fortitude. It was not until China launched a major counter-offensive in Korea in late 
November 1950 that Panikkar’s credibility was restored.574 
Throughout the winter of 1950-51, Chinese troops in the hundreds of thousands helped 
turn the tide of the war, and the North took control of Seoul yet again.575 Efforts to find a 
negotiated settlement fell short. With India taking a leading role, Arab-Asian members at the 
United Nations convinced the General Assembly in December to approve the creation of a three-
person committee made up of Nasrollah Entezam (Iran), Lester Pearson (Canada), and Benegal 
Rau (India) to investigate the principles on which a cease-fire could be based. The Chinese 
refused to cooperate, though, and the committee’s work halted one month later.576 Then, the U.S. 
delegation put forward a resolution that would condemn China as an aggressor state for their 
involvement in Korea. As the resolution moved through the Assembly system, Nehru warned 
from Delhi that the aggressor resolution “cannot lead to peace. It can only lead to an 
intensification of the conflict and might, perhaps, close the door to further negotiations.”577 But 
the nonaligned position was not powerful enough to intervene at this point. Passage of the U.S. 
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resolution in the General Assembly on 1 February 1951 was the first time in history that body 
condemned a nation for aggression.578 As a result, Communist China’s position became more 
entrenched and the war continued to expand. For the moment, India’s diplomatic role in the 
effort to find a peaceful solution waned.  
When the Chinese and Koreans finally met with the UN Command for armistice talks in 
July 1951, the bulk of the war’s heavy military fighting had passed. In less than four weeks the 
two sides had agreed upon a five-point agenda that included the establishment of a de-militarized 
zone; ceasefire arrangements; and recommendations to the governments of the countries 
concerned. But it was agenda item number four – on the arrangements for prisoners of war – that 
would become the major barrier to a final agreement, extending the armistice negotiations over 
years rather than months. The POW issue struck at the heart of the Cold War divide that 
underpinned the Korean conflict.579 The United States and its allies believed that no POW should 
be forced to repatriate. The Communists, in contrast, were adamant that all POWs be repatriated. 
Both sides drew on the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 to support their stance. To allow the 
POWs to choose whether or not to repatriate upon release was not in accordance directly with the 
Convention, but it was pointed out in legal arguments by the U.S. side that the language simply 
read: “returned and repatriated,” not forcibly repatriated. This argument held that the prisoners’ 
human rights would be violated if forced repatriation resulted in inhumane treatment upon 
return.580 The Communists took the language of the Convention at face value. The Soviets 
opposed voluntary repatriation in principle.581 Furthermore, China and North Korea stood to lose 
tens of thousands of soldiers if a high percentage of POWs chose not to repatriate, as seemed 
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likely. With the military situation at a virtual stalemate and neither side ready to make significant 
offensive maneuvers, there was no compelling reason to bend on this question. The armistice 
talks ground to a halt at the end of the April 1952, with agenda item number four the only major 
issue remaining.  
Throughout these ongoing negotiations, India remained the main diplomatic channel 
through which the Chinese communicated to the West and vice versa. To this end, Vijaya 
Lakshmi Pandit, acting as a cultural ambassador for India, led an official “Cultural Goodwill 
Mission” to China in the spring of 1952 that was based on a discourse of postcolonial Asian 
solidarity.582 Chinese radio coverage of the delegation’s tour described the visit as strengthening 
ancient bonds between the two countries to help promote peace in Asia and around the world.583 
Historians have established that Zhou en-lai approached Pandit about the Korean POW problem 
during her visit. Knowing his words would wind their way to Washington via Delhi, he told her 
China would accept 100,000 repatriates in order to move the armistice talks forward, an increase 
of 30,000 over the number currently offered by the UN Command. Pandit relayed the 
conversation to Nehru, but before word reached Washington, the United States had already 
released a lower number, and their tactics made capitulation on either side remote.584 Throughout 
May and into June 1952, Indian diplomats were involved in an attempt to speak to both sides to 
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mediate a solution to the impasse. However, the Americans continued to believe Ambassador 
Panikkar’s reports from China were embellished.585    
When the UN General Assembly gathered in New York on 14 October 1952, the 
American and Soviet sides were wrangling for their respective positions to emerge victorious on 
the Korean issue. The United States—convinced that a military solution was both possible and 
necessary—wanted resolutions renewing UN support and requesting more members’ 
involvement. The Soviets kept pushing for political reunification with the oversight of neutrals. 
Others looked to India in the nonaligned bloc as well as the British Commonwealth states for 
leadership on mediating a resolution that would balance the interests of the United States and the 
Soviet Union while maintaining both sides’ support. It was at this Assembly that India’s 
controversial diplomat V. K. Krishna Menon took the lead in creating an alternative plan for 
POW repatriation. Krishna Menon had most recently served as India’s High Commissioner in 
London, were he had “produced a chaotic, scandal-ridden mission.” Nehru had offered him sick 
leave followed by a cabinet post or ambassadorship in Moscow. When he refused, Nehru offered 
for him to be part of the UN delegation. Unwilling to serve under Pandit, Krishna Menon was 
then given the Korean situation as a special project.586 A sense of rivalry between Krishna 
Menon and Pandit was perceived by observers and was increased by the distinct difference in 
their personalities and diplomatic styles. In her memoirs, Pandit wrote of his tendency to exclude 
her and other Indian delegates from his work.587 Fellow UN diplomat Dayal recalls that Krishna 
Menon brought “a certain stridency” to India’s voice at the UN, and he was significantly more 
abrasive and less cooperative than Pandit. “For all his cleverness and subtlety,” Dayal wrote, 
                                                
585 Stueck, The Korean War, 278-284. 
586 Ibid., 294. 
587 Pandit, The Scope of Happiness, 287. 
  179 
“Menon lacked finesse, nor did he show good judgment.” Yet Krishna Menon “did a great deal 
of footwork among delegations and the burning of midnight oil to find a solution” in the fall of 
1952, “play[ing] his cards very close to his chest, leaving the leader and the delegation totally in 
the dark about his activities.”588 His tactics, though unpopular, did have some success on the 
Korean issue.  
Krishna Menon presented a proposal in the second week of November that would create a 
neutral four-member repatriation commission along with an “umpire” to break deadlocks. 
Prisoners of war would be transferred to the demilitarized zone, turned over to the commission, 
and screened before being sent to their respective nations. The Americans tried to persuade the 
British and Canadians not to back the Indian proposal, but Krishna Menon continued to push. By 
the end of November, the Americans had agreed upon an amended resolution. The Soviets, 
though, rebuked the Indian resolution. At this point, the Communists were not willing to 
capitulate on the POW issue. Despite continued Soviet opposition, Nehru decided not to 
withdraw the proposal, which passed overwhelmingly with Western alliance support and that of 
the Afro-Asian bloc.589 The Chinese and North Koreans joined the Soviet bloc in rejecting the 
proposed solution, making its passage at the UN moot. 
India’s POW proposal found new life when the Soviets and Chinese moved to end the 
war after Stalin’s death in March 1953. The Communists agreed to exchange sick and wounded 
POWs before a ceasefire agreement, and they let UN General Assembly President Lester Pearson 
(Canada) know that they were prepared to come to a final agreement.590 A final agreement was 
settled in the first week of June 1953; the Armistice was signed at Panmunjom on 27 July 1953 
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without the participants exchanging a word.591 After three years of fighting, casualties in the 
millions, and the loss of over ten percent of the Korean population, the armed conflict came to an 
end right where it started: at the 38th parallel. Tens of thousands of prisoners remained in 
custody, their futures still uncertain. 
 
‘For the Honour of India’: Peacekeeping and Masculinity  
Assumption of responsibility for the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation 
Commission (NNRC) and the mission of the Custodian Force (India) (CFI) provided the Indian 
state with an opportunity to prove the possibilities of nonalignment through peacekeeping and 
demonstrate a more masculinized role on the global stage. Instead of selecting a diplomat to 
chair the NNRC (the four other delegations were led by diplomats), India appointed a highly 
decorated general who had wide name recognition throughout South Asia for his military 
command during Partition and the first Indo-Pakistan War (1947-48). Though the CFI remained 
lightly armed and was ordered to utilize non-violent persuasion before force, these men 
nevertheless were trained soldiers representing an emerging nation-state at a time of heightened 
international tension. A successful military operation outside the subcontinent, even with its 
peacekeeping overtones, could help legitimize the postcolonial Indian state. Even more, the 
particularities of this engagement helped tie the Nehruvian policy of nonalignment closer to the 
non-violent Gandhian ideal. The CFI demonstrated a new way in which to enact nonalignment 
and was a position that served the Indian nation-state’s pragmatic and ideological needs. The CFI 
embodied a middle ground between militarized Cold War masculinity and the characterization of 
the effeminate Indian neutrality. 
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India had not been the first choice to oversee the POWs. During armistice talks North 
Korea had rejected Switzerland as an option, but said they would accept a neutral Asian state. 
Then, the Soviets approached India in May 1953 after Indonesia refused.592 The United States 
did not like the choice of India, but they also did not want to insult India further by rejecting its 
willingness to play the role of custodian, especially since the United States staunchly opposed 
India’s participation in a possible Korean political conference.593 Two days before the armistice 
was signed the Indian government issued an order to create the CFI. Lieutenant General S.P.P. 
Thorat (1906-1992), Chief of the General Staff at the time, conducted an initial assessment of the 
situation. The Advance Party traveled to Korea from 11-18 August to establish what form the 
CFI should take and what logistical support each side needed.594 The CFI eventually was made 
up of approximately 6,000 Indian soldiers who were selected on the basis of availability, not 
experience. Most of the officers were young – 25-30 years old – and few had ever been out of 
India.595 
Before the CFI even left the subcontinent, their mission was imbued with special 
significance within a domestic rhetoric of Gandhian-inflected nationalism. Indian governmental 
leaders focused on the troops’ responsibility to uphold India’s honor in the eyes of the world. In 
his speech to the troops, Nehru said, “’The honour and good name of India is in their keeping. 
Let each soldier, remember this and demonstrate to the world that the soldiers of India stand for 
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peace and the service of the people.”596 Rajagopalachari, then India’s President, linked the 
mission to Gandhi who he imagined “would have blessed them ‘greatly and earnestly’ because 
they were going to discharge a task which Gandhiji himself would have liked most today.”597 
And while in Madras to board the transport ships, the Governor of Madras told the departing 
troops that they had been “entrusted with a great and noble task and the world is fortunate 
because humanity has evolved a stage when soldiers embark on a mission of peace.”598 The 
mainstream Indian media, with almost daily coverage over the ensuing four months, ensured the 
Indian public remained apprised of these young men’s performance. 
General K.S. “Timmy” Thimayya (1906-1965), chair of the NNRC, was an inspired 
choice to be the face of India’s first post-independence overseas military engagement. Elite and 
well educated, he had become a popular figure in the Indian military through his service during 
the first India-Pakistan war (1947-48). The second son in a family of wealthy coffee planters, he 
had been groomed for military service from an early age. As a teen, he attended the Prince of 
Wales Royal Indian Military College (RIMC) at Dehradun, and was one of only six Indian boys 
admitted to the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. Six months after Thimayya’s arrival, 
Lieutenant General S.P.P. Thorat (1906-1992), head of the CFI, began his training at Sandhurst, 
and the two forged a lifelong friendship.599 After Sandhurst, Thimayya served in Bangalore and 
Baghdad. During his third assignment to Allahabad (1928-1932) he developed ties to prominent 
Indian nationalist figures such as Sarojini Naidu and Mohammed Ali Jinnah.600 He also visited 
Jawaharlal Nehru in Naini prison (1930), and he got to know Nehru’s sisters, Vijaya Lakshmi 
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Pandit and Krishna (Betty) Hutheesingh, well. At one point he considered resigning his 
commission to join the nationalist movement, but was encouraged to stay in the military by the 
elder Motilal Nehru with the prescient assurance that after independence the state would need 
experienced Indian military leaders.601 
After serving honorably in World War II, Thimayya sat on the Indian Armed Forces 
Nationalisation Committee organized to accelerate the Indianisation of the military. He then was 
promoted to Major General in command of the Boundary Force in September 1947, which put 
him on the front lines of the violence and massive displacement around the Partition of India and 
the creation of Pakistan and India.602 For his leadership in this period the Pakistani Urdu poet 
Faiz Ahmad Faiz (1911-1984) wrote in Thimayya’s honor: “Na Hindu, na Musalman / Sirf 
Insaniyat Thi / Thimayya ka Iman” (Neither Hindu nor Muslim / Humanity was / Thimayya’s 
only belief).603 In the spring of 1948, Thimayya took over command of the Sri Division of the 
Jammu and Kashmir force (JAK). During the first year of the armed conflict over the border 
region, he became famous in India for leading the Stuart light tank assault on the Zojila pass, 
which helped win back the Ladakh region for India.604 After this, “Thimayya’s name had become 
a household word in India. He was considered a hero and the saviour of Kashmir.”605 Who better 
to represent Indian strength in Korea? 
Though he was to become the public face of the NNRC, Thimayya later wrote he “knew 
extraordinarily little about the Korean War, and even less about the prisoners” when he was 
appointed to the position. His initial impression was that the job would be “a firm, orderly and 
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relatively simple carrying out of the Terms of Reference” for the NNRC that had been produced 
out of the armistice talks. But he quickly realized the Terms had been written so as to allow both 
sides to have their own interpretation. Rather than bringing their positions together, the 
document and the months spent negotiating it had only hardened each side’s perspective. Neither 
side was going to make compromises because to do so was to give up on their opposing 
ideological positions. His job, in his own words, immediately became “an almost frantic effort” 
just to keep the mission together.606 When Thimayya arrived in the DMZ, he had three goals 
regarding the prisoners: to maintain discipline in the camps and punish offenders accordingly; to 
help the prisoners trust and feel at ease with the CFI; and to allow each prisoner, “alone and 
protected,” to make his own choice about repatriation. While the goal to allow each prisoner on 
his own to have a chance to speak his mind sounded reasonable, in reality it proved almost 
impossible and brought into stark relief the militarized nature of the CFI’s mission.  
The CFI’s biggest challenges came in the southern camps that held nearly 26,000 non-
repatriated North Korean and Chinese POWs.607 These men had endured years of detention and 
arrived in the DMZ antagonized by their recent experiences and their unknown futures. The 
internal Chinese and North Korean POW organizations resisted the separation of individuals 
from the group, and prisoners were scared and insecure about their situation. In addition, the 
insistence by the opposing sides to meet with each non-repatriate to explain “the real truth about 
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his position and his rights,” and the efforts by the retaining side to not allow those explanations 
to take place, complicated the situation.608 
From the first day of contact with POWs, the CFI faced a delicate balance between 
enacting the ideals of peacekeeping and the need to maintain militarized control of a vast prison 
system. On the first day of prisoner handovers on 10 September, Thimayya and the CFI had to 
respond to emergency issues regarding prisoner behavior and disagreements amongst the NNRC 
delegations that foreshadowed the overwhelming challenges they would face in the coming 
months. Fifteen observers representing the NNRC and both Commands were present at the 
exchange, along with the CFI’s troops. The first several groups of prisoners were processed 
smoothly, but just after noon the in-coming prisoners noticed the Communist observers and 
became enraged, screaming, throwing rocks, and “rush[ing] the barbed wire fence” to try to 
attack.609 One Korean POW threw himself into an Indian soldier’s arms and cried that the other 
prisoners were preventing him from asking for repatriation. Another tried the same thing and was 
barely saved from being beaten to death by other prisoners. By the end of the first day, nearly 
1,000 POWs were in CFI custody. Nine had thrown themselves on Indian troops asking to be 
repatriated, two of whom were saved from brutal assaults. These men were ultimately 
repatriated, but it was evident they had been abused and threatened in the camps, including 
having unwanted anti-communist slogans tattooed on their bodies.610 
 In the Indian nationalist reading of these events, the unarmed Indian soldiers were 
characterized as paternalistic and civilized in the face of Chinese prisoners’ outbursts. The Times 
of India article describing the chaos of the initial hand-over of prisoners was titled: “Path Of 
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Non-Violence Being Followed By Indians in Korea.” The Indian guards were described as using 
“stern but fatherly,” “gentle persuasion” to guide the Chinese through the in-take process.611 
Given the language barrier, the Indians depended upon gestures to get their instructions across:  
A guard would approach a Chinese who was shouting abuse at a Communist 
fellow countryman and throw his arm around him. Then after asking him by 
gestures to remain silent, the quiet Indian would show him by example that his 
hysteria was having no effect and creating no impression. Then the Chinese, 
trained by a life of ‘observing face’ and respect for example, would quietly follow 
the guiding guard through the routine of arriving at the Indian camp.612  
 
An article a few days later emphasized that the “Indian troops made a conspicious [sic] effort to 
avoid even a hint of force in handling the Chinese prisoners-of-war which they accepted today. 
They pointed, gestured, smiled and touched only those prisoners who wandered into the wrong 
line or the wrong compound.”613  
 But as tensions increased between the CFI and the POWs in the coming weeks, the 
Indians faced a difficult and very public decision regarding the level of force they would employ 
to control POW behavior. To what extent would the mission remain peaceful in the face of 
violent and unruly prisoners? The mission had humanitarian overtones, but the Indians were also 
prison guards. The enclosures built to house the UN Command POWs each included seven to ten 
compounds, which in turn held 500 prisoners each. Two four-meter high barbed wire fences set 
twelve feet apart surrounded each compound, and another floodlit double fence line with sentry 
towers at regular intervals surrounded each enclosure. The arrangement looked formidable, but it 
was quickly discovered that “the fence could be scaled in about 8-10 seconds, and the wooden 
posts could be loosened and pulled out of the ground in about 30 seconds. A body of determined 
men could push down the fence in a matter of minutes.” Adding to the risk, the compounds were 
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built close together, allowing prisoners to see and hear what was happening in the other 
compounds, increasing the possibility that unrest in one compound would spread.614 Thorat had 
been warned by the UN Command that the prisoners were agitated about being moved closer to 
the communists in the DMZ, but he “did not think that the prisoners would prove to be so unruly 
as they did.”615 Internally, the prisoners had arrived well organized with the objective “to resist 
repatriation and prevent such prisoners as desired repatriation from exercising that right…any 
prisoner who desired repatriation had to do so clandestinely, and in fear of his life.”616 They 
quickly armed themselves with “crude weapons, such as tin daggers made of oil barrels and 
spears cut from...tent poles which had iron spikes at one end, and they produced fire bombs out 
of tins filled with oilsoaked [sic] rags.”617 In contrast, the majority of CFI troops “were unarmed 
except for sticks,” though they did have machine guns for use in the watchtowers.618  
Within this already oppositional environment a number of extremely tense situations 
evolved between the CFI and the prisoners before the one-on-one explanations regarding 
repatriation even started. The first – Thorat’s successful negotiation of a hostage situation – 
helped produce a mythology surrounding the Indian performance of non-violence in Korea.619 
All morning on 25 September, Chinese POWs in compound D-31 had protested the removal of a 
fellow prisoner who had asked for repatriation; the POWs threw stones at the guards and 
threatened a mass escape. When Thorat, along with men from the Jat Regiment and Major H. S. 
Grewal, a Chinese-language interpreter, arrived to assess the situation, the angry prisoners 
refused to talk and after several minutes grabbed Grewal. “Grewal was a big built and strong 
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man,” Thorat remembers, “but was utterly helpless in the hands of about twenty prisoners who 
had dragged him into a nearby tent.” Sepoy Thakur Singh, closest to Grewal, went after him and 
was also taken hostage. Thorat rushed into the compound, along with twelve Indian soldiers, 
who “picked up stones or whatever they could collect to protect” him.620 The prisoners, who 
outnumbered the Indians fifty-to-one inside the enclosure, met them with spiked tent poles. 
Thorat stepped between the two sides, ordering the Indians to halt, while members of the Jat 
Battalion surrounded the enclosure with weapons drawn.  
In the many versions told of this incident, Thorat is universally hailed for his ability to 
stay calm and take control of the situation with his masculine leadership qualities; casually 
leaning on the fence, smoking a cigarette while assessing the situation. One hour into the stand-
off, he reportedly asked an English-speaking Chinese prisoner, “’What kind of Chinese are you? 
Where is your hospitality? You have offered my men neither tea nor cigarettes?’” In what is 
characterized as a miraculous transformation, his challenge to Chinese pride eased the tension, 
tea and cigarettes were brought, and the prisoners eventually released the two Indians, agreeing 
to write a petition to the NNRC expressing their concerns.621 Thorat’s demonstration of personal 
courage in the face of danger earned him two honors at the end of his service in Korea: one a 
military honor, the Ashoka Chakra Class II (now the Kitri Chakra), and the second a civilian 
award, the Padma Shri.622  
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 Thorat’s heroic intervention notwithstanding, non-violent negotiation did not resolve all 
conflicts. Clashes between the troops and POWs at the southern camp hospital on 1 and 2 
October resulted in the shooting deaths of three prisoners and greatly increased the tension 
between prisoners and guards. The hospital, located close to the prisoner compounds, had 
become the prisoner organizations’ main contact with the outside world.623 When Czech and 
Polish representatives entered the hospital on 1 October to investigate the situation, the CFI had 
to defend the communist men from prisoner attacks. Prisoners in a neighboring compound, 
witnessing the clashes, threatened escape and began scaling the barbed wire fences. When they 
breached the second fence line, refusing to stop despite numerous warnings, the troops opened 
fire, killing one and wounding five.624 The following day a riot again broke out when an Indian 
doctor prevented a Chinese POW from committing suicide and tried to bring the injured man to 
the hospital. In an attempt to prevent the prisoner from being taken away, prisoners “broke 
through the inner gate and scaled the outer barbed wire fence and rushed the compound 
commander.”625 The CFI again opened fire, this time leaving two dead and another five 
wounded.626 Two more prisoners were shot and killed in separate incidents in the following 
month.627  
The image of the benign soldier dominates the history of the CFI with little to no mention 
of these fatal incidents. Yet the shootings point to a corruption of “peacekeeping” when enacted 
by trained, armed soldiers; an inherent power differential made apparent in the bodily clash 
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between guards and prisoners. Thorat laid this hierarchy bare after the first shooting, stating that 
the use of deadly force “would impress on the prisoners ‘that we are the custodian force and they 
the prisoners and not the other way around.’”628 Thimayya’s own words reveal an attitude toward 
the POWs on the ground that helped legitimize the Indian state’s “mature” intervention on behalf 
of the child-like prisoners.629 He did express empathy with the prisoners, who he knew were 
acutely aware of the vulnerability of their situation and had been used as pawns in an ideological 
battle, acknowledging that their “human rights [were] largely forgotten.” But he also regarded 
them from a paternalistic perspective, with the Indian soldiers figured as more civilized than the 
men they guarded. The North Korean and Chinese POWs, he wrote, were not the “brave and 
noble warriors who, through experience and by an intellectual process, had learned that 
communism was Evil and that capitalism was Good,” as they had been portrayed in Western 
media. The majority, he believed, “were simple-minded, ignorant and completely 
unsophisticated peasants who followed anyone who took the trouble to impose his will upon 
theirs.” The North Koreans, he wrote, acted “like bewildered and angry children” who were 
“confused, afraid and violent...easily led and swayed.” Though the Chinese were “better 
disciplined, less noisy, and a bit more rational,” they still were “like lost and abandoned children 
[who] seemed infinitely pathetic.”630   
In the wake of the shootings and an increase of anti-Indian rhetoric originating from the 
South Korean government condemning the use of force, Thimayya felt compelled to hold his 
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first press conference to address the increasingly complex situation.631 Surrounded by dozens of 
journalists from around the world, he sat at a table in front of two large posters that revealed a 
dual intent behind India’s visibility on the global stage: the first an image of Benares with the 
words “SEE INDIA,” the second featured Kashmir and urged “VISIT INDIA.”632 The 
relationship between the Korea mission and India’s desire to perform its legitimacy on the world 
stage could not have been more obvious. In response to a question about possible responses to a 
mass escape attempt, Thimayya said the CFI would not resort to “mass slaughter.” 
Misinterpretation of his statement was turned into widespread front-page coverage in the United 
States, Britain, and India, all of which claimed the CFI would not attempt to stop a mass escape 
at all.633 Thimayya was compelled to hold a second press conference the next day to clarify his 
position regarding what level of force the CFI was willing to utilize, though that position 
remained largely untested.634 
The Indian government, meanwhile, called on the United States and the United Nations 
to condemn the threats toward the CFI coming from the South Korean government, claiming 
                                                
631 See “S. Korean Assembly Member’s Demand,” The Hindu, 3 October 1953, 7; “Two Rioting POWs Killed,” The 
Statesman, 3 October 1953, 1; “S. Korean Member’s Threat,” The Hindu, 4 October 1953, 6; “Explanations to 
P.O.W.s May Never Begin: Sequel To Threat Of Anti-Indian Violence,” Times of India, 5 October 1953, 1; “’We 
Know No Fear’: Indians’ Views On S. Korean Threat,” Times of India, 5 October 1953, 7; “Expulsion of Indian 
Force: South Korea May Use ‘Volunteers,’” Times of India, 6 October 1953, 7; “S. Korean Threat of ‘Reprisals’: 
Indians Unconcerned,” The Guardian, 5 October 1953, 5. The UN was notified of these on-going threats, see “S. 
Korean Threat Engages Attention of U.N. Delegates,” Times of India, 6 October 1953, 7; and Paul W. Ward, “U.N. 
is Notified of India Protest,” Baltimore Sun, 8 October 1953, 1, 10. 
632 Image, The Hindu, 13 October 1953, 10. Beginning in September The Hindu ran pictures of the NNRC and CFI 
on the back page of the newspaper approximately once per week. The Kashmir poster can also be seen in an image 
of a press conference in early 1954 in Nambiar’s, For the Honour of India, 92. 
633 “Indians Not to Resist Mass Break-Out of P.O.W.s in Korea,” The Statesman, 7 October 1953, 1; “Thimayya on 
Role of Indian Troops: ‘Will Not Prevent Mass Break-Out of P.O.Ws,” The Hindu, 7 October 1953, 5; “Call For 
Fair Play,” The Guardian, 7 October 1953, 1; “Indians Will Not Stop Mass Escape by POWs,” Times of India, 7 
October 1953, 1; “Indians Won’t Bar Mass POW Flight,” New York Times, 7 October 1953, 1; “India Shuns Using 
Force On Captives,” Baltimore Sun, 7 October 1953, 1,7; and “Indians May Quit Korea,” The Irish Times, 7 October 
1953, 1. 
634 “Agency Reports Misleading: N.N.R.C. Chief’s View,” Times of India, 9 October 1953, 1; Robert Trumbull, 
“India Reassures on Captives,” New York Times, 8 October 1953, 3; and Thimayya, Experiment in Neutrality, 164. 
  192 
they risked undermining the Indian mission in the DMZ.635 The Times of India expressed 
indignation over the United States’ failure to protest, concluding with a masculine nod toward 
Indian power: “India is in no mood to be pushed around—by anybody.”636 The Statesman 
believed Rhee’s threats were merely “bluff and bluster,” but admitted, “there is no knowing how 
far lunatics, political or other, may in some circumstances go.” Asking for the United States to 
warn Rhee off seemed reasonable.637 The Hindu asserted that “what was already a delicate and 
thankless task” had turned into a dangerous one. By reaching out to Washington, Delhi was 
hoping to prevent “a complete breakdown” of the NNRC, which would undermine the already 
fragile truce.638 At a press conference in Delhi, Nehru praised the CFI for its control of a difficult 
situation despite the shootings earlier in the month. South Korea’s attitude from the beginning 
had created difficulties for the NNRC mission, he said, and continued threats from the Rhee 
government should end.639 
The biggest test to the CFI’s policy on the use of military force occurred just a short time 
later. With only 90 days for prisoner explanations allowed by the Terms of Reference, the 
process was already behind when the first group of 500 Chinese POWs refused to come out of 
their compound for explanations on 15 October 15. Troops surrounded the compound and 
messages were exchanged with the prisoners. Finally, as troops armed with bayonets moved in, 
the prisoners agreed to comply. The first 250 men were escorted out, split into groups of 25, and 
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then taken to the explanation huts. The Times of India referred to the emergence of the Chinese 
prisoners “without using even a harsh word” as “a magnificent victory” for the CFI without 
mention of the threat of violence explicit in the wielding of bayonets.640 Once inside the 
explanation booths, the POWs refused to listen to the explanations. They spat, threw their shoes, 
and created disturbances such that the explainers could not be heard. Prisoners who tried to 
attack the communist explainers had to be forcibly restrained. Others would pretend to be calm, 
but hit the explainer if he came too close.641 At the end of the first day, 490 prisoners had been 
processed. Ten asked to be repatriated and were handed over to the Northern Command in an 
elaborate ceremony.642  
The second day was even more tense. Two compounds of Korean prisoners were to be 
processed, but they were much more resistant than their Chinese comrades had been the day 
before. Two hundred soldiers surrounded the enclosure, prepared to go in through the main gate 
and force the prisoners out. When they advanced, all but the leader of the prisoners disappeared 
into their tents. Bunkers were dug, messages were flagged between compounds, and POWs in 
the other compounds moved to scale the barbed wire fences, “with their suicide squads—wearing 
gloves and stripped down to knickers only—in front.”643 Mass escape was threatened if the 
Indians used force. Thimayya later described the situation as “terrifying.” “The prisoners seemed 
quite insane,” he remembered; they demonstrated wildly, “shouting and screaming like 
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maniacs.”644 Eventually 600 Indian troops armed with sticks and rifles surrounded the 
compound, and special guards with tear-gas were called in.645 Efforts to have Chinese POWs 
who had been through the process the day before assure the Korean prisoners failed. After 
negotiations had gone on for five hours, Thimayya insisted the POWs come out without any 
further negotiation, and the NNRC gave Thorat permission to use deadly force if the Indians 
were attacked or in the case of a mass breakout attempt.646   
The stalemate placed Thorat in a nearly impossible dilemma. What would the cost in 
human lives be if the troops opened fire on the enclosures? Robert Allen, a reporter for the New 
York Times, described how Thorat took his time contemplating the issue with the same refined 
masculine calm he had demonstrated during the September hostage situation: 
[Thorat] stood on a mound overlooking the P. O. W. compounds, studiously 
practicing golf swings with his chrome and leather-trimmed shooting stick. 
Prisoners were screaming, singing and chanting. They blew bugles and banged on 
their metal mess gear. Five hundred of General Thorat’s troops—lean, hard 
professional fighting men carrying rifles—were drawn up just outside one of the 
prison compounds. 
Once or twice he was heard to mutter, ‘Does anyone realize what a terrible 
strain I am under?’647 
 
In the end, convinced that the use of force would result in hundreds of casualties, he “decided to 
eat my pride and told Thimayya to call off the operation for the day.”648 He requested “a clearly-
worded directive authorizing the use of force” in this situation.649 The NNRC in response held an 
emergency meeting to discuss the matter. The Czechs and the Poles “were livid with rage,” 
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arguing that the Indians were “weak for not using force”650 and that Thorat “should act in terms 
of the Commission’s unanimous directives given to him earlier.” The Swiss and Swedish 
delegates, however, thought the new situation warranted a reassessment, “as they were not 
prepared to agree to any decision which involved heavy casualties.”651 Thimayya, determined to 
avoid “mass slaughter,” insisted that a unanimous decision by the Commission was warranted. 
Without that unanimity the NNRC deadlocked, and the CFI withdrew from the standoff 
prompting celebrations by the prisoners, but demoralizing the troops who viewed retreat as a 
failure.652 In a press conference days later, Thimayya admitted, “’We had to swallow our pride to 
withdraw our troops on Friday…But I think it was better to swallow our pride than kill two or 
three hundred.’”653 
The dilemma of whether to use force to compel the prisoners of war to attend 
explanations undermined the CFI’s authority and was never resolved satisfactorily. 
Disagreement over the issue and the prisoners’ continued resistance to the explanations process 
left the NNRC “torn and paralysed” for weeks with Indian mediation unable to bridge the gap.654 
While the Indian position did not deny that the Terms of Reference allowed for the use of force, 
Thimayya continued to insist that with the likelihood of high casualties the Commission had to 
be unanimous on the issue. Another 500 Chinese went through explanations on the 17th of 
October, in what The Statesman referred to as a “moral victory by the Indian troops, but further 
efforts proved fruitless.655 The explanations remained suspended.656 The only method left was 
                                                
650 Robert Allen, “’Operation Convincer’ Backfires on Communists,” New York Times, 25 October 1953, E3. 
651 “Part III. Commencement of explanations, Chapter I,” in Interim Report, 10. 
652 Thimayya, Experiment in Neutrality, 173-174; S. N. Prasad, History of the Custodian Force (India),” 53-54. 
653 “Impartial Status of Indians in Korea,” Times of India, 20 October 1953, 1. 
654 G.K. Reddy, “Gen. Thimayya Refutes Communist Charge,” Times of India, 20 November 1953, 1. 
655 “More Rowdyism at Explanations,” The Statesman, 18 October 1953, 1. 
656 “Explanations Remain Suspended,” The Statesman, 21 October 1953, 1. 
  196 
that of persuasion, which Thimayya utilized to little avail in the coming weeks.657 No other 
compound was convinced to cooperate until the last day of October, and the North Korean 
prisoners who attended the explanations acted out violently, throwing chairs at the explainers. 
The CFI had to use twice as many troops than previously to control the situation.658 Explanations 
took place for two only days in November and then not again until December.  
True to the dominant discourse idealizing the CFI, in the midst of the deadlock over the 
use of force, G.K. Reddy declared the Indian soldier “the silent hero of this international drama 
that is being staged on the blood-drenched battlefields of Korea.”659 The decision not to use 
deadly force was supported by many contemporary observers despite the now highly likely 
failure of the NNRC’s mission. The Times (London) supported the position, as did the Daily 
Telegraph, and The Guardian.660 The unapologetically anti-communist New York Times editorial 
board expressed its hope that the deadlock at the NNRC would continue to protect the lives of 
POWs in the camps.661 “Impartial observers” in the DMZ reportedly hailed the Indians’ 
“reasoning and restraint” in such a difficult situation.662 The Indian government’s assessment of 
this decision two decades later concluded that while “the use of force involving heavy casualties 
would not only have defeated the object of sending the CFI to Korea, but would also have done 
harm to India’s reputation.” However, they concurred with Thorat’s opinion that by giving the 
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prisoners “the choice of attending or not attending explanations…the entire project of 
explanations was wrecked.”663  
In the end, only ten days of explanations took place within the 90-day time period allotted 
for explanations. Fewer than fifteen percent of Korea and Chinese POWs were processed 
through the system; only about four percent of those chose repatriation.664 The remaining 
prisoners remained in limbo. With the NNRC and the CFI’s work designated to end on 22 
January, a heated debate emerged over the fate of those prisoners who had not gone through 
explanations. Switzerland and Sweden argued that the timeline laid out in the Terms of 
Reference was solid and therefore the CFI had to release the prisoners from custody four weeks 
after the period of explanations ended. Czechoslovakia and Poland believed that since the 
explanations had not been completed, the Commission’s work should continue. Thimayya 
favored an extension of the explanation period and the creation of a new agreement given the 
changed circumstances. But without the two sides’ willingness to negotiate, the only solution 
seemed to be to follow the letter of the Terms.665  
The dispute created “an explosive situation.”666 The South Korean government was said 
to be planning a mass break out of troops from the camps if they were not released on schedule, 
and rumors swirled of “armed bands” preparing to infiltrate the camps.667 The UN Command 
insisted that all prisoners in the southern camps had to be released at midnight on 22 January.668 
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With hope of a negotiated solution lost, India made the unilateral decision that the CFI would 
comply with this deadline. Though Thimayya announced it would be illegal for those commands 
to release the prisoners as civilians at that time, it was apparent the UN Command would release 
them anyway.669 The Communists opposed the decision, saying it played into the hands of the 
UN Command and went against the Armistice agreement, but possessed little power to affect the 
outcome.670 So over a period of nineteen hours on 20-21 January, on a “cold, windy, and rainy 
day,” the CFI transferred close to 22,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners back into UN 
Command custody.671 “Thus ended the drama of our Korean assignment,” Thorat wrote in his 
memoirs, “in which nations had played with the future of men as if they were dumb cattle and 
sheep.”672 
 
The End of the Mission 
Despite the mission’s ultimate failure to fully assess the desires of the prisoners of war, 
praise for the custodial force at the end of their mission came from a variety of sources, and, in 
Thorat’s estimation, “went far beyond the customary diplomatic courtesies.”673 The Commander 
of the Commonwealth Division in Korea presented Thorat with a silver plaque engraved with the 
words: “190th Indian Infantry by 1st Commonwealth as a token of their admiration for steering so 
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fine a course between the rock of Scylla and the whirlpool of Charbydis, Korea 1953-54.”674 
British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Selwyn Lloyd praised the CFI for “discharg[ing] its 
duties with calmness, consideration and dignity…the Indian soldiers had brought credit on 
themselves and their country.”675 Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden paid tribute to the Indian 
force, garnering cheers when he stated, “They have justly won world-wide respect.”676 And 
President Eisenhower sent his praise through Nehru, saying the force did well in a “’delicate and 
demanding peace-time mission,’” upholding the “’high reputation of the Indian Army.’”677 The 
Times (London) concluded that the world owed Thimayya and the CFI for the work they did with 
“courage and outstanding good sense.”678 Even the skeptical New York Times editorial board 
offered muted praise, conceding the Indian soldiers were “apparently…well-disciplined and 
impartial,” performing their duties well.679  
The rhetoric used by Indians as they welcomed their troops home was especially 
idealistic and drew again on the ideals of Nehruvian nonalignment and Gandhian nationalism 
that had been invoked in August when they first left for Korea. With no reference to the 
militarized violence inherent in the mission, the Times of India was effusive in its praise for a job 
well done. “By divorcing so completely the Indian Army from the concept of aggression and 
relating it so successfully to the concept of peace,” they argued, “the Custodian Force has 
established a tradition which is but a faithful counterpart of the policy of dynamic 
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‘neutrality.’”680 The Statesman congratulated the CFI for completing its “duty magnificently.”681 
At a reception for the returning troops in Singapore, India’s representative there, Gopala Menon, 
told the soldiers, “’You have acted as a spearhead of the Gandhian ideals of love, peace, non-
violence and truth and you have a won a major battle which may well mean the turning point in 
the world struggle for peace and tranquility...We could not have had better soldiers, or better 
torch bearers, or better ambassadors of India’s eternal and immortal mission of peace and 
goodwill.’”682  
Once back in Madras, the Governor again addressed the troops, telling “them that besides 
earning universal approbation, they had set up a ‘unique example’, which was bound to go down 
in world military history.” The Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army announced, “’You have 
enhanced the prestige and reputation of our armed forces and you have added further glory to our 
nation’s arms.’” And the Chief Minister of Madras proclaimed it was “’the tradition and 
character developed in India through thousands of years that’” allowed the CFI to achieve such 
glory.683 He continued, “the honour they had brought to India was even bigger than the honour 
that would have been attained in successful battle.” The Statesman reported on the troops in 
Madras: “These men are back from the Indian Army’s first mission of peace abroad—a delicate 
assignment in execution of which they have won the admiration of the world and a place of pride 
in military history.” From Nehru’s message: “’They performed their tasks with courage and quiet 
efficiency and upheld the honour of India.’”684 Thorat remembers the train he took from Madras 
to Delhi making “many unscheduled halts to enable the crowds [who heard about their progress 
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through newspaper reports] to express their admiration and affection for the men.”685 In Delhi, 
CFI and NNRC members were welcomed at the train station by Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi, 
senior Army officers, and the Deputy Defence Minister.686 
G.K. Reddy, having reported from the DMZ since September, wrote a series of articles 
about the situation at the end of December that criticized the mission while venerating the Indian 
soldiers involved. The POW problem, he argued, was “part and parcel of a gigantic 
psychological war being waged” between the Communists and the West over not only the 
control of territories, but also the “loyalties and allegiances” of the people. The Indians arrived in 
Korea prepared to steer a neutral course and help solve this “human problem,” but they could not 
have predicted the level of divisions between the two sides. It was only through “moral strength” 
that the Indians could keep going under these circumstances. “In every respect, the ‘Honour of 
India’…has been the guiding principle of their thoughts and actions here, which have brought 
credit to the country and enhanced its prestige.” In the midst of “this baffling conflict of 
ideologies, the one person in Korea who has remained completely unaffected is the Indian 
Jawan.”687 Though Reddy believed the decision not to use force was the right one to make, India 
had made that too clear to the prisoners too early, making it even harder to control the situation. 
“It was certainly not our job to kill the prisoners,” he reasoned, “but it was certainly our job to 
have enforced strict discipline right from the beginning.”688 In the final analysis, he felt the CFI’s 
failure to carry out their duties lay not in their actions, but in those of the UN Command, which 
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“had a bigger purpose in view than merely winning over these disgruntled and ignorant 
[Chinese] peasant soldiers who were sick of war and yearning for peace and a quick return to 
civilian life. It was intended as a psychological threat to Red China that in the present day wars 
of not only guns but also ideas, it may not be able to count upon the complete loyalty and 
allegiance of its own troops.”689 Within this anti-communist logic, “there is no place…for 
[India’s] conception of neutrality or an independent middle-of-the-road approach.”690 
Thimayya and Thorat, in their later assessments of the Korean mission, agreed with 
Reddy’s opinion regarding the ideological conflict undermining the Indian objective of neutral 
mediation. Thimayya initially approached the mission with the attitude that “a neutral area and a 
rational atmosphere” could help the two sides escape “from the violent emotions that dominated” 
the situation. But he came to believe “[n]either side gave sufficient attention to the human aspect 
of the POWs problem.” The Americans called them “gooks” and treated them like they were 
despised. On the other hand, the Northern Command, he believed, would have been happy to see 
the true non-repatriates shot. The neutral party under these circumstances was “doomed to 
failure” because the situation was about ideology and not the prisoners themselves.691 For 
Thimayya, Korea was a failed experiment in neutrality. Thorat wrote that in his opinion “the two 
opposing commands were really indifferent to the completion of explanations. Often it appeared 
to me that they had forgotten the humane aspect of the problem and had set their heart merely on 
gaining a propaganda victory—or at least avoiding a propaganda defeat.” The explanations failed 
because “both commands were interested in the P.O.Ws not as human beings, but as pawns in 
the game of Cold War…the prisoners faded into the background. The only thing that mattered 
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was the political prestige of countries involved…[both] would rather save face by sabotaging 
explanations.”692 
 
Conclusion 
Until the time India accepted the responsibility for prisoners of war in 1953, the Indian 
government’s involvement in the Korean conflict remained largely within the diplomatic sphere. 
The Indian government condemned North Korea’s invasion of the South in 1948, but 
subsequently worked to soften the hawkish United States-dominated efforts to force a militarized 
solution to the conflict. The attempt to forge a middle ground through nonalignment opened the 
Indian government to harsh criticism from the United States in particular, where strong anti-
communist attitudes rejected the possibility of neutrality. The nonaligned position was 
characterized as indecisive and weak, even cowardly and effeminate. Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit 
remained a visible United Nations presence, serving as India’s ambassador to the United States 
(1949-52) and ultimately assuming the Presidency of the General Assembly. But her skill “at 
remaining always a good diplomat besides being very feminine,” in the words of one U.S. 
journalist, was not pressed into service to settle the Korea issue.693 Instead, male diplomats such 
as K.P.S. Menon, V.K. Krishna Menon, and Nehru played the more prominent roles in 
representing the nonaligned position on the global stage vis-à-vis Korea. In the fall of 1953, two 
different performances of India’s postcolonial national character were being played out: through 
Pandit at the UN General Assembly and through young, male soldiers in the de-militarized zone. 
Pandit, no longer on the periphery at the UN, remained a feminine symbol of Indian diplomacy, 
unable to gain traction within the complexly gendered Cold War politics. Through the NNRC 
                                                
692 Thorat, From Reveille to Retreat, 149, 156. 
693 Harris, “U.N. Elects Mme. Pandit,” 1. 
  204 
and the CFI, Indian soldiers, figured as the inheritors of Gandhian non-violence, were led by 
Thimayya and Thorat, prominent military figures who became highly visible masculine actors on 
the ground. Pandit remained an important cultural ambassador, but where nonalignment was 
emphasized, Indian men represented independent India’s will and capacity on the global stage.  
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5 
THE LEGACIES OF UN POSTCOLONIALISM 
 
 
 
The cases involving India at the United Nations highlighted in this research project point 
to the many contradictions inherent in an ideologically utopian organization faced with the 
challenges of governance in a decidedly non-utopian world. 2015 marked the seventieth 
anniversary of the UN, which prompted countless retrospectives and discerning assessments of 
the organization’s past effectiveness, present relevancy, and future prospects. The most cynical 
critics claim the UN project buckled under its own weight almost immediately after its creation 
when the Security Council fell victim to the power of the veto, leaving the organization without 
crucial enforcement tactics. More optimistic voices point to the successes achieved in global 
health and the coordination of aid for refugees and famine victims coordinated through UN 
agencies. But pragmatists on all sides acknowledge the fact that the organization continues to 
exist at all is in itself an achievement given the short life of its predecessor and the enormous 
challenges the UN has faced. What was created at a moment of great practical and ideological 
need in the waning months of the world’s second global war in a generation has been sustained 
into the twenty-first century by a continued commitment to the basic principle of international 
cooperation, despite its many imperfections.  
It is in the fractious and contradictory space between the aspirational and the operational 
that we see the emergence of UN postcolonialism – a gendered culture of diplomatic debate and 
exchange that evolved in reaction to issues confronting the new international organization. In the 
period between the end of World War II and the end of the Korean War, the culture of the United 
Nations was altered by the presence of the postcolonial Indian state, a precursor to the even 
bigger changes brought to the organization at the height of decolonization when 16 African 
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countries plus Cyprus joined in 1960. India’s diplomacy in turn was altered as the state 
responded to changes wrought on the ground by independence and by Cold War politics. As a 
symbol of postcolonial possibilities for millions of colonized and oppressed around the world, 
India’s leadership on issues such as South African racist policies and the Indonesian 
independence movement at the General Assembly combined with changes in international ethics 
as a result of the atrocities of World War II to make a space for new debates on different terms. 
Though the veto at the Security Council protected the dominance of the Great Powers, the 
democratic nature of the General Assembly and the presence of postcolonial member states there 
opened up the possibility of new solidarities leading to unexpected outcomes. The framers of the 
UN Charter based the organization’s structure on an assurance that past diplomatic practice 
would inform future debate. However, when the case against South Africa emerged at the first 
General Assembly through the leadership of Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, this postcolonial issue 
touched a nerve for many delegates who were swayed by the moral and ethical argument. The 
vote to condemn South Africa overrode a legalistic dependence upon the judiciary to make the 
Assembly a powerful political force from its inception. This heated debate forced the UN to 
immediately confront, in highly gendered and emotional terms, the legacies of colonialism and 
racial ideology that had been previously side-stepped by colonial powers.  
After 1953, the particular form of gendered diplomacy that Pandit brought to the United 
Nations on behalf of India was absent when V. K. Krishna Menon took over as India’s leading 
UN representative.694 Between 1954 and 1960, Krishna Menon brought a distinctly different 
personality to the UN than Pandit had so far cultivated. Where Pandit was often described as 
charming, Krishna Menon was considered abrasive to the point of rudeness. While she might be 
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most remembered for the tears she shed during debates over South African race policy, he is 
infamous for delivering one of the longest UN speeches in history: a nearly eight-hour defense of 
India’s position in Kashmir before the Security Council in 1957. And though Pandit’s work on 
behalf of India has begun to gain recognition in this work and others, Krishna Menon remains 
the more visible diplomat in the historiography of India’s so-called “golden age” of diplomacy at 
the UN.  
My work makes Pandit visible not just as a diplomat but as an elite Indian woman, which 
reveals the variety of power at play at the birth of the United Nations in a way traditional 
approaches to this history (preoccupied by men such as Krishna Menon) have not. That a woman 
represented India cannot be dismissed – who she was, how she represented herself, and how 
observers and delegates consumed her performance altered the culture of debate and exchange in 
international diplomacy at the UN. Anger and suspicion directed at her for her supposed 
emotionality during the South African debates and throughout her UN career as well as analysis 
of how her body was read as she moved through the space of the UN bring into relief the highly 
gendered nature of diplomatic space. I believe that India’s ability to garner allies inside and 
outside the organization in 1945 and 1946 was enhanced by Pandit’s savvy self-representation of 
a Nehruvian Indian womanhood that embodied a unique combination of British-inflected 
erudition and respectable Gandhian-influenced female activism. It also didn’t hurt that so many 
male observers found her physically beautiful and, judging from the suggestive language used by 
some, sexually desirable as well. Pandit’s comparative youth, personal history of activism and 
extended prison sentences, respectability as a widow, British-tinged spoken English, and 
powerful oratory all added to her charisma. The other Indian delegates who might have led these 
early delegations in her stead – all men – could not have replicated Pandit’s complex appeal in 
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that particular moment. And when the aspirational Indian leadership had little other power to 
wield in the international arena in 1945 and 1946, the work Pandit did on behalf of the Indian 
nation was invaluable to the nationalist project. However, as international politics and India’s 
practical concerns after independence changed, the needs of representation for India’s interests 
changed as well. 
Early examples of the impact of UN postcolonialism made through India’s representation 
should not be taken simply as more fodder for the Indian exceptionalist narrative that seeks to 
cast Pandit, Nehru, and Gandhi as idealistic peacemakers at work on the world stage. For one, 
India was not alone in helping produce the character of UN postcolonialism that made 
colonialism, racism, and other forms of oppression issues for legitimate debate. The context and 
legacy of colonialism was dealt with in other parts of the UN structure and by other delegations 
and special interest groups. There were furious fights over the question of self-determination in 
the Trusteeship Council and many pushed for mechanisms of enforcement to be included in the 
creation of the Declaration of Human Rights (first adopted in 1948), to name just two examples 
amongst many. Also, there has never been a time when the “India” that was represented at the 
UN was so pure as to be above reproach no matter that Pandit et al were in presenting the Indian 
National Congress as the only legitimate Indian nationalist representation on the UN stage. The 
Congress nationalism that dominated the UN spotlight from 1945 forward functioned within a 
rhetorical position that was only sometimes successful in silencing opposition and hiding the 
realpolitik of post-independence governance. Congress might have been the largest and most 
powerful of the many anticolonial and nationalist organizations on the ground, but it did face real 
opposition from constituencies too often dismissed by Congress’s brand of nationalism.  
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Recognizing the impact of Partition on India’s foreign policy agenda widens the cracks in 
the celebratory Indian nationalist narrative that tends to dominate the history of India at the UN. 
The achievement of Indian independence came at an extremely high cost as a result of the 
fragmented map left behind by the British, a situation that ultimately brought a series of 
postcolonial issues to the UN that still have no resolution. Nehru and the Congress leadership 
had worked diligently to avoid power sharing with the Muslim League. When negotiations 
between the two broke down, India and Pakistan’s borders were created by the so-called 
Radcliffe Line, a series of boundaries drawn quickly and with indifference by a British 
bureaucrat who had little knowledge of the subcontinent. Millions migrated in the immediate 
aftermath; hundreds of thousands were killed; uncounted numbers endured mass rape; and the 
pain and suffering continues in regions still disputed by the two states. At home, the Indian 
leadership was embroiled with Pakistan and the uncooperative princely states of Junagadh, 
Kashmir, and Hyderabad in a series of militarized conflicts imbued with masculinized rhetoric 
over the literal and figurative shape of the postcolonial state. That translated into several forms of 
UN involvement, including the creation of the UN Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan that continues to oversee a tenuous ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir.  
Though left out of most literature due to effective silencing by the Indian state, the 
Hyderabad case reveals the broad contradictions inherent in the Indian postcolonial experience at 
the UN once operational concerns overtook aspirational desires. Simultaneously, how Partition 
functioned at the UN itself altered the postcolonial relationship to the international organization. 
India’s approach to Hyderabad’s case at the Security Council was directly linked to the lessons 
learned by the conflict over Kashmir at home and abroad. And the failure of UN intervention 
after India’s invasion of Hyderabad reveals competing interests at stake in the international 
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organization. While several smaller states pushed the Council to recognize the danger of 
allowing a larger state to use the military to force a smaller state’s accession, some 
Commonwealth States and the United States were willing to defend the Indian position in the 
interest of future stability. Partition and the Hyderabad case reveal that India’s postcolonial 
reality was not a rejection of the circumstances of rule established by the British imperial state, 
nor did the delegations representing independent India seek to upend the system that protected 
the basic tenets of nation-state sovereignty. The Indian state responded flexibly on the 
international stage according to its changing needs.  
 By 1953, India had assumed a complicated insider-outsider status at the United Nations 
that had been produced by the particularities of the postcolonial state’s nation-and state-building 
projects as they intersected with various UN organs. Pandit’s election as president of the General 
Assembly that fall was an acknowledgement of her successful diplomatic career and a nod to the 
more prominent position India had taken within the Afro-Asian/nonaligned bloc. The Cold War 
Korean conflict had shifted some authority from the stalemated Security Council to the more 
democratic General Assembly, allowing new voting configurations to impact the outcomes of 
debates. India’s role negotiating a nonaligned position in these debates, considered an effeminate 
and passive position by the U.S. government, nevertheless provided Delhi with an opportunity to 
influence international politics. At the same time, Pandit’s election also signaled the United 
States’s success at keeping Indian involvement in Korea at arm’s length outside the UN. Many 
observers saw her election as a sort of consolation prize for India’s exclusion from the Korean 
political conferences. So, while Pandit seemed to be assuming a role garnering her and India 
greater insider power, the bureaucratic position did not offer many opportunities to influence 
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debates. Her call to have a special session of the Assembly in the spring of 1954 to deal with the 
Korean issue was dismissed.  
As my research shows, Pandit’s power also was constricted by continued preoccupation 
with her as a cultural object. Within the competitive masculinity of Cold War gender politics, 
Pandit’s power in 1953 was limited by her feminine representation of Indian diplomacy that had 
served the nation so well in 1945 and 1946. In response to changing international politics, India 
strove to demonstrate a more masculinized diplomatic persona through the bodies of male 
soldiers as peacekeepers in Korea at the same time Pandit presided over the GA in New York. 
During this first peacekeeping mission in Korea, the Custodian Force (India) (CFI), oversaw the 
tens of thousand of prisoners of war who had languished in prison camps for years after active 
fighting ended while the U.S.-dominated UN Command and the communist command in North 
Korea battled over competing ideologies. Even according to the two Indian Generals who 
oversaw the mission, the CFI failed to fulfill its main purposes in the face of such rigid 
ideological opposition. Perhaps this is why the CFI garners so little space in the UN 
historiography. By contrast, the mission, which was the first time India had sent troops abroad 
since independence, remains prominent in histories produced by the Indian government. This 
operation helped legitimize India’s status as a fully-fledged state with sophisticated military 
capabilities. At the same time, the discourse surrounding the mission served the nationalist 
project. The Indian soldiers’ actions became tied to the tradition of Gandhian non-violence with 
little reference to the militarized nature of the mission and the deaths and casualties that resulted 
from clashes with prisoners. The use of peacekeeping troops provided the Indian state with an 
opportunity to enact Nehruvian nonalignment through the bodies of male soldiers, a distinctively 
hybrid reaction to changing international politics.  
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 In September 2015, seventy years after Pandit headed India’s delegation to the first 
United Nations General Assembly, another Indian woman, Sushma Swaraj, delivered opening 
remarks to the same body. Swaraj, currently India’s Minister of External Affairs, appeared at the 
UN as a representative of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s right-wing Hindu nationalist 
administration.695 Many of the main points Swaraj made in her appraisal of the UN touched on 
issues that arose in the cases from the late 1940s and early 1950s addressed in this research 
project. The UN, in her assessment, has achieved its original promise by aiding the process of 
decolonization and eventually dismantling apartheid, two prominent aspects of India’s foreign 
policy at the birth of the UN. She also discussed at some length the importance of UN 
peacekeeping and highlighted India’s status as the largest contributor of peacekeepers to date. 
But Swaraj criticized the UN’s failure to fulfill its purpose in other instances, including how the 
veto and the exclusion of Asian and African countries as permanent members of the Security 
Council undermine the potential of that body. “How can we have a Security Council in 2015 
which still reflects the geo-political architecture of 1945?” she wonders. Terrorism was also of 
great concern in Swaraj’s speech. In a testament to the long shadow of Partition over the 
subcontinent, she specifically identified Pakistan as a country that utilized “terrorism [as] a 
legitimate instrument of statecraft” in an attempt to destabilize India and make a claim on Jammu 
and Kashmir.  
Of particular interest in the context of the UN stage as a space through which nationalist 
narratives can be built were two references made to Mohandas Gandhi. Though Modi and his 
                                                
695 Swaraj is only the second woman to hold the office of Minister of External Affairs. The first was Indira Gandhi, 
Jawaharlal Nehru’s daughter (no relation to Mohandas Gandhi), who was groomed from a young age to carry on the 
Nehruvian legacy. Gandhi was also India’s only female Prime Minister to date, serving from 1966-1977 and 1980 
until her assassination in 1984. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, was Prime Minister from 1984-1989. Rajiv was also 
assassinated in 1991. His widow, the Italian-born Indian politician Sonia Gandhi, has been president of the Indian 
National Congress since 1998 and continues to serve in the Indian Parliament. 
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Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) continue to condemn the Indian National Congress and seek to 
minimize Jawaharlal Nehru’s legacy as the father of the Indian state, the new Indian 
administration has embraced Gandhi within the ideology of Hindutva as a progenitor of the 
Hindu nation. Swaraj reiterated this deliberate connection when she referred to the UN’s 
founding and Gandhi in the same breath: “When the United Nations was established, a rather 
diminutive looking man was writing out the final act in a struggle that would become a symbol 
of hope for the colonized and the oppressed everywhere.”696 Later in her speech she wondered if 
Gandhi would approve of how the planet’s resources were being used. The return to Gandhi 
before an international audience is a contemporary example of Indian self-representation that 
remains dependent upon a celebratory national narrative and reacts to changing political 
pressures. The symbol of Gandhi in this context serves the BJP’s nationalist agenda by eliding 
the violence and oppression undergirding the Hindutva project at home. Pakistan is a state 
sponsor of terrorism, India is the nation created by Gandhi. The simplistic consumption of 
Gandhi’s legacy outside the subcontinent continues to be relied upon in an attempt to situate 
India in a morally elevated place within the family of nations despite a much less palatable 
reality on the ground.  
These references to Gandhi in Swaraj’s speech echo one of the themes Pandit and her 
colleagues drew upon to help frame India’s position at the birth of the United Nations during a 
very different historical moment. As this dissertation has shown, even for those who could 
legitimately claim to have served beside Gandhi in the years prior to independence, the ability to 
rely upon a non-violent legacy to uphold India’s global moral leadership was diminished quite 
                                                
696 “Statement by the Hon’ble External Affairs Minister, Mrs. Sushma Swaraj at the General Debate of the 70th 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 01, 2015,” Permanent Mission of India to the 
United Nations. PDF accessed from: http://gadebate.un.org/70/india. 
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quickly once Congress’s anticolonial nationalism evolved into operational governance. The 
“India” represented in San Francisco by Pandit – an aspirational independence movement 
fighting against colonialism and racial oppression from outside the power structure – was very 
different from the “India” Arcot Ramaswamy Mudaliar spoke on behalf of during the Hyderabad 
discussions at the Security Council just three years later, which was also operating in a different 
political framework from the Indian state represented by Indian peacekeepers in 1953. These 
case studies offer a lens into how the gendered performance of the Indian nation-state on the UN 
stage transformed in response to quickly changing local and international politics. And in turn 
they trace the ways the culture of the United Nations evolved when faced with the contestations 
and contradictions presented by the postcolonial state. 
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